


THE MAKING OF DEMOCRACY

edited by
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and
JAN ŠKALOUD



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*A Monsieur le Professeur
Dusan Sidjanski en
signe de ma reconnaissance*

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On the cover: „The Manner and Use of the Ballot” from *The Oceana of James Harrington and his other works*, London, 1700.

IS THE RE-EMERGING NATION-STATE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE COMPATIBLE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Dusan Sedjanski



European Federalism

Federalism is our future. This is the conclusion of this look at European projects and their implementation from the origins of the European Community to today, a conclusion which marks the beginning of a new era for European federalism. For a long time considered by governments as a threat to the unity of the "Nation" and a concept for savages, federalism today appears to be the only form of social and political organisation capable of safekeeping national and regional identities in a context of growing interdependence and globalisation. In the networks of today's information-based society it becomes the antidote to the strong revival of the Nation-State built upon virulent nationalism. Once more, Europeans are faced with a choice between the unification of Europe or its balkanisation.

Having regained their independence, several former or new Eastern Europe states are being sorely tempted to rebuild the Nation State, despite the attraction of the European Union. As they emerge from communism, these countries are finding it impossible to make „state" coincide with „nation" because peoples, cultures and religions in this region are so severely mingled and even antagonistic. Against this background, reconstituting the Nation State involves imposing, if necessary by force, the culture of a dominant majority: an action of assimilation that often leads to discrimination and in the worst cases, conflict. Contrary to the process of creating a union in Europe, this causes disintegration and violent confrontation. The fall of the Berlin Wall therefore did not only reveal the gaps in economic development between East and West but worse, it exposed differences in values, attitudes and behaviour. Learning democracy and federalism is a long and slow process.

In view of this revival of nationalism, I thought it urgent to retrace the steps taken by the European Union and go back to the origins of European federalism, before turning to the Maastricht Treaty and its consequences. The history of Europe

is full of ideas and projects for a union of European countries. It was in the dark hours of the resistance and the Occupation, however, that projects for a European federation emerged. Utopically based on the free association of men and states in the framework of a democratic community, these ideas were spread by the Resistance following the issue of the federalist „Ventotene Manifesto“. War was declared between democratic Europe and the partisans of hegemony. Taken up after the war by hundreds of pro-European movements, the federalist ideals were developed in the Congress of Montreux before coming to fruition in the European Manifesto, announced in The Hague. From then on, the European Manifesto became a counter project to the Marxist manifesto and the spreading of communist Europe.

The convergence of Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann's initiatives and the actions of the members of the militant European Movement led, with the blessing of the US, to the creation of the European Communities. Shortly after the second world war therefore - hardly five years - the two deadly enemies were to become principal political and trading partners and then a Franco-German tandem, which is now the dynamic core of European integration. The Community has delivered peace and prosperity to Europe, as well as favoured the development of its Nations and Regions. We have seen the fulfilment of Churchill's premonitory call, made at the Hague Congress in his speech on the merger and sharing of sovereignties, which he declared were the only guarantees for safeguarding the diversity of peoples, customs and traditions. This conclusion on today's reality is the culmination of the line of thinking that leads from Proudhon's "Federate Principle" to Denis de Rougemont's announcement of the "principles of federalism" at the Montreux Congress a century later.

According to Denis de Rougemont, federalism means renouncing hegemony, because federating means uniting different elements in a dynamic equilibrium; it means safeguarding the individuality of each Nation, region and minority; it means opposing totalitarian simplification and uniformity imposed by a centralising Nation-State; it means living in a space of freedom, democracy and participation with different cultures, beliefs, political parties, businesses and interest groups co-existing within a complex and varied social fabric. Based on the recognition of the dignity of man, his political federalism evolves according to the principles of subsidiarity, autonomy and participation, going beyond the „State“, both above and below it, through the European federation, and that of Communes and Regions respectively.

As much in its foundations as in its directing principles and in its flexible approach, federalism achieves a synergy between two opposing poles of attraction: globalisation compelled by the arrival of new technologies, and cultural individuality at both national and local levels. On the one hand a solidarity caused by the di-

vision of labour and interdependence leading to internationalisation and the creation of continental groupings; and on the other a solidarity based on mutual cultural identity, either ethnic or national, based on real history or legends. This contradiction is resolved in a „Union in diversity“ which permits an alignment of large economic forces and the wealth of individuals and their countries; a union based on a web of solidarities, memberships and multiple loyalties. Paradoxically, the convergence of the two opposing trends has been achieved by the development of new information technology and the creation of new networks in both business and socio-political relations. The future of federalism lies in the microchip, programmed into the proliferation of horizontal networks, transforming the notion and use of power and reversing the traditional pyramid.

