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Efforts among less developed countries

ÉTUDES ET RECHERCHES

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I

Executive heads according to the conventional wisdom are crucial actors in international organizations. They can have an important influence on the success or failure of the programs of their organizations and more broadly but still in a limited way on the course of events. The influence of executive heads in the UN and in other universal-membership international governmental organizations(IGOs) has been carefully documented in several scholarly studies, (1); in his important article analyzing the experience of Directors-General of the International Labor Organization (ILO), Robert W. Cox has identified three critical variables with which executive heads must deal successfully to insure the success of the programs that they might aspire to have their organizations execute. (2) The variables that he singled out are : (1) the IGO's international bureaucracy; (2) the member states of the IGO, and especially the most powerful among them; and (3) the international system. Cox shows how executive heads to be effective must control their bureaucracies and forge effective relationships with member states, including at times forming alliances with domestic interest groups. But in his view, the basic personal qualification for effective leadership is clear perception of what actions and initiatives the state of the international system at any time permits. (3)

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(1) See for example : Leon Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace, (New York : Columbia University Press, 1967) and Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State : Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1964).

(2) Robert W. Cox, "The Executive Head : An essay on Leadership in International Organization, Vol. XXIII, No 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 205-230.

(3) Ibid., p. 226

Leadership by executive heads has also been studied in regional international institutions. Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold have demonstrated the vital role of the High Authority and then of the Commission of the European Communities. (4) Indeed, the Commission has been called the "engine" of European integration. Particulary in the early years of the European Communities by constantly advancing new initiatives, by utilizing alliances with member states and with interest groups, and by formulating package deals, the Commission has been an essential catalyst to move the six and then the nine toward integration. In the last five years, however, the Commission has lost partly at least, its capacity to take initiatives and to maintain the dynamics of the integration process.

Students of international organization have tended to assume that generalizations about the role of executive heads and maxims about the qualities that they ought to have and the strategies that they ought to employ to be effective that have been derived from the experience of universal-membership IGOs and the European Communities would be universally applicable. This paper examines that assumption by analyzing the role of executive heads in six limited-membership IGOs that have as their purpose promoting economic integration among their member states, all of which are less developed countries (LDCs).

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(4) See : Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe : Political, Social, and Economic Forces (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1958), and Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Policy : Patterns of Change in The European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1970).

It seeks to develop framework that encompasses all of the variables relevant to the integration process including : economic and political factors within and among the member states; relations between the member states and third countries, especially the United States and the European Communities; institutional and legal aspects of the integration schemes; the personal characteristics of the executive head; and the strategies that the executive head employs.

In the late nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties regional economic integration became a widely-accepted prescription for promoting the economic development of LDCs. Economic integration seemed to be a logical way to make possible for LDCs, particularly those with relatively small territories and populations, to promote collectively their industrial development by enabling them , to take advantage of economics of scale and to increase their bargaining power in international economic affairs. Several integration schemes were created in Central and South America, Africa and Asia. Despite the seemingly compelling logic that brought them into existence, virtually all of these schemes have fallen short of the high expectations that accompanied their creation, many have suffered crises, and some are in disarray. When they have been confronted with crises, officials of the integration schemes and outside consultants have tended to draw from the experience of the European Communities and to suggest institutional reforms patterned after the European Communities, particularly giving the executive head the attributes of the Commission. (5)

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(5) See : Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion Centroamericana, El desarrollo integrado de Centroamérica en la presente decada, (Buenos Aires : Inter-American Development Bank, 1973-1974), 13 vols

The utility of these proposals depends on whether or not the generalizations and maxims gleamed from the experience of IGOs with other types of members can be applied to IGOs comprised exclusively of less developed countries.

The six regional economic integration efforts that we analyze are : the Central American Common Market (CACM); the Andean Group; the Caribbean Community (Caricom); the Central African Customs and Economic Union (Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale - UDEAC); the East African Community (EAC); and the West African Economic Community (Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest -- CEAO). Charateristics concerning the member states of the six schemes are given in Appendix A.

The General Treaty on Central American Integration was signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua on 13 December 1960 and Costa Rica acceded to the Treaty on 23 July 1962. Efforts to unite the Central American States, however, date to the nineteenth century, and from the time that they gained independence until 1838 the Central American states constituted a single political unit, the Federal Republic of Central America. CACM made considerable progress until the so-called "soccer war" erupted in 1969 between Honduras and El Salvador. Since 1969, Honduras has ceased participating in CACM, and the integration effort has floundered. Efforts to bring Honduras back into CACM and to reinvigorate integration processes have thus far been without avail. The population of the CACM countries including Honduras is almost 15,950,000; without Honduras, it is 13,263,000. (6)

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(6) These population figures and those integration schemes are taken from : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atals, 1974, (Washington, D.C. : IBRD, 1974). The population figures are estimates for mid-1972.

The "Cartagena Agreement" creating the Andean Group was signed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru on 26 May 1969, and Venezuela adhered to the agreement on 13 February 1973. The Andean Group is one of the most far-reaching integration schemes among LDCs, and it made notable progress until a crisis erupted about the Group's policy concerning foreign investment that lead to Chile's withdrawal in 1976. Without Chile the population of member countries of the Andean Group is 59,977,000.

The Caribbean Community was established by the signature of the Treaty of Chaguaramas on 4 July 1973 by Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, and five territories which were either countries associated with or colonies of the United Kingdom : Belize, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Vincent and St. Lucia. Two additional territories with similar status, Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, acceded to the treaty the following year . In 1958 even before any of the states had gained independence the West Indies Federation was formed, but this foundered in 1962. Five years later, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was created, to which Caricom is the successor. The population of the members of Caricom is 4,586,000.

The "Treaty of Brazzaville" establishing the Central African Customs and Economic Union was signed by Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Gabon on 18 December 1964. During the period of French colonial rule there had been some unity among these countries since 1910. As a result of difficulties concerning the distribution of benefits between land-locked and costal states, Chad withdraw from UDEAC in 1968. The UDEAC Treaty was revised and strengthened in 1974. The population of the four current UDEAC member states is 9,402,000.

During the period of British colonial rule there was a high degree of administrative and economic integration among Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). After the three states gained independence, they signed the Treaty of Kampala on 6 June 1967 which established the East African Community. The combined population of the EAC states is 36,155,000. From the outset, economic relations among the three states posed difficulties, Kenya benefited more than Tanzania and Uganda from the Common market;

and when Idi Amin came to power in Uganda in 1971 these difficulties were severely exacerbated by political tensions. Finally, in 1977 the East African Community completely collapsed.

The Treaty of Abidjan creating the West African Economic Community was signed on 17 April 1973 by the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. CEAO come into existence in 1974, and it has began to function . It was the third attempt to recreate the economic unity that these and other states had had when they were under French colonial rule. The total population of the CEAO member states is 25,723,000.

Five of the six regional economic integration schemes(all but the Andean Group) aim at preserving or recreating at least some of the economic unity that existed among the member states during an earlier period. Each of the six schemes provides for the establishment of a customs union with some permissible exceptions and all of them call for a measure of harmonization and coordination of economic development policies. In certain instances in varying degrees joint development policies are mandated. All of the six schemes are based on the assuption that import substitution can constitute an important strategy of economic development.

What role have the executive heads of the international institutions of these six schemes played ? How successful have they been in working toward achieving the goals set forth in the treaties that established the six schemes ? What factors explain their relative success and lack of success ?

II

To explore these issues requires a conceptual framework that would permit comparisons of actions taken in quite different circumstances. Even without further elaboration, it is evident that the differences among the six schemes are substantial. The territories of the member states of the Central American Common Market form a relatively compact and well-defined geographical unit. The members of Caricom in sharp contrast include : Belize, in Central American; widely dispersed islands that are inter-mingled with non-members; and Guyana, in South America. The combined population of the member states of the Andean Group is more than thirteen times that of the member states of Caricom. The natural resource endowments and their distribution among the member states differ considerably. The levels of economic development of the member states of the six schemes also vary sharply. The averages of the per capita Gross National Products in 1972 of the member states of the six schemes were in descending order : Andean Group -- $ 544; Caricom -- $ 538; CACM -- $436; UDEAC -- $ 385; CEAO -- $ 170; and EAC -- $ 147.(7)

Of the 35 states and territories currently involved in the six integration schemes, Venezuela had the highest per capita GNP of $ 1,240, and Upper Volta the lowest of $ 70. And as will be seen, the international institutions that were established also differ significantly.

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(7) These figures are based on the data contained in : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atlas, 1974 (Washington, D.C. : IBRD, 1974). Per capita GNP is calculated in the World Bank Atlas, 1974 at 1972 market prices, and it is rounded to the nearest dollar as it is here.

The framework that we employ is based on the well-established proposition that political actions and their effect can be explained by the interaction of the personal attributes of the actor and the context in which the action is taken. (8) The framework is essentially a list a variables drawn up in an effort to ensure that all relevant factors will be considered in each case so as to facilitate comparisons. And in postulating that different variables are related, it provides a basis for reasoned speculation about the relationship of these variables.

Executive heads of regional economic integration efforts are appointed in mid-life. They bring with them to their positions certain personal attributes, first established personalities. In terms of their role as executive heads their world outlooks, especially the way they see the problems of their region in the context of global developments, their work habite, and their skills at interpersonal relationships are particularly important. (9)

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(8) See : Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and B. Sapin (eds.) Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York : Free Press, 1962).

(9) These characteristics bear some resemblance to those that James D. Barber deals with in his : Presidential Character : Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1972). However, we deliberately eschew his effort to explain the personality of executive heads in psychological terms. Among other reasons for this is the paucity of materials available concerning the individuals with whom we are concerned. Moreover, Barber's effort to develop psychological explanations for individuals operating in a single national context was precarious enough in methodological terms, to attempt a comparative effort in several national settings would surely be imprudent.

Executive heads also bring career backgrounds with them. Invariably they have held important positions before their appointment. Their experience in these positions can affect their personalities. Through this experience, they may also develop a typical approach to problem solving. In addition, they will have established in their previous positions a reservoir of personal relationships on which they can draw. Frequently, their designation as executive heads is due to their relationships, to their previous position and their capacity demonstrated. (10)

In their new positions, executive heads of regional economic integration schemes find themselves within a definite context; first there is the institutional framework within which they must operate. The treaty that created the regional economic integration effort specifies their formal authority and their relationship to other organs. A second element of the context within which executive heads must operate is the distribution of forces within and among the member states of the integration effort. A long list of forces could be relevant. Some of the most important are : the levels of economic development among the member countries; the rate and distribution of economic growth; the type of political regimes; the ideology and stability of leadership within the countries and the interest and strength of political parties, interest groups and ethical or linguistic groups, and the army. Whether developments in these various spheres within the member countries of the integration scheme are moving in similar or divergent paths is at least as important as the nature of the

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(10) Other criteria are also taken in account such as : the trust they enjoy among the heads of states and governments of member countries, as well as their capacity to deal with them in an appropriate way and in given situations. Sometimes, the member states prefer a rather weak personality in order to maintain more control over the regional administration. The type of executive head is in some respects a good indicator of the member states' intentions.

developments themselves. A final important element of the situation within which executive heads must operate can be comprised under the heading the <u>disposition of external actors</u>. The policies of the major states, particularly the leading industrial states and especially the United States and the principal members of the European Communities, can vitally affect the possibilities open to integration efforts among LDCs. The member countries of the schemes are dependent on exports to the industrial countries and the industrial countries are sources of financial assistance and investment. The major states, however, are not the only external actors of importance. Since none of the six regional schemes reviewed here constitutes an easily self-contained geographic unit, the actions of neighboring states can have an influence. Other international governmental organizations can also play a role. Some, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the regional development banks, could provide assistance. Others might come to be viewed as rival focal points for integration activities, as could occur in West Africa where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) includes all of the members of CEAO plus 10 other states. Finally, regional economic integration efforts among less developed countries must deal in varying degrees with Transnational Corporations (TNCs). We say in varying degrees because TNCs are not equally interested in all six of the schemes with which we are concerned.

As executive heads of regional economic integration schemes begin to perform their functions, there is an interaction between their <u>personal attributes</u> and the <u>context</u> within which they must operate. More or less consciously executive heads determine the <u>strategies</u> that they will pursue. They set <u>objectives</u> and they define <u>tactics</u> to achieve these objectives. They may shift their objectives and tactics as the context within which they operate changes, and their personal attributes, including their personalities, may also change as time goes on. This is undoubtedly too formal a description for what in most instance is probably a very instinctive and semi-conscious process. The point of the formalization is to facilitate comparisons; it is clear that different executive heads do behave differently, and some vary their behavior over time. For an executive head of an institution even to do nothing is to adopt a strategy that will have consequences.

Executive heads will apply their strategies in the decision-making processes of their regional economic integration schemes. We intend a broad definition of decision-making processes, one that would include not only decisions taken in the established international institutions in which the executive might or might not participate, but also those that the executive head might take acting alone, and the instances in wich the member states acting alone, take or fail to take actions relevant to the integration program. The decision-making processes will inevitably involve factors that have already been identified in the context within which the executive head must operate the distribution of forces within and among the member states and the disposition of external actors.

The strategies that executive heads employ will meet varying success in the decision-making processes, and the decisions that are taken in their own right will meet varying success. Clearly a definition of success that could be applied in six very different settings is crucial to our effort at comparison. Unfortunately, there is no readily available objective criterion or set of criteria by which to measure success. We utilize several measures, noneof which are completely satisfactory or adequate. First, we examine the fate of the executive head's proposals, whether or not their are adopted and implemented. Then we explore developments with respect to the integration scheme. Do member states leave the scheme ? Are new member states added ? Are the aims of the treaty and the timetables set in the treaty met ? Finally, we consider developments within the member states, because the purpose of the integration schemes was to improve conditions within the member states. From what has been said to this point it should be obvious that in our view the ability of the executive head of a regional integration schemes to affect broad economic, social and political developments within the member states of the scheme is extremely limited, and at this stage we have no way of measuring whatever contribution the executive head might make. Nevertheless, even if we cannot establish causal connections we think that it is important not to lose sight of ultimate consequences of political actions, however remote and slight the connection may be.

Our analytical framework is displayed graphically in Figure I.

Figure I

A Framework for Analyzing the Role of Executive Heads in Regional Economic Integration Schemes among LDCs



The feedback loops in Figure I are intended to emphasize our view that all of the processes are interconected and interactive.

III

1. Institutional Framework

Let us begin our analysis by considering the contexts within which the executive heads of the six regional economic integration efforts function.

First we must deal with the institutional framework and identify the executive head and then sketch the formal authority of the office. In four of the schemes, CACM, Caricom, UDEAC and CEAO, there is a clearly identifiable single executive head, called in each case, Secretary-General. All of the four secretaries-general are appointed for fixed but renewable terms of from three to five years duration. The formal authority of each of the four is defined in conventional terms : to service the inter-governmental organs; to perform asks delegated to them by the inter-governmental organs, and to be responsible for the administration of the international secretariat. However, an interesting difference is that in the cases of Caricom, UDEAC, and CEAO these responsibilities extend to several fields in addition to that of the creation and maintenance of the customs union. In CACM the Secretary-General and the secretariat have responsibilities for matters associated with the customs union and with industrial and agricultural development, but cooperative activity in several other fields in the responsibility of autonomous bodies.

The Andean Group is the only one of the six schemes formally to have a collective executive head. The Junta, or Beand of the Andean

Group is patterned after the Commission of the European Communities, although in some ways it is even more supra-national than the European Commission. The Andean Board consists of three individuals, who are appointed for three years renewable terms. For important decisions the board must act unanimously. Fixing the membership of the Board at three, so that there were fewer Board members than member states, was a conscious effort to minimize the possibility that the Board members would reflect national viewpoints. Indeed, the members of the Board need not necessarily be citizens of the member states, although they must be citizens of a Latin American State. In contrast the thirteen members of the Commission of the European Communities always include two citizens from each of the larger member states, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and one citizen from each of the five smaller member states, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

The Andean Board's formal authority parallels that of the European Commission in several respects. Some Andean Group Decisions can be taken on the basis of a proposal by the Board and the proposals can only be modified by the intergovernmental Commission by unanemous vote. In this case, as in the European Community, the unanimity protects the proposals of the Community board and reinforce its position in regard to the intergovernmental body. This rule looses its significance when the procedure for the adoption of some final decisions is already a unanimous vote. In certain instances, the Board can take decisions which have binding effect, specifically in the field of supervision, execution and management competences.

Like CACM, Caricom, UDEAC, and CEAO, the East African Community has a single Secretary-General, who according to the Treaty is "the principal executive officer of the Community". (11) However, there are also three East African Ministers, each nominated by one of the member states. Each of the Ministers must be accorded ministerial rank in the state that nominated him. The East African Ministers are members of national governments and chair several of the important intergovernmental Councils and meetings, and they have operational authority over members of the secretariat in their sphere of competence. This situation tends to confine the Secretary-General's authority to administrative matters, and even in this sphere his authority is limited by that of the East African Minister who chairs the Finance Council. As well by the fact that each Community Minister heads a secretariat in charge of corresponding responsibilities in the field of finance, communications and research, common market and planification. These three secretariats are also responsible to the Community Ministers. In fact, each Minister exercises direction and control over one of the three secretariats which constitute the Community's Central Secretariat. Thus these secretariats are subject both to the hierarchic control of the Secretary-General and the instructions given by the Ministers. Their duties and responsibilities are distributed according to the following principle : political instructions come from the Community Ministers, while operational and administrative activities are the responsibility of the head of the central administration. In practice, however, the distinctionbetween political directives and administrative action seems difficult to maintain. This double loyalty could be a potential source of tensions between Community Ministers and Secretary-General.

A second element of the institutional framework in which executive heads find themselves are the other organs of the integration schemes. In four of the six schemes, Caricom, UDEAC, EAC, and CEAO, the supreme organ is an institution comprised of the heads of state or heads of government of the member states. (12)

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(11) Article 61, paragraph 1 (a)

(12) These institutions are called : Caricom -- Conference of Heads of Government; UDEAC -- Le conseil des chefs d'état; EAC -- the East African Authority; and CEAO -- La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat.

In these instances, the executive head is appointed by and responsible to the collective heads of state. Legally or as a practical matter decisions among heads of state require their unanimous agreement.

The supreme organ of CACM is the Central American Economic Council, which is comprised of a minister of each of the member countries, usually the Minister of Economic Affairs. During the period 1971-1972, the functions of the Central American Economic Council have been largely taken over by the Normalization Council, which is composed of two members from each member country, the Minister of Economic Affairs and a person appointed by the President of the country. Unanimity is required for decisions in both the Council and the Normalization Commission. Starting in 1973 the smoother functionning of different institutions has been assured : first, the meeting of ministers of Economic affairs and the meeting of vice-ministers of Economic affairs which have assumed the responsibility for the regular functionning of economic integration process and of the free trade area, as well as for the supervision concerning the juridical aspects of the CACM; second, a High-Level Committee for restructuring of the CACM was established in order to consider the proposals by SIECA and by Governments . (13) Since 1976, the conclusions and the project formulated by the High-Level Committee has been before the meeting of the ministers of economic affairs, the ministers of Foreign-affairs, the ministers of finance and the presidents of Central Banks. (14)

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(13) <u>Carta informativa</u>, SIECA, october 1975, No 168, p. 1 and 2.

(14) <u>Carta informativa</u>, SIECA, January 1976, No 171, p. 11.

The crisis of 1969 made evident the absence of foreing ministers in the integration process who were deeply engaged in the conflict resolution negociations. The idea of the enlarged Council was embodied in the new Draft Treaty, Title II, Chapter I, art. 12. This article provides that the CACM Council like the Council of the European Community, is composed of all relevant ministers who can meet together in plenary sessions or separately in special meetings. In this way, the Council becomes a comphension institution offering a framework for meetings of all ministers concerned by centralamerican affairs. The final decisions of this enlarged council have not yet been taken on the Draft the Treaty establishing the Centralamerican Economic and Social Community. (15)

In the Andean Group the supreme intergovernmental body is the the Commission, a body which is composed of representatives of each of the member states. As in the Council of the European Communities, the Commission has statutory authority to take some decisions by qualified majority votes. The Central American Economic Council appoints the Secretary-General of CACM and the Commission appoints the Board of the Andean Group.

In all cases except the Andean Group the basic treaty creating the integration effort provides for one or more intergovernmental institutions that can take decisions in defined spheres of competence and that can prepare major decisions for the principal intergovernmental organ in collaboration with the Secretary-General.

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(15) <u>Proyecto de Tratado de la Comumidad Economica y Social Centroamericana</u>, Comite de Alto Nivel para el perfeccionamiento y la reestructuracion del Mercado Centroamericano, Guatemala, Marzo 1976.

CACM has the Executive Council, comprised of Deputy ministers of Economic Affairs. In Caricom there is the Common Market Council and there are also the Conference of Ministers of Health and Standing Committees comprised of various other ministers in functional fields. UDEAC and CEAO respectively have a Management Committee and a Council of Ministers, each comprised on a ministerial level. In the East African Community the East African Ministers collectively had the responsibility of assisting the Authority and the Treaty provided for five Councils in functional fields.

In each of the six regional economic there are several autonomous institutions. CACM, Caricom, the Andean Group, and EAC have development banks, and UDEAC has recently established a development bank. The EAC and CEAO treaties provide for judical organs. The EAC treaty also provided for a Legislative Assembly. The EAC had extensive common services concerned with railways, airways, harbors, and posts and telecommunications. In CACM there are several research and training institutes. In no case does the executive head have any formal authority with respect to these autonomous institutions.

The international secretariats are the final element of the institutional framework within which executive heads must operate. The approximate size of the international secretariats of the six regional economic integration schemes in the midnineteen-seventies in listed in Table I. Except for the East African Community, the limited size of the international secretariats is striking. Moreover, it is especially notable that the Board of the Andean Group, which has the most extensive responsibilities has the smallest staff.

2. Distribution of Forces within and Among the Member States

The second important element of the context within which the executive heads of regional economic integration efforts among

Table I

Approximate Size of International Secretariats of Regional Economic Integration Schemes among LDCs

CACM	181
Andean Group	103
Caricom	150
UDEAC	136
EAC	4,500 *
CEAO	112

* Includes the Income Tax Department of 1,070 which was assigned to the separate member states in 1973.

Sources : For CACM, Andean Group, UDEAC and EAC : Dusan Sidjanski, Current Problems of Economic Integration : The Role of Institutions in Regional Integration Among Developing Countries (New York : United Nations, 1974, Sales Number E.73.II.D.10.), and for Caricom and CEAO, UNCTAD.

developing countries must operate involves the distribution of forces within and among the member states. The literature concerning regional economic integration has advanced and to a certain extent supported the hypothesis that the greater the degree of homogenity among the member states, the more favorable the chances for achieving integration. (16) If this hypothesis were valid, presumably the task of an executive head would be easier, and the chances for the executive head's strategies succeeding greater, the greater,the homogenity among the member states. Students of economic integration among less developed countries, have singled out differences or similarities in levels of economic development as an especially crucial issue. (17) The have maintained that unless integration processes are carefully guided, the creation of a customs union can result in an unequal distribution of benefits that will exacerbate inequalities among the member states.

Gross National Product per capita can be taken as a indicator of levels of economic development. Table 2 compares the six regional economic integration schemes according to the relative homogenity of their per capita GNPs in the early nineteen seventies. It gives the mean per capita GNP, the standard deviation, the coefficient of variability, and the skewness. Data are given for the original six members of the European Communities for purposes of comparison. As can be seen, the East African Community and the Central American Common Market are the most homogeneous groupings among the six schemes under review. With respect to levels of development, the three member states of the East African Community are even more homogeneous than the original six members of the European Communities.

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(16) See for instance : Ernst B. Haas and Phillipe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration", International Organization, Vol. XVIII, No 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 705-737

(17) See Lynn K. Mytelka, "The Salience of gains in Third-World integration systems", "World Politics", Vol. XXV, No 2 (January 1973), pp. 236-250

Table 2

The Relative Homogenity of the Levels of Economic Development of the Member States of Regional Economic Integration Schemes in the Early Nineteen - Seventies

	Mean per Capita GNP	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variability	Skewness
CACM	$ 436.	111.10	.25	.43
Andean Group (with Chile)	$ 586.67	344.61	.59	1.10
Andean Group (without Chile)	$ 544.	362.75	.67	1.19
Caricom	$ 538.18	221.76	.41	.66
EAC	$ 146.67	20.55	.14	-.07
UDEAC	$ 385.	290.30	.75	1.395
EEC (original six)	$ 3035.	534.88	.18	-.93
CEAO	$ 170.	101.32	.596	.35

The data used for calculations were 1972 per capita GNP at market prices. They were taken from : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, <u>World Bank Atlas, 1974</u> (Washington, D.C. : IBRD, 1974).

The Andean Group and UDEAC are the least homogeneous groupings of the six. In the case of the Andean Group, Venezuela's per capita GNP ($1,240) was more than six times that of Bolivia ($200), and in UDEAC, Gabon's per capita GNP ($880) was almost six times that of the CAE ($160). Although it is a gross oversimplification, as a rough working hypothesis we assume that the greater the homogeneity with respect to levels ofeconomic development among the member states of an economic integration effort, the easier the task of the executive head and the greater the chances of the executive head's strategies succeeding. In this perspective, the rank order of the six schemes as favorable contexts for executive heads would be : (1) EAC, (2) CACM, (3) Caricom, (4) Andean Group, (5) CEAO and (6) UDEAC. Nevertheless, the degree of disparity of economic development among members can be more or less corrected by measures and mechanisms, for compensation (special aid, financial and technical support, etc.) It is obvious that among the six schemes those less favorably ranked as Andean Group, CEAO or UDEAC have established with the exception of EAC better instruments and rules for compensation : Development Banks, solidarity found, technical assistance.

Another aspect of the distribution of forces within and among the member states concerns the economic policies that they pursue. In its statistical analyses the United Nations classifies all 37 of the states with which we are concerned as "developing market economies", but despite this common classification there are considerable differences with respect to which the governments of the several states intervene in economic matters. In both the United Republic of Tanzania and the People's Republic of Congo, the government plays a major role in the economy. In Tanzania in particular, state corporations are responsible for much of the economic activity. Jamaica and Guyana appear to be moving toward greater governmental intervention. The countries with the least governmental intervention would be : Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador in the Andean Group; Trinidad and

Tobago in Caricom, and Kenya in the East African Community. The monetary policies of the countries also differ. All of the countries of the Central American Common Market have formally accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, meaning that their currencies are basically convertible, and all of the states of the Andean Group except Chile and Colombia have also accepted this obligation. All of the other 26 states except Guyana and Jamaica maintain various forms of exchange control. However, the member states of UDAEC and all of the member states of CEAO except Mauritania have equivalent of currency convertibility within the franc zone.

A final economic issue concerns the extent to which the member states of a regional economic integration scheme trade with one another. Table 3 gives the percentage of each region's exports that were intraregional trade as of the date that the integration treaty was signed. As is clear from the table, at the outset of each of the integration schemes, intra-regional trade constituted a relatively small portion of each region's total exports. Of the six schemes, the East African Community had the highest level of intra-regional trade. But compared to the European Economic Community, the level of intra-regional trade even in EAC was small. In 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, intra-regional trade constituted 30 percent of the six countries' total exports.

The political systems of the member states are also important aspects of the distribution of forces. At the outset, it should be noted that only a few of the 35, or 37 if Chad and Chile are include even though they have withdrawn from UDEAC and the Andean Group respectively, would qualify as polyarchies, (18) in the sense of governments being constituted through elections in which there is meaningful competition among organized political forces. As of 1977 all of the members of Caricom met this definition, but beyond this

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(18) The term is taken from Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1971)

Table 3

The Relative Importance of the Regional Market
as a Destination for Exports

Intra-regional Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports
as of the Date of the Signature of the Integration Treaty

CACM, 1960	7.5
Andean Group, 1969	2.8
CARIFTA, 1967	5.1
Caricom, 1973	10.5
UDEAC, 1964 *	2.5
EAC, 1967	17.3
CEAO, 1973	7.9

* The earliest available accurate figure is for 1965.

Source : UN Document TD/B/609 (Vol. II), 20 May 1976, "Economic Co-operation and Integration Among Developing Countries", Annex V. This document was prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

only Costa Rica in the Central American Common Market and Columbia and Venezuela in the Andean Group did. (19) The governments of the remaining states were all authoritarian in varying degrees. Several were one-party states where plebiscitary elections were regularly held, but in a large number of the member states of the regional economic integration schemes governments have come to power as a result of military coups. Table 4 shows the proportion of the member states of each of the six schemes that has experienced military coups during years between 1960 and 1975. In four of the six schemes half or more of the member states have experienced military coups, and some states, such as Honduras, have experienced several coups.

The significance for regional integration efforts of military coups varies. A coup could affect only a limited number of personalities at the top of a political system, leaving in place those who deal with the daily administrative matters including many aspects of economic integration. Some military coups, however, have had demonstrably harmful effects on integration efforts. When Colonel Asvaldo Lopez Arellano assumed power in a military coup in Honduras in 1963, a regime came to power that had not participated in the formulation of the strategy of Central American integration and did no completely share the assumptions on which this strategy was based. The new Honduran government soon began to take actions that were disruptive to integration efforts. So many political tensions erupted as a consequence of Idi Amin Dada's seizure of power in Uganda in 1971 that further collaboration among the member states of the East African Community became almost impossible.

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(19) See Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom - VII", Freedom at Issue, Number 39 (January - February 1977), pp. 5-17

Table 4

Proportion of Member States of Regional Economic Integration Efforts Experiencing Military Coups, 1960 - 1975 *

Integration Effort	Number of Member States	Number of Member States Experiencing Military Coups *	Percentage of Member State Experiencing Military Coups
CACM	5	3	60
Andean Group	6 (Including Chile)	4	67
Caricom	12	0	0
UDEAC	5 (Including Chad)	3	60
EAC	3	1	33
CEAO	6	3	50
Total	37	14	38

In the case of states that gained their independence after 1960, only military coups that occured after the date of independence are counted.

Since Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere has refused to attend any meeting in which Uganda President Amin would be present, the Authority of the East African Community has not met since 1970. This is a negative aspect of heads of state participation in a regional body which on the other side can have many positive effects, as the power is actually concentrated in these main national and regional actors. Their good collaboration can give an energic impulse to the integration movement as their personal or role conflicts can paralyse and even endanger the integration process. The 1974 coup in Chile that brought Augusto Pinochet Ugarte to power led to a sharp deterioration in the political and economic relations among the members of the Andean Group, and eventually to Chile's withdrawal.

Interest groups are active and significant political forces mainly in the member countries of CACM, the Andean Group and Caricom. Within these countries, they tend to play a larger role in the countries with polyarchic governments than in those with authoritarian governments. At least, their role are exercised more openly in the polyarchic settings where they are considered as legitimate than in authoritarian systems. They are also much more structured and influencial in the military dictatorship ideologically neutral combined by marked or mixt economic system then in left oriented authoritarian systems with more or less socialized economy.

In Latin American groupings the political heterogeneity is accompanied by economic system homegenity which explains the interest groups activities at national as well as at regional level. The groups structure and action at regional are in some way the projection of their nature and behavior at national level.

A few points need to be made in summary concerning the political features of the internal aspects of the context within which executive heads of regional economic integration efforts among LDCs must operate.

First, the internal political aspects of the member states of the regional economic schemes present the executive heads of these schemes with situations that are very different from that that exists in the member states of the European Communities, where all of the states qualify as polyarchies, where there have been no military coups, and where there are active, strong, and influential interest groups at both the national and the community levels. Second, changes in government can occur as they have through military coups that are so drastic as to seriously limit if not rule out further collaboration among the member states. Such governmental changes can be largely unrelated to integration processes. There is nothing that executive heads can to do prevent them and there are limits on what executive heads can do to limit the damage that they can cause. Third, given the political character and structure of the majority of the less developed states that are members of the six regional economic integration schemes being reviewed, there is little opportunity for executive heads to form alliances with domestic interest groups to promote economic integration as the Commission of the European Communities has done. Given the authoritarian character of most of the governments, and the fragility of their political authority, an executive head could be at some risk even to go as far as David Morse did when he was Director-General of ILO in trying to stimulate support among private groups in the United States for his organization.

The main differences among the economic and political systems of the member states of the six schemes regional economic integration schemes being considered here are presented schematically in Table 5. This table contradicts the impression of great homogenity among the member states of CACM and EAC based on the analysis of their levels of economic development contained in Table 2. The relative homogenity of the levels of per capita GNP of the member states

Table 5

The Main Characteristics of the Political and Economic Systems of the Member States of Regional Economic Integration Schemes among Less Developed Countries, 1977

Scheme and Member States	Political System	Economic System	Monetary System
CACM			
Costa Rica	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist	Convertible Currency
El Salvador	Multi-Party - PF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Convertible Currency
Guatemala	Multi-Party - PF	Capitalist	Convertible Currency
Honduras	Non-Party -- PF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Convertible Currency
Nicaragua	Dominant Part - PF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Convertible Currency
Evaluation	Highly Heterogeneous	Highly Homogeneous	Highly Homogeneous
Andean Group			
Bolivia	Non-Party - PF Military Dominated	Capitalist-Socialist	Convertible Currency
Chile	Non-Party - NF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency
Colombia	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency
Ecuador	Non-Party - PF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Convertible Currency
Peru	Non-Party - PF Military Dominated	Capitalist-Socialist	Convertible Currency
Venezuela	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist-Statist	Convertible Currency
Evaluation	Highly Heterogeneous	Relatively Homogeneous	Heterogeneous

Table 5 continued

Caricom *			
Antigua	Associated with UK Multi-Party - F		
Barbados	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist	Non-converti- ble Currency
Belize	UK Crown Colony Multi*party - F		
Dominica	Associated with UK Multi-Party - F		
Grenada	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist	Non-converti- ble Currency
Guyana	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist- Socialist	Convertible Currency
Jamaica	Multi*Party - F	Capitalist- Socialist	Convertible Currency
Montserrat	UK Crown Colony Multi-Party - F		
St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla	Associated with UK Multi-Party - F		
St. Lucia	Associated with UK Multi-Party - F		
St-Vincent	Associated with UK Multi-Party - F		
Trinidad and Tobago	Multi-Party - F	Capitalist	Non-converti- ble Curency
Evaluation	Homogeneous with respect to Political Systems, Heterogeneous with respect to Constitutional Status	Relatively Homogeneous	Heterogeneous

Table 5 continued

UDEAC **			
Cameroon	One-Party-Nationalist - NF	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency **
Central African Empire	One-Party-Nationalist - NF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency **
Congo	One-Party-Socialist - NF Military-Dominated	Capitalist-Socialist	Non-convertible Currency **
Gabon	One-Party-Nationalist- NF	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency **
Evaluation	Heterogeneous	Heterogeneous	Homogeneous
EAC			
Kenya	One-Party-Nationalist - PF	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency
Tanzania	One-Party-Socialist - NF	Socialist	Non-convertible Currency
Uganda	Non-Party- NF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency
Evaluation	Highly Heterogeneous	Highly Heterogeneous	Highly Heterogeneous
CEAO ***			
Ivory Coast	One-Party-Nationalist - NF	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency ***
Mali	One-Party-Nationalist - NF Military Dominated	Capitalist-Socialist	Non-convertible Currency ***
Mauritania	One-Party-Nationalist - NF	Capitalist-Socialist	Non-convertible Currency ***
Niger	Non-Party - NF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency ***
Senegal	Dominant-Party-PF	Capitalist-Socialist	Non-convertible Currency ***
Upper Volta	Non-Party- PF Military Dominated	Capitalist	Non-convertible Currency ***
Evaluation	Highly Heterogeneous	Heterogeneous	Relatively Homogeneous

Table 5 continued

* For the member states of Caricom their constitutional status is given in addition to the type of their political system.

** The currency that circulates within all of the UDEAC states is the CFA franc which is issued by the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale. In effect, UDEAC states have a common currency which is convertible within the franc zone.

*** The CFA franc issued by the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest is the common currency in Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. Mali issues its own currency, the Mali franc, which is generally convertible into CFA francs. Mauritania also issues its own currency, the Ougiya. Mauritania treats CFA francs like other foreign currencies. Thus four of the six CEAO countries have a common currency and a fifth country (Mali) has a currency that is convertible into this common currency.

Source for data concerning Political and Economic Systems : Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom - VIII," Freedom at Issue, No 44 (January-February, 1978), pp. 3 - 21. In the Survey all states and dependent territories are rated on a seven point scale according to the extent to which civil and political rights are respected. The criteria that are applied in the rating are explained in the article. On the basis of this rating states are then judged to be "free", "partly free", or "not free". These judgements are indicated in Table 5 by the symbols F, PF, and NF. A state that the Survey judged as "Free" would meet or territory Dahl's criteria for being a polyarchy. Such states or territories would have fully competitive electoral processes and those who were elected would clearly rule. With respect to civil rights, there would be freedom of expression and freedom of the press and individual civil rights, such as habeas corpus and the right to a speedy and open trial for persons accused of crimes, would be respected. The criteria for judging states according to their type of political and economic system are also explained in the article.

Source for data concerning monetary regimes : International Monetary Fund, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1977, (Washington, D.C., IMF, 1977). Our summary ratings are based on whether or note a state has formally accepted the obligations for Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. If it has, we regard the country as having a convertible currency. If a state has not accepted Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement and instead has Article XIV status, we regard the state as having a non-convertible currency. This dichotomy ignores many complicated issues.

The authors are responsible for the summary judgements about the relatively homogeneity or heterogeneity of the political, economic, and monetary systems of the member states of the six regional economic integration shemes.

of the East African Community is largely offset or neutralized by the hetrogeneity of their economic and political systems, and the heterogeneity of the political systems within the Central American Common Market has a similar offsetting effect. On the other hand, the economic and monetary systems of the CACM member states are very similar.

There are also considerable differences among the member states of the Andean Group, where although the economic systems are relatively homogeneous, the political systems are highly heterogeneous, and among the member states of UDEAC, where the political and economic systems are heterogeneous, despite the fact of the common currency. Interestingly, these two groupings tend to organize general and sectoral programs aiming at stimulating common and more homogeneous regional development. These efforts are also supported by other regional bodies. Other than their constitutioned status the member states of Caricom have considerable feature in common, while the characteristics of the CEAO states are relatively heterogeneous.

Distribution of external forces

A final element of the context within which executive heads must operate concerns the disposition of external actors. All of the member countries of the six regional economic integration schemes export principally to developed market economies, and all of them have an asymetrical trading relationship in that this trade is much more important to them than it is to the developed countries that import their products. Table 6 gives the proportion of the total exports of the member countries of the six schemes that were purchased by the United States and the thirteen members of the European Economic Community in 1970 and 1976. Even though these states have continued to be heavily dependent upon the developed western states,

Table 6

Proportion of Exports of Members of Regional Economic Integration Schemes Going to the United States and the European Communities (percentages)

Regional Economic Integration Scheme	Exports to United States		Exports to European Communities		Total Exports to US and EC	
	1970	1976	1970	1976	1970	1976
CACM	35	38	22	22	57	60
Andean Group *	32	34	27	17	59	51
Caricom **	47	59	29	15	76	74
UDEAC	7	11	67	47	74	58
EAC	11	13	29	38	40	51
CEAO	11	10	65	63	76	73

* Figures for the Andean Group include Chile.

** Figures for Caricom only include data for Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Source for data on which the percentages are based : International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, Annual 1970 - 1976 (Washington, D.C., IMF, 1977).

all of the schemes but CACM and EAC have lessered the proportion of their exports going to the United States and the member of the European Communities. In addition to these trading relationships, the United States and the European Economic Community provide financial and technical assistance to the integration schemes and their member countries. Clearly the economic progress of these LDCs, including their progress toward regional economic integration, depends heavily upon the policies of the developed states with market economies. To characterize the policies of the United States and the European Economic Community toward any particular integration scheme at any particular period as either favorable or unfavorable would be an oversimplification. Views within the United States and the European Economic Community are not uniform. The European Community has adopted general agreement with 52 LDCs in which particular financial assistance is provided for regional integration and cooperation efforts. The question is to see how these opportunities will be used in fact by executive heads of regional groupings. Moreover, different aspects of the integration schemes elicit different views. Executive heads of the regional integration schemes need to be sensitive to the way in which views differ according to issues and individuals. In some ways, given the different character of the politics that are involved, executive heads of regional economic integration schemes have greater scope for intervening in the domestic political processes of the major trading partners of their member countries than in the domestic political processes of the member countries themselves.

International governmental and non-governmental organizations are a second element of the external context. Because all of the six schemes involve a derogation from the most-favored-nation rule of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) all of them have had to be scrutinized and approved by GATT.

Under Raul Prebisch's guidance the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and then the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development actively promoted the theory of economic integration among less developed countries. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has played a similar role, specifically creating and financing the Institute for Latin American Integration (Instituto para la Integracion de Américana Latina - INTAL) for this purpose. The UN's Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank have also sought to assist economic integration efforts. The United Nations Development Programm (UNDP), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the African Development Bank are all potential sources of assistance, although in fact these international institutions devote only a small portion of their funds to regional projects.

International non-governmental organizations have not developed a significant role with respect to economic integration among developing countries. To date, nothing comparable to the Action Group, that played such an important part in Western European integration, has arisen.

<u>Transnational Corporations</u> constitute the final element of the external context in which executive heads must operate. On the one hand, to the extent that they control significant sectors of production within the member states of integration schemes, they constitute forces that must be dealt with. TNCs are also potential sources for new investment. Transnational Corporations play some role in all 37 of the countries that have been involved in the six regional integration schemes being examined here. Measuring this role, though is difficult. Direct Foreign Investment is the most easily available indicator of the role of TNCs. The Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) as of the end of 1967 of the countries that are members of

the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is given in Table 7. (20) These countries are estimated to be the origin of more than 95 percent of DFI. (21) Table 7 shows that the DFI of DAC countries is very unevenly distributed among the member countries in some of the schemes. Sixty-one percent of the DFI in the 3 member states of EAC is in Kenya, 56 percent of the DFI in the 6 countries that have been members of the Andean Group is in Venezuela, and 47 percent of the DFI in the 5 countries that have been members of UDEAC is in Gabon. Table 7 also shows how much the ownership of DFI in the member countries of CACM, the Andean Group is concentrated in United States TNCs and how much the ownership of DFI in UDEAC and CEAO is concentrated in French TNCs. Direct foreign investment is in Kenya is heavily concentrated in UK TNCs, but the pattern of ownership is more dispersed in Tanzania and Uganda. Both the uneven distribution of direct foreign investment among the member countries of the regional economic integration schemes and the concentration of the ownership of the DFI in the United States and France and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom are important elements of the <u>problematique</u> that face the executive heads of the six schemes.

Since relative shares of new direct foreign investment can become an important issue in regional economic integration efforts among less developed countries, we have attempted to devise a standardized measure of the DFI that existed in the 37 countries as of the end of 1967. Direct foreign investment per capita seemed to us to be the most easily calculable measure and it also accords with

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(20) The member countries of DAC are : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States of America.

(21) See United Nations Secretariat, <u>Multinational Corporations in World Development</u> (New York : UN, 1973, Sales No E.73.II.A.11) p. 139

Table 7

Direct Foreign Investment of DAC Countries in Member Countries of Regional Integration Schemes, 1967

	DFI (millions of dollars)	Country Accounting for 40 percent or more (percentage)		Other main investing countries (percentage)	
CACM					
Costa Rica	135.5	USA	89.3	UK	5.9
El Salvador	77.5	USA	58.1	Canada	16.8
Guatemala	146.5	USA	84.4	Canada	6.1.
Honduras	168.8	USA	97.7	UK	1.4
Nicaragua	72.8	USA	63.9	Canada	27.5
Andean Group					
Bolivia	143.5	USA	82.9	UK	8.4
Chile	963.1	USA	91.3	Japan	3.6
Colombia	727.7	USA	86.2	Netherlands	3.5
Ecuador	82.0	USA	58.5	UK	26.8
Peru	782.4	USA	84.4	Japan	3.8
Venezuela	3,495.0	USA	73.1	UK	10.1
Caricom					
Belize	28.5	UK	70.2	USA	17.5
Guyana	189.0	Canada	41.0	UK 34.1, USA	24.6
Jamaica	670.9	USA	70.7	Canada	18.3
Trinidad and Tobago	686.8	USA	75.8	Canada	18.3
UDEAC					
Cameroon	149.5	France	75.1	UK	11.9
Central African Republic	36.6	France	91.8	USA	4.1
Chad	17.8	France	80.4	Netherlands	8.4
Congo	90.1	France	83.4	Belgium	6.1
Gabon	265.2	France	73.4	USA	10.9
EAC					
Kenya	172.1	UK	78.8	USA	8.7
Tanzania	60.4	UK	46.7	Italy	18.7
				Denmark	12.9
				Fed. Rep.Ger.	5.6
Uganda	48.0	UK	48.1	Canada 31.1, USA	4.2
CEAO					
Ivory Coast	201.6	France	80.0	USA	3.7
Mali	6.5	France	76.9	UK	7.7
Mauritania	101.1	France	68.8	UK	16.2
Niger	23.3	France	95.7	USA	2.1
Senegal	153.8	France	87.4	USA	4.4
Upper Volta	16.2	France	75.3	UK	12.3

Source : United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, New York, UN, 1973, Sales No E.73.II.A 11), Table 35, pp. 182 - 185.

an intuitive understanding of "fair shares". Table 8 presents statistics concerning the relative dispersion among the member countries of the six schemes in terms of DFI per capita. Since data were only available for four of the twelve members of Caricom those figures are not particularly useful for comparative purposes. Again, as was the case with respect to per capita GNP, in ter s of the relative homogeneity of the situation of the member states, the East African Community and the Central American Common Market appear to be in the favored position. The relative paucity of DFI in EAC is also apparent. The high concentration of DFI in Gabon within UDEAC and in Venezuela within the Andean Group shows up clearly in the statistics in Table 8. If homogeneity in respect to the level of direct foreign investment facilitates integration or at least avoids conflicts on this issue, and if these statistics are a valid measure of homogeneity, then the executive head of UDEAC would appear to face the most difficult task. Unfortunately there is no easy way to aggregate the various aspects of the contexts in which the executive heads of the six regional economic integration schemes must operate. There is no common unit that would make it possible to sum the characteristics in each case so that the total scores could be compared. Instead, we must settle for verbal summaries.

The Central American Common Market is the oldest of the schemes. It has a single executive head assisted by three associate secretaries general, responsible to a ministerial council. The integration movement in Central American has many facets and there are many institutions, but the authority of CACM's executive head is largely limited to liberalization and commercial trade matters. In terms of economic development, the CACM countries are relatively homogeneous, with the exception of Honduras which has the lowest per capita GNP and the lowest growth. Only Costa Rica of the member countries would qualify as a polyarchy. Three of the 5 members have experienced military coups in the last decade and a half. All of the members are dependent upon the United States for trade and for direct foreign investment.

The Andean Group has the most supranational executive head. A collective body chosen by a ministerial council commission, the Board has far reaching authority that extends to many fields. Despite this, the Andean Group's secretariat is the smallest of the six schemes which raises some questions concerning its administrative capacity. The differences in the levels of economic development of the Andean Group countries are marked. Colombia and Venezuela have polyarchic regimes, all of the other member countries have authoritarian governments and have experienced military coups. All of the member countries are heavily dependent on the United States for foreign trade and direct foreign investment.

Caricom has a single executive head, who like the executive heads in all three of the African schemes is reponsible to a council of the heads of government of the member countries. Caricom's Secretary-General's powers are defined in conventional terms for international governmental organizations, but they extend to a broad array of fields. All of the member countries are polyarchies but have different socio-economic orientations (capitalistic, in Trinidad, socialistic in Jamaica and even more pronounced in Guyana). (22) Their disparity in size of population and territory as well as their geographie are striking. The members of Caricom are heavily dependent upon the United States for trade and direct foreign investment.

The East African Community's administrative and economic unity

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(22) There are also important differences in the constitutional status of the Caricom member States : Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are independant; Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis -- Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent are "States Associated with the United Kingdom; and Belize and Montserrat are colonies of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is responsible for the defense and foreign affairs of both the Associated States and the colonies. As mentioned earlier, Bahamas, which is independent, has joined the Caribbean Community, but it has not adhered to the Annex establishing the Common Market.

Table 8

Relative Dispersion of Direct Foreign Investment of DAC Countries in Regional Integration Schemes, 1967

Regional Scheme	Mean per capita DFI	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of variability	Skewness
CACM	$ 43.64	21.07	.48	1.39
Andean Group	$ 89.63	104.07	1.16	1.33
Caricom *	$ 356.52	174.397	.489	1.43
UDEAC	$ 133.26	203.29	1.53	1.60
EAC	$ 7.77	4.61	.59	2.08
CEAO	$ 40.21	42.45	1.06	1.29

* Data are Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago only. In the terminology of the Caricom Treaty, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago (and Barbados) are designated as "More Developed Countries", and the other members except the Bahamas are designated as the "Less Developed Countries". These figures are therefore very misleading in that they only include one of the seven less developed countries.

Source : For Direct Foreign Investment : United States, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, (New York : UN, 1973), Sales No E.73II.A.11), Table 35, pp. 182 - 185. For population, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atlas, 1974 (Washington, D.C., IBRD, 1974).

began in the nineteen-twenties and the East African Common Services constituted a substantial infrastructure of integration. A secretariat that dwarfed the secretariats of the other schemes was among the legacies of this integration during the colonial period. The three member states are relatively homogenous in terms of their levels of economic development. None of them are polyarchies, but only one, Uganda, has experienced a military coup. Their economic structures and orientations are highly divergent. The trade of the member countries and the direct foreign investment in them is relatively diversified. There is a single executive head whose autho - rity, however, is considerably hedged by that of the East African Ministers.

UDEAC and CEAO are similar to each other in many respects. Each has a single executive head, responsible to a Council of heads of state. Although in each case the authority of the executive head is defined in the normal manner for IGO's, the scope of this authority is fairly broad. In each case there are significant disparaties among the levels of economic development of the member states, although they are somewhat greater in the case of UDEAC. All of the member states of both schemes are heavily dependent upon France for Trade and direct foreign investment. Half of the CEAO members have experienced military coups in the past decade as have three of the five states that were members or two of the four that are members of UDEAC. Their socio-political systems are highly different.

Such then are the contexts within which the executive heads of the six regional economic integration schemes must operate. Let us turn now to consider the individuals who have assumed these roles and their characteristics.

IV

The individuals who have been executive heads and their nationalities are listed in Table 9. Two facts are immediately evident from the Table. First, there was a period when the Central American Common Market did not have executive heads. In the case of CACM, Carlos M. Castillo resigned so that he could become Costa Rica's Minister of Economics, Industry and Commerce. Unfortunately his resignation occurred in the aftermath of the armed conflict in 1969 between Honduras and El Salvador, and the member states were unable immediately to elect a successor.

In this case then, at the time of the most severe crisis among the member-states, the organization lacked an executive head.

Secondly, while there has been a rotation in the nationalities of the executive heads of four of the schemes, all Secretaries General of UDEAC have been from Cameroon and both Secretaries General of CEAO have been Senegalese. In UDEAC it is agreed at the outset that the Secretary-General should be from Cameroon, the population of which is twice as large as that of the other three states combined and which has a GNP that is more than 10 percent larger than that of the total of the other three states. The Assistant Secretary-General of UDEAC has customarily been from Gabon, the richest of the member States. Senegal, the state from which both Secretaries-General of CEAO have come, is the second richest and fourth most populous state in the Community.

Earlier we made the point that executive heads brought both established personalities and career backgrounds to their positions. Since the second of these two features is the less complex, let us start with it. The several individuals listed in Table 9 had many different career backgrounds. Immediately prior to his appointment Pedro Delgado was Deputy and Acting Minister of Economy in El Salvador. Carlos M. Castillo, in contrast, had been Director of the

Table 9

Executive Heads of Regional Economic Integration Schemes

Central American Common Market, Secretary-General	
Pedro Delgado, 1961 - 1966	El Salvador
Carlos M. Castillo, 1966 - 1971	Costa Rica
Robert Mayorga Cortés, 1973 - present	Nicaragua
Andean Group, Board	
Germanico Salgado Penaherrera, 1970 - 1976	Equator
Salvador Lluch Saler, 1970 - 1976	Chile
Felipe Salazar Santos, 1970 - 1976	Colombia
Luis Barandarian 1976 - present	Peru
Jesus Alberto Fernandez, 1976 - present	Venezuela
Rafal Garcia Velasco, 1976 - present	Equator
Caricom, Secretary-General	
William Demas, 1968 - 1973 (CARIFTA)	Trinidad and Tobago
Alister McIntyre, 1973 - 1977	Grenada
Central African Customs and Economic Union, Secretary-General	
Charles Onana-Awana, 1964 - 1970	Cameroon
Pierre Tchanqué, 1970 - 1977	Camaroon
Vincent Efon, 1977 - present	Camaroon
East African Community, Secretary-General	
Z.H.K. Birgurwenkya, 1968 - 1971	Uganda
Charles G. Maina, 1971 - 1974	Kenya
Edwin Mtei, 1974 - 1977	Tanzania
West African Economic Community, Secretary-General	
Cheik Ibrahima Fall, 1974 - 1977	Senegal
Moussa N'Gom, 1977 - present	Senegal

Mexico City office of the Economic Commission for Latin America. Promoting and assisting Central American economic integration is one of the major responsibilities of this office. Robert Mayorga-Cortés had been a member of the staff of SIECA, the permanent secretariat of CACM, immediately prior to his appointment. The three members of the Board of the Andean Group had respectively been an economist, an engineer, and a lawyer, Luis Barandarian, as member of the second Board, was a general. Prior to his appointment, Alister McIntyre was Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research of the University of the West Indies. Z.H.K. Bigirwenkya had been Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Uganda's ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Charles Maina was Director of the School of Public Administration in Kenya. Edwin Mtei was governor of the Board of Tanzania. Before he was appointed Secretary-General of UDEAC, Charles Onana-Awana was Minister of Finance and Planning in Cameroon, and after his service as Secretary-General he returned to Cameroon to serve in ministerial positions. Pierre Tchanqué was Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance prior to his UDEAC appointment. Cheik Fall and Noussa N'Gom came to CEAO from government ministries in Senegal.

Seven broad categories of career background emerge from this listing. Some of the executive heads served in ministries of member-states. Others served in the secretariats of international governmental organizations, and some in the secretariat of the regional economic integration scheme itself. Still others were in academic institutions. Private business, law, and military are final categories. Of course some of the individuals in their total careers prior to their appointment as executive heads worked in several of these categories of institutions.

Table 10

The Professional Experience of the Executive
Heads of Regional Economic Integration Schemes Among LDCs

	Nation. Govern. Minist.	Intern. Govern. Organ.	Integrat. Scheme Secret.	Academic Institution	Private Business	Law	Military
CACM							
P. Delgado	x			x			
C. M.Castillo		x					
R. Mayorga-Cortes			x				
Andean Group							
G. Salgado							
S. Lluch							
F. Salazar						x	
L. Barandiarian	x						x
J.A. Fernandez	x						
R.G. Velasco						x	
Caricom							
W. Demas (CARIPTA)	x			x			
A. McIntyre				x			
UDEAC							
C. Onana-Awana							
P. Tchanqué	x				x		
V. Efon							
EAC							
Z. H. K. Bigerwenkya	x			x			
C.G. Maina	x			x			
E, Mtei	x			x			
CEAO							
C. I. Fall	x						
M. N'Gom	x			x			

All of them have high educational and professional training. Table 10 summarizes the total professional experience of the various executive heads in terms of these seven broad categories. Only CACM has drawn its executive heads from IGOs or from the secretariats of the integration schemes.

Dealing with the personalities of the executive heads is more difficult. What we are particularly interested are those features of the personalities of the executive heads that will have an impact of their approach to their tasks. We believe that two quite different approaches may be distinguished, the ideological approach and the pragmatic approach. Those executive heads who take the ideological approach have an all encompassing and integrated vision of economic, social, and political change in which regional economic integration is an important instrument. They see integration institutions as providing a guiding and perhaps even directive force, and consequently they are likely to stress the importance of the supranational character of these institutions. They will emphasize the essentiality of limitations on sovereignty and the ideological orientation of the integration. Although executive heads who take a pragmatic approach may have equally broad and coherent visions of the future and processes of change, they do not stress these. Instead, they are inclined to emphasize specific, near-term goals. Whatever their personal views about the importance of integration institutions, in public they stress the importance of the member states. As executive heads, they maintain that they are merely executing the policies determined by the member states. They avoid discussions of the issue of sovereignty, and instead concentrate on immediate, practical tasks. As described here these two approaches probably represent polar extremes; most executive heads would fall on a continuum somewhere between the two opposite tendicies. However, we believe that the two approaches do represent broad tendencies.

Perhaps the difference can be seen more clearly by examining some of the writings of various individuals with whom we are concerned. Just before he became Secretary-General of the Central American Common Market, Carlos M. Castillo published a book, Growth and Integration in Central America. In it he developed a strikingly clear conception of the role of the Central American Common Market. The views expressed in the book represent an exemple of the ideological approach. Castillo saw a strong ferment for change in Central America and he saw a "profound contradiction between increasing aspirations and limited opportunities. . ." (23) He felt that the Central American governments were unresponsive to the increasing aspirations either because traditional oligarchies would rather resort to military coercion than to allow change or because of political immobilisme that was a concomitant of economic stagnation. He saw the creation and maintenance of a regional common market as a way of indirectly forcing internal change. The following quotation illustrates his position :

> The interdependence between internal reform and the creation of new opportunities can make for political development at the regional level. Free trade, tariff equalization, harmonization of fiscal systems, uniform social policies, regional development programs, and agreements to promote the free movement of factors of production are all measures requiring various degrees of political adjustment in each country to the larger interest of the region as a whole. In this way political change grows out of the needs of economic integration. (24)

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(23) Carlos M. Castillo, Growth and Integration in Central America, (New York : Frederick M. Praeger, 1966) , p. 169

(24) Ibid., p. 271

Since the governments in the region, however, could not be counted on take the required action by themselves, supranational institutions would be crucial. He argued that it was essential that :

> ... economic integration and the processes upon which it is built be made independent of the unilateral actions of national governments and of the capricious and arbitrary conduct of individual rulers. Such independence is obtained through the adoption of norms common to all member countries giving rise to co-ordinated, jointand supranational action. (25)

In his view the key issue in regional integration institutions gaining and developing supranational authority would be for them to "succeed in the performance of their statutory duties". (26) Castillo felt that processes of regional economic integration would lead to the creation of new social classes and strengthen emerging social classes both groups of which would take the lead in bringing about internal reforms within the Central American Countries. The classes that he identified were industrial entreprenuers, industrial workers and middle classes. He saw these new groups forming a broad alliance with agricultural workers and subsistence farmers against the vested interests of land owners and traditional exporters. (27)

At least the public rhetoric of the executive heads who take the pragmatic approach is quite different. Alister McIntyre also published a book shortly before he assumed the position of executive head by becoming secretary-General of Caricom. His book was a technical analysis of the effects of reverse preferences (preferential treatment given by LDCs to the experts of particular developed countries) on trade among developing countries. (28)

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(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid., p. 172

(27) Ibid., pp. 176-177

(28) Alister McIntyre, Current Problems of Economic Integration : The Effects of Reverse Preferences on Trade Among Developing Countries, (New York : United Nations, 1974, Sales No E.73. II.D.18.

The general conclusions of the book which actually deal with issues of some political significance, exemplify McIntyre's loy - keyed, technical approach :

> The analysis of reverse preference arrangements in the previous sections has pointed to many directions in which these preferences may be an actual or potential obstacle to the expansion oftrade between reverse preference-granting countries and other developing countries. Taking into account the pledges made within the international community to promote the development of closer trade and economic links between developing countries, it can be assumed that those developed countries which are now recipients of reverse preferences will be willing to forgo these preferences wherever they are constraining the expansion of trade between preference-granting and other developing countries. Accordingly, it may be of particular interest to note the conclusion reached in the study that the forthcoming accession of the United Kingdom to EEC will provide the enlarged Community with a unique opportunity for re-structuring any special arrangements it may wish to retain with certain developing countries.
>
> Another general conclusion reached by the study is that there are several areas where existing and prospective associated States can take fresh initiatives to promote trade expansion among themselves as well as with other developing countries. Thus, the particular conclusions detailed below illustrate the scope for a concerted programme of action by the developed and developing countries concerned to remove obstacles that stand in the way of trade expansion among the latter. (29)

Admitedly the subject-matter of the two books was quite different, but to the extent that books reflect authors' interests, that in itself is significant. What is striking about this passage is the modesty of the approach, the limited and specific goals proposed, and the emphasis on choices by governments.

If these two vignettes can illustrate two different perhaps ideal types of personalities of executive heads. These two executive

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(29) Ibid., p. 61

heads could be the polar extremes on a continuum along which the other occupants of the posts could be placed according to the extent to which they were ideological or pragmatic in their approach. Figure 2 contains such a continuum with illustrative placements.

With this information about the career background and the personalities of the executive heads, let us turn now to consider the strategies that various of them have chosen and the fates that their strategies have met.

V

It is beyond the data that are available to us and the constraints of this presentation to be comprehensive. What we present instead are various case studies that we hope will illustrate the interactions among the several variables that are involved. Our case studies are divided into three broad categories. Those in the first category deal with what may be termed the ordinary functioning of the customs union or common market. Here our concern is with the functioning of the executive head in the tasks that were agreed to in the treaty establishing the regional economic integration scheme. The second category involves situations in which a crisis has erupted in the relations among the member states. What have the executive heads done in these circumstances ? The final category involves what might be termed special projects. What happens when executive heads attempt to accomplish goals that they themselves have played a major role in defining ?

The first case involving the ordinary functioning of the customs union or common market concerns the role that Pedro Delgado played in the creation of the Central American Common Market in the early nineteen-sixties. His task essentially consisted of keeping material before the ministers so that the required decisions could be taken according to the prearranged schedule.

As he began to run into difficulties and faced the resistance of the member states he attempted to put together package deals that would be attractive to all of the member states, or perhaps more accurately that would have something in it for all of the member states. For instance, in 1965 SIECA made a number of proposals about balance of payments issues that seemed to keep the CACM moving along. Examples of problems that he faced were : desequilibrium in balance of payments and in trade development (El Salvador and Guatemala most favored, Honduras most desadvantaged); conflict about establishment of integrated industries and consequently the paralysis of the regional industrial development; absence of common policies in the main industrial, agricultural, infrastructural sectors; losses in revenue from taxes suffered by some countries and especially Honduras; finally, the inadequacy of the institutions and the decision-making process : the weakeness of the secretary general's powers, the lenght of the procedure : unlike other experiments in integration, the main decisions of the Council are not only taken by unanimous vote but have the form of protocols which must be ratified by the national legislative assemblies. These carry-overs of the traditional international procedure constitute an obstacle to the efficient and rapid functioning of the Common Market and give the member States a supplementary arm for control; similarly, the Council may not modify customs-tariffs without the approval of the assemblies. This intervention of the national assemblies contributes to slow down and threaten the Central American integration process in so much as many of national

Figure 2

The Broad Approaches of Executive Heads



Rankings are necessarily judgemental and are based on an analysis of the public speeches and writings of the executive heads.

parliaments are too dependent on their governments in the non-polyarchic systems. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Delgado managed to achieve consensus among governments on several issues vital to the trade liberalization and to the beginning of the integration processes.

The CACM ran into problems that could not have been foreseen easily and imaginative and energetic Secretary-General kept the market going.

A second case deals with the early functioning of the Andean Group. Charged with the responsibility for inaugurating the Cartagena Agreement, the Junta took a fairly dynamic approach at the outset, initiating the decision- making process and presenting proposals within the framework of the obligations and the time table set forth in the treaty. It is somewhat difficult, however, to classify the Junta's approach according to our ideological -- pragmatic continuum. First, the Board is a collective body composed of three different and strong personalities. At this time the three members of the Board were : Felipe Salazar, a lawyer who had a global approach that was somewhat formalistic and fairly ideological; Germanico Salgado, an economist who was more pragmatically minded; and Salvador Lluch, an engineer with economic experience whose approach can best be characterized as that of an open-minded technician. The Board's final stand on any one issue was then and is now the result of the internal agreement among its members, and in reaching this agreement the influence of the different individuals varies from issue to issue and time to time. Second, since the Board's proposals were based on the obligations states in the Treaty, they necessarily took on some of the ideological characteristics of the Treaty, even of this characteristic was compensated by the more pragmatic pre-consultations of the Board with governments and independent experts. Third, during its initial years, the Junta, like the Commission of the European Communities in a comparable period in its history, experienced an "heroic" period which was characterized by bolder proposals and positions that it advanced or would have been tolerated later.

Some fundamental decisions were taken at this stage; for example, Decision 24 on foreign investments and the decisions on industrial programming for the mechanical engineering and petrochemical industries. The Board of necessity and by strategy played an important role in decision-making in these early years. According to the Treaty the Board has principal responsibility at the preparatory stage, and even later in the negotiating phase where the Commission must take the final decision, as a practical matter, the Board still has a crucial position in assisting the governments to achieve a consensus through framing compromises or package deals. Fortunately at this early stage there was a strong harmony between the Board and the governments of the member states of the Andean Group. Initiatives proposed by the Board found a receptive audience, and when the governments found it difficult to reach consensus, the welcomed the assistance of the Board. The collective thrust of the Board's proposals may have been ideological, but the ideology that they encompassed was largely shared by the member governments. The success of the Board in these early years depended in large measure on the convergence of the positions of the governments of the member states, the governments willingly supported the guidelines and policies proposed by the Board. As in other regional groupings, the capacity of the executive head to exercise influence is a function of many variables among which the consensus and support or lack of support by the governments are probably the most determining. Nevertheless, in the case of the Andean Board, as in the case of the European Communities, the power of initiative, and the stature of the collective executive head, proved to be important in facilitating inter-governmental consensus.

However, experience shows that the despite the formal authority of the executive head of the Andean Group and the personal stature of its members, the Board became virtually impotent when faced with the severe crisis caused by the coup in Chile and the global economic problems of the seventies. Chile insisted that unless Decision 24 were modified, it would leave the Andean Group. Venezuela countered that if Decision 24 were moremodified it would leave. The Board could do little to break the deadlocks that developed. Even after Chile's departure, the Board has been unable to prevent other governments such as those of Colombia and Peru from having second thoughts about the policy resulting from Decision 24. The Board lost is momentum in proposing initiatives.

External forces also played a role, for instance with respect to the proposed programming agreement for the automobile industry. Although the member countries have had difficulties with the Board's proposals, the foreign automobile firms have simply said that they would not go along with various features of the proposals.

A former member of the Board has argued that to strengthen the position of the Board, a court shoud be created that would rule on the obligations of governments and on the legality of their actions in terms of the Treaty of Cartegena. In some ways this proposal resembles Carlos Castillo's desire to make progress in spite of governments. The problem is that international organizations with staffs that play only a limited role in the economic affairs of the member states simply cannot coerce states to do things that they do not want to do. The Andean Board make tremendous progress in the early years not primarily because they had supranational powers, but because there was a consensus among the member states. Nevertheless, the leading role as defined by the treaty that the Board had to assume and its dynamic approach and action contributed to the governments consensus building.

Several of the six regional economic integration schemes have faced serious crises. Oft n these crises have involved the threatened or actual departure of a member state from the scheme. The cases in point are : the Central American Common Market crisis that started in the late nineteen sixties and has continued to the present, the above mentionned Chilean crisis in the Andean Group, the 1968 crisis in UDEAC, and the crisis in the East African Community dating especially from 1971. With respect to CACM, the SIECA appears to have continued to seek a solution in increasing the autonomous powers supranational and competences of the common body and the secretary general and in improving of the scheme -- essentially following Delgado's evaluating report from 1965 and Castillo's advice.

It was clear that the new steps of central American integration proposed by Delgado were hampered by the resistance from different governments but also by increasing economic difficulties of balance of payments and unequal distribution of benefits and losses. The sequence of problems that arose among member states put in evidence the lack of efficient institutional setting and of general integration strategy, as well as the limitations imposed by the integration based essentially on the free trade even if the intrazonal commerce registered successes with 24 % of exports in 1970. These tensions and difficulties exploded when the conflict between El Salvador and Honduras broke in 1969 threatining after the rejection of the <u>modus operandi</u> in 1970 which confirmed the suspension of the common market and free trade. In these occasions, the influence of the secretary General is seriously diminished all the weight beeing concentrated on governments. It is probable that in such a crisis a more pragmatic personality would have had a better chance in his effort of conciliation that a predominantly ideologically minded Secretary General. But, in general the role of the secretary general relatively important in a good conjoncture/become limited in highly political crisis.
seems to

It would be extraordinary for an executive head to play a major role in helping to resolve a political crisis among the member states.

The prolonged crisis followed by some provisional and transitional mesures aiming to maintain the exchanges and to preserve main activities of the Common Market, finally resulted in a rethinking of the regional strategy, restructuring of the institutional machinary and in a draft treaty of the Economic and Social Community. In this process of renovation of the treaty and the elaboration of the new strategy for regional integration, the Secretary-General and his four associate Secretaries-General have played a crucial role as promotional actor. They not only drafted the ante-project of the Community influencing its fundamental orientation but also - after its approval by representatives of Presidents, - still continue to act in favour of its final adoption and ratification. They persue a clear integration ideology line.

In the case of the East African Common Market, given the deep differences between Amin and Nyerere and between Tanzania's and Kenya's economic systems and development strategy, and given the restricted character of the Secretary-General's power, there has been little that he could do to maintain the Community. The first Secretary-General was judged as to strong personality trying to impose his views on governments and replaced by a more flexible and diplomatic personality. The SG has been limited to making a few trips to Kampala to talk to Amin, and when in 1971 there was an immediate danger of EAC falling apart because of lack of funds, he decided to pay people anyway and got the support of Kenya and Tanzania for his action. He may have staved off collapse, but ultimately he would not prevent it. At the same time, we have the impression that Malacela and Robert Ouko, the Tanzania and the Kenya EA Ministers have been more effective than the SG. This is due to the fact that at least, they are more of an established political figures and that they occupied a more influencial position in the EA scheme and decision-making process.

In the case of UDEAC, what is interesting is that after CHAD and the Central African Repulic both announced that they were withdrawing, CAR changed its mind and decided to stay in UDEAC. Worsening relations between CAR and Congo (Zaire) probably played a part in Bokassa's change of mind, but it is also possible that France and the member states of UDEAC also put pressure on Bokasso to stay in UDEAC. In any case, shortly after B announced that he would go to a UDEAC meeting, he also announced that he was paying a state visit to France.

The two cases that illustrate personal projects are Tchanqué's success in getting the UDEAC treaty revised in 1974 and McIntyre's success in getting rid of reverse preferences in the Lomé convention. Both illustrate the use of UNDP as a resource and the importance of having specific goals and the UDEAC case illustrates the importance of the SG's relations with the Heads of State.

Before attempting to draw generalizations from these case studies we need to examine the overall progress made in the six regional integration schemes and the developments that have occurred within member states within the period of the schemes.

VI

First let us consider <u>developments with respect to the integration schemes</u>. Table 11 presents results of scoring of the six schemes on a modified version of the scale that Leon Lindberg developed for measuring the extent of integration in the European

Community. (30) The scores in the chart for 1977 apply only to the countries that remained members of the six schemes. Thus it must be recalled that although the scores for the Andean Group and UDEAC indicated increased integration during the life of the scheme, one member state has left each effort. The scores for CACM also apply principally to the four member countries that are continuing to collaborate, they do not apply to the collective relations of these states with Honduras. Several developments are apparent from Table 8. First, all of the schemes except the East African Community have made some progress toward achieving collective decision making for regional economic integration during their period of existence. Although there was considerable integration at the time that the East African Community began, the collective decision making processes have been progressively dismantled during the life of the treaty. Since the scale of measurement is not ordinal, and given the subjective character of the scoring, the actual progress of the other five schemes cannot be compared very precisely. Nevertheless, CACM's progress appears to have been relatively slow. Given the fact that it started with a measure of collective decision making processes and the fact that it has been in existence for a considerably longer period than the other schemes, its 1977 score did not indicate that much more collective decisbn making that existed in the other four schemes.

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(30) See Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), pp. 649-731, especially 663-678.

Table 11

The Changing scope of Six Integration Schemes
(Percent of Scores Achieved)

	CACM		ANDEAN		CARICOM		UDEAC		EAC		CEAO	
	61	77	70	77	74	77	65	77	68	77	74	77
1.	75	55	100	60	95	65	100	75	45	100	100	75
2.	20	30	-	40	--	30	-	20	25	-	-	20
3.	5	15	-	-	5	5	-	-	25	-	-	5
4.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	-	-	-
5.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

The actuel scoring for the 6 scheme on wich this table is based are reproduced in appendix B.

Scale for Scoring : From Low to High Integration

1. All policy decisions are made by individual governments by means of purely internal processes or are made in other nonnational settings.
2. Only the beginnings of community level decision authority have appeared.
3. Substantial regular policy making goes on at the community level, but most matters are still decided by purely domestic processes.
4. Most deciaions must be taken jointly, but substantial decisions are still taken autnomously at the nation-state level.
5. All choices are subject to joint decision in the community system.

Regardless of the level at which decisions were taken in the six regional economic integration schemes, how much success have they achieved in the essential goals of regional economic integration. Table 12 gives intraregional exports as a percentage of total exports for each of the six schemes for selected years from 1960 through 1974. As can be seen, all of the six schemes but the two newest, Caricom and CEAO had achieved a higher proportion of intra-regional exports than existed at the date the treaty establishing the scheme was signed, and since Caricom is a direct successor to CARIFTA, if 1967 the date of the signature of the CARIFTA is used as a base point rather than 1973, the date of the signature of the Caricom agreement, the statement would apply to Caricom too. However, what happened in Caricom also occurred in three other regional schemes. In CACM, Caricom, UDEAC and CEAO, after intra-regional exports increased relatively to a certain extent, they began to decline.

The relative stagnation and even decline of intra-regional trade can be seen even more clearly in Table 13, which gives the intra-regional exports of the member countries and of the schemes for 1976. Only in the Andean Group do these recent figures indicate a continual increase, even if the level remains low below the latin american mean. The progressive disintegration of the East African Community is evident from the fact that intra-regional trade in that region had declined to a level that was lower than it was at the time that the treaty was signed, and although the level of intra-regional trade was still above that that prevailed in 1960 when the treaty was signed, it was far below the heighths in the late-nineteen sixties and early nineteen-seventies. As the nineteen-seventies wore on, the global economic difficulties contributed to the stagnation in intra-regional trade, but in the two cases where the most subtantial decline occurred CACM and EAC, political difficulties among the countries involved were clearly major if not the

Table 12

Intra-regional Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports
of Member Countries of Regional Economic Integration Schemes
(Underlining Indicates Year in Which Treaty was Signed)

	1960	1965	1967	1969	1971	1973	1974
CACM	7.5	17.8	24.9	25.4	24.1	23.4	24.8
Andean Group	1.5	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.4
Carifta/ CARICOM	4.8 **	-	5.1	7.8	9.2	10.5	7.0
UDEAC	1.7 **	2.5***	4.2	6.2	8.1	7.8 **	-
EAC	14.0	20.0	17.3	16.3	17.3	13.1	13.9
CEAO	2.5	5.9	7.1	6.8	8.6	7.9	4.3 *

* Provisional figures

** Estimate of the UNCTAD Secretariat

*** Figures for 1964 for UDEAC are not available

Source : UN Document TD/B/609 (Vol. II), 20 May 1976, Economic Cooperation and Integration Among Developing Countries, Annex V.

Table 13

Intra-regional Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports of Member Countries of Regional Economic Integration Schemes, 1976

CACM		UDEAC	
Costa Rica	19.4	Cameroon	6.7
El Salvador	16.1	CAE	.2
Guatemala	21.6	Congo	.8
Honduras	3.7	Gabon	1.8
Nicaragua	19.1		
Total CACM	17.1	Total UDEAC	3.0
Andean Group		EAC	
Bolivia	7.5	Kenya	20.1
Colombia	11.5	Tanzania	6.3
Chile	5.7	Uganda	.5
Ecuador	15.5		
Peru	8.5		
Venezuela	1.7		
Total Andean Group	5.3	Total EAC	11.68
Caricom		CEAO	
Barbados	17.5	Ivory Coast	7.1
Guyana	13.0	Mali	3.2
Jamaica	6.2	Mauritania	.2
Trinidad and Tobago	5.4	Niger	2.0
		Senegal	2.0
		Upper Volta	25.8
Total Caricom	6.6	Total CEAO	4.7

Source for data : International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, Annual 1970 - 1976, (Washington, D.C., IMF, 1977). The data for several countries are provisional.

most important of the factors responsible. Table 12 also shows the differences among the extent to which the member countries of the schemes export to their partner countries. In only 11 of the 28 countries (39 percent) are intra-regional exports 10 percent or more of the countries total exports. For this reason alone, the regional economic integration schemes can hardly essentially focus on intra-regional trade in order to influence the states. Only in CACM does intra-regional trade have substantial importance for most of the member states. As a point of comparison, intra-EEC exports constitute more than 50 percent of the exports of the EEC member countries.

Finally, growth rates in thenational economies of the member states of those regional economic integration schemes that have been in existence long enough to have had the possibility of having had some effect : on CACM; the Andean Group; UDEAC, and EAC. Table 14 gives the average annual growth rates for GNP and population for the member states of the four schemes from the time that the integration treaty was signed until 1973, the last year for which GNP figures in constant prices were available. The difference in the rates of growth of the various member countries is striking. Moreover, in some cases low rates of growth in GNP are combined with high rates of population growth, with the result that the differences in the rates of per-capita GNP growth would be even sharper. In three of the four schemes, CACM, the Andean Group, and EAC, the country with the lowest rate of growth in GNP among the members has been the focal point of a crisis. Given the relatively low level of intra-regional trade and the marginal role played by regional development program, the integration schemes can hardly have played a major role in determining the differential growth rates. At the same time, the schemes, and the strategies of executive heads within them, have displayed timid efforts to achieve redistribution or equalization.

VII

What generalizations about the role of executive heads in regional economic integration schemes among less developed countries can be drawn from this analysis ? First, it would seem clear that the ability of the executive heads to affect developments within their integration schemes is limited and that their ability to affect developments within and among the member states of the schemes is even more limited. At this historical juncture, regional economic integration efforts are only marginal and complementary factors influencing the development of the economies of less developed countries. World prices for the commodity exports of these countries, the availability of domestic and foreign capital for investment purposes, and population growth are much more potent factors. Intra-regional trade accounts for only a small and in many cases a tiny fraction of the Gross National Products of the member states of the regional economic integration schemes and the regional planning of development is still at early stage. Because of this, there is only at best a loose connection between progress toward regional economic integration in the sense of moving toward joint decision making with respect to economic issues and the economic development of the member countries. The economic links that do exist between regional economic integration efforts and national economic development are hardly sufficient to exercise a compelling force on political developments within the member countries. Thus political developments within the countries occur largely autonomously without reference to the regional economic integration efforts. Yet the regional economic integration efforts and the executive heads of these schemes depend upon the voluntary cooperation of their member states for their success. Regional economic integration cannot be imposed on states, and intra-regional trade is not sufficiently important to most of the 37 states that have

Table 14

Average Annual Growth Rates for GNP and Population for Member Countries of Regional Economic Integration Schemes From the Time The Treaty Was Signed Until 1973

(Figures in Percentages)

	GNP	Population
CACM (1960 - 1973)		
Costa Rica	6.4	3.1
El Salvador	5.3	3.2
Guatemala	5.6	2.4
Honduras	4.5	3.2
Nicaragua	6.1	3.0
Andean Group (1969 - 1973)		
Bolivia	5.7	2.6
Chile	2.5	1.7
Colombia	6.8	3.2
Ecuador	7.6	3.4
Peru	7.6	2.9
Venezuela	5.9	3.6
UDEAC (1964 - 1973)		
Cameroon	6.2	2.0
Central African Empire	3.6	2.2
Congo	4.7	2.8
Gabon	8.8	1.4
EAC (1967 - 1973)		
Kenya	6.7	3.4
Tanganyika	4.4	2.7
Uganda	3.3	2.9

Source for data : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Tables, 1976 (Washington, D.C., IBRD, 1977).

been involved in these six schemes to compel them to take any particular actions, including even those that would be involved in retaining established custom union or common market features. Executive heads are virtually powerless to prevent military coups or to present the adoption by member states of diametically opposed economic policies, yet such events can have a determining effect on the progress of regional economic integration.

This dominant reality having been underscored, it is also true executive heads of regional economic integration schemes have some ability to affect the course of events. They can influence the pace and character of steps toward the adoption of customs unions and common markets and the terms of the relationship of the member countries of their schemes with various actors in the world economy : states, groups of states and TNCs. There is, however, no clear formula for success. Different executive heads have been successful with different strategies in different circumstances. Executive heads who pursue what we have term ideological approaches can succeed when the member states of the scheme share the executive head's ideology, and pragmatic approaches can succed when the executive head can induce the member states to agree to the particular specific goals that are advanced, either because they value the goals or consider their attainment not prejudical to their own interests.

Some more detailed maxims also emerge. Given the structure of political power and of authority within the member states of regional economic integration schemes the attitudes of the real heads of government of the states are crucially important for the success of the integration schemes. Including or excluding the heads of the governments of the member states in the intergovernmental institutions that are established seems to have little consequence so far as insuring that the heads of government will achieve a working consensus.

The Central American Common Market is experiencing a long crisis and the East African Community has reached an impasse, despite the fact Central American Economic Council is composed of ministers and the East African Authority is composed of heads of state. These situations occurred, it should be recalled, despite the fact that CACM and EAC in many respects presented the most favorable environments for regional economic integration.

Because of the importance of external forces, other things being equal executive heads who are skilled in dealing with these would seem to have an advantage. The resources available to their integration efforts can be increased by their improving their negotiating power and by grants from developed countries and international financial institutions. Generally blocked from manipulating interest groups within their regions either because such groups do not exist or because of the authoritarian character of the member states, executive heads can turn to external forces for levels for action.

In view of the important limitations and problems that have been discovered in connection with import substitution as a strategy for economic development, executive heads' of regional economic integration schemes whose authority permit them to go beyond issues concerning the creation and maintenance of a customs union would seem to have an advantage. As member countries emphasize other economic development strategies than import substitution, schemes that concentrated on this risk becoming outmoded and irrelevant to the main economic issues facing their member states.

In a general way the three variables identified as being "critical" for the success of an executive head by Robert W. Cox would seem to apply to regional economic integration schemes among less developed countries as well as to the International Labor Organization. On the other hand, we are skeptical of the applicability to these schemes of prescriptions based on the experience of the

European Communities. The environment of regional economic integration efforts among LDCs and the forces at work in these efforts are just too different from the situation in Europe for the prescriptions to be valid without substantial alteration.

If the overall thrust to our remarks seems to favor a pragmatic as opposed to an ideological approach on the part of executive heads, this emphasis is intended. Because of the multiplicity of internal and external factors, and the highly fluid nature of the contemporary world economy, we believe that those executive heads who are imaginative and creative in crafting initiatives, and who can constantly adjust their goals and tactics to the prevailing situation, will have the greatest chance of moving toward the realization of the purposes of their organizations.

DS/HJ/fm

Appendix A/a

States that have been Members of Regional Economic Integration Schemes Among Less Developed Countries and Their Characteristics, 1974

State	Population (1,000)	Area (1,000 km2)	GNP (million US)
Central American Common Market			
Costa Rica	1,922	51	1,641
El Salvador	4,004	21	1,554
Guatemala	5,881	109	3,050
Honduras	3,098	112	955
Nicaragua	2,186	130	1,407
Total	17,091	423	8,607
Andean Group			
Bolivia	5,275	1,099	1,655
Chile	10,405	757	8,683
Colombia	25,014	1,139	11,935
Ecuador	6,824	284	3,366
Peru	15,028	1,285	11,489
Venezuela	12,405	912	25,284
Total	74,951	5,476	62,412
Caribbean Community			
Guyana	769	215	413
Jamaica	2,020	11	2,405
Trinidad and Tobago	966	5	1,883
East African Community			
Kenya	13,125	583	2,575
Tanzania	15,053	945	2,103
Uganda	11,172	236	2,890
Total	39,350	1,764	7,568
Central African Customs and Economic Union			
Central African Empire	1,676	623	356
Chad	4,079	1,284	380
Cameroon	6,332	475	1,690
Congo	1,314	342	560
Gabon	514	268	1,029
Total	13,915	2,992	4,015
East African Economic Community			
Ivory Coast	4,759	322	2,906
Mali	5,501	1,240	402
Mauritania	1,215	1,031	354
Niger	4,426	1,267	504
Senegal	4,275	196	1,535
Upper Volta	5,840	274	470
Total	26,016	4,330	6,171

Source : Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1977, Leesburg, Virginia, WMSE Publications, 1977), pp. 21, 23.

Appendix A/b

States that have been Members of Regional Economic Integration Schemes Among Less Developed Countries and Their Characteristics, 1974

State	Public Expenditures: Military Expenditures (million US $)	As % of GNP	Health Expenditures (million US $)	As % of GNP	Education Expenditures (million US $)	As % of GNP
Central American Common Market						
Costa Rica	8	(.5)	31	(2)	85	(5)
El Salvador	18	(1)	21	(1)	52	(3)
Guatemala	26	(1)	43	(1)	73	(2)
Honduras	16	(2)	12	(1)	32	(3)
Nicaragua	22	(2)	36	(3)	36	(3)
Total	90	(1)	233	(3)	511	(6)
Andean Group						
Bolivia	41	(2)	21	(1)	65	(4)
Chile	211	(2)	192	(2)	330	(4)
Colombia	118	(1)	119	(1)	242	(2)
Ecuador	72	(2)	33	(1)	105	(3)
Peru	385	(3)	116	(1)	486	(4)
Venezuela	459	(2)	558	(2)	993	(4)
Total	1.286	(2)	1.039	(2)	2.156	(3)
Caribbean Community						
Guyana	7	(2)	10	(2)	25	(6)
Jamaica	15	(.6)	73	(3)	162	(7)
Trinidad and Tobago	4	(.2)	32	(2)	58	(3)
East African Community						
Kenya	40	(2)	38	(1)	139	(5)
Tanzania	69	(3)	48	(2)	75	(4)
Uganda	65	(2)	20	(.7)	87	(3)
Total	174	(2)	106	(1)	301	(4)
Central African Customs and Economic Union						
Central African Empire	20	(6)	4	(1)	15	(4)
Chad	19	(5)	5	(1)	9	(2)
Cameroon	7	(.4)	19	(1)	71	(4)
Congo	6	(1)	9	(2)	34	(6)
Gabon	11	(1)	16	(2)	25	(2)
Total	63	(2)	53	(1)	154	(4)
East African Economic Community						
Ivory Coast	42	(1)	42	(1)	221	(8)
Mali	10	(2)	5	(1)	12	(3)
Mauritania	8	(2)	3	(.8)	12	(3)
Niger	4	(.8)	5	(1)	10	(2)
Senegal	25	(2)	16	(1)	42	(3)
Upper Volta	6	(1)	4	(.9)	14	(3)
Total	95	(2)	75	(1)	311	(5)

Appendix 8

The Changing Scope of Six Economic Integration Schemes

	CACM 61	CACM 77	Andean 70	Andean 77	Caricom 74	Caricom 77	EAC 68	EAC 77	UDEAC 65	UDEAC 77	CEAO 74	CEAO 77
External Relations												
1. Military Security	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. Commercial Relations	2	3	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2
3. Diplomatic Relations	1	3	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Political and Civil Rights Functions												
4. Public Safety	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
5. Political Participation	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
6. Civil Rights	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Social and Cultural Functions												
7. Culture	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8. Health	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
9. Social Welfare	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
10. Education	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1
Economic Functions												
11. Free Movement of Goods	3	2	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	4	1	3
12. Free Movement of Capital	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1
13. Free Movement of Labor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
14. Transport policy	2	3	1	1	1	2	4	1	1	2	1	1
15. Agricultural Policy	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
16. Economic Planning	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2
17. Monetary Policy	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1
18. Natural Resources	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
19. Counter Cyclical policy	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
20. Research and Development	2	2	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	1

Scale for Scoring : From Low to High Integration

1. All policy decisions are made by individual governments by means of purely internal processes or are made in other nonnational settings.
2. Only the beginnings of community level decision authority have appeared.
3. Substantial regular policy making goes on at the community level, but most matters are still decided by purely domestic processes.
4. Most decisions must be taken jointly, but substantial decisions are still taken autonomously at the nation-state level.
5. All choice are subject to joint decision in the community system.

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