The Federal Stamp on the European Community

SECTORAL FEDERALISM

Although it is only a partial and incomplete federation, the European Community is strengthening its federative features as it develops, something that the Single European Act makes very clear. However if the Community is seeking forms of participation for the Regions at Community level, the sometimes rather excessive autonomy of the Member States, and their sometimes rather cumbersome participation, currently tend to prevent European union rather than contribute to it. The problem here is the opposite of the one that surfaces in certain federal states where the autonomy of member states has to be safeguarded from the grasp and encroachment of the central state. The problem is that the institutional embryo of the European Community encounters difficulties when it wants to assert its autonomous power in relation to the Member States, several of which are old European nations. When we speak of the centralising ambitions of Brussels it is worth remembering that this emerging power is much less solid and powerful than the central power in several federal states, in particular the Swiss Confederation. In the early days of the European Community there was a legitimate fear of certain centralising ambitions preponderantly inspired by France (standardisation, the use of regulations). In the meantime France and the Community have both evolved towards a greater differentiation and regionalisation. The new direction of Community action, set out and confirmed by the Single European Act - is proof that the European Community is searching for a new form or structure of powers. Far from moving towards a single federalist model - federalism offers numerous 'models' - the Community is looking for an original form of organisation that is both adequate and dynamic; adequate in respect of the requirements and

trends of reality and the new forms of power; dynamic as it looks forward to the future, and in its flexibility and its ability to adapt rapidly through its federative structures and processes. It is true that although the term 'federalism' sometimes crops up in the speeches of former President Jacques Delors, it has not been officially sanctioned in the European Community. Nonetheless just a Molière's M. Jourdain spoke prose, the European Community practises federalism in many areas of its activity without using the term or even knowing it is doing so.

Unlike a federal state, the European Community is not responsible for a shared defence, nor is there a European army or a European police force. As regards foreign policy, it has only a few embryonic elements such as a common commercial policy including certain powers of negotiation or its aid and development policy which is in any case concurrent with those of Member States; the European Council is nonetheless on the way to formulating common positions in respect of global issues or those of Eastern Europe. Even in the economic sphere the Community's powers are limited - as can be seen by the continuing lack of any Community economic or monetary policy - although the European Monetary System does constitute the beginnings of such a policy. In 1990 the Delors Committee set out the stages to economic and monetary union involving a system of Central Banks, a European Central Bank, and a single currency. The substance of the Committee's proposals was embodied in the Maastricht Treaty.

Even in sectors that are actually a part of its area of action or jurisdiction, European Community powers are often limited although such restrictions have not prevented certain irritatingly pedantic rulings from being adopted abusively. Overall we are a long way from a Federation like the Swiss Confederation and even further away from „centralised power”. European Community powers are limited and are exercised primarily under the form of regulations and initiatives and, more rarely, in matters of common policy (e.g. the CAP) or the management of Community funds. Furthermore, in carrying out its regulative tasks the European Community often uses directives, which are binding as to the object they define but leave Member States free to choose the appropriate means. The area without borders is being built by means of about 300 directives. When the European Community issues general regulations, „Community laws” that are directly executive according to a technique very common in federal systems, it entrusts their execution to the Member States - as does the Swiss Confederation. These few examples confirm that the European Community has a hybrid form, with limited though real powers in socio-economic and technical matters, powers that are incomparably more limited than those of a federal state. But the European Community is still developing: it is getting bigger, having gone from 6 to 9, from 10 to 12 and then from 12 to 15 members and is now preparing for further ad-

missions; it is getting deeper, strengthening its activities and extending them to areas like the environment, regions and research; finally, it has been given an outline of a Political Union. This evolution was confirmed by the Single European Act, and has been crowned by an Economic and Monetary Union and a Political Union as embodied in the Maastricht Treaty.

A HYBRID INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Classic categories are inadequate to enable us to grasp the reality of the Community system which from a traditional perspective looks like a mixture of heterogeneous elements. Thus confederal elements stand side by side with federal and international features, while the whole fits into an assembly of combined interlocking powers. While the European Council and the Council of Ministers - intergovernmental institutions as well as Community institutions - are similar to confederal conferences, the Commission itself is a new type of institution that looks like a future executive organ. For the time being it can exercise only limited 'governmental' power attributed to it by the Council of Ministers and the European Council. In this respect, as in the carrying out of normative tasks, the Commission-Council tandem functions according to the general rule that the Commission proposes and the Council adopts in consultation or cooperation with the European Parliament. Unlike in national systems, the Parliament is a long way from exercising full legislative functions in the European Community, and yet since its election in 1979 it has represented the European „people” or more precisely the European peoples of the Community. From this point of view it is close to a Chamber of Representatives of the People, while the Council - the main decision-making organ - in which the Member States have seats - prefigures a Chamber of the States. As for the government of the European Community, it is difficult to find an institutional seat for it, as governmental functions, still fragmentary but in the process of developing, are shared between the Commission, the Council and the European Council. However, it is the European Council that - with the help of the Commission and the Council of Ministers - holds most of the power when it comes to issues with strong political overtones or that are fundamentally political.

In the socio-economic domain the European Community may be seen as a complex union whose active power is based on a Commission - a collegial institution with 17 members (reminiscent of the Swiss Federal Council: a stable Executive elected by Parliament but not responsible to it) - and a Council that is a prototype Council of States, which as an expression of member governments exercises certain executive functions and is the ultimate legislator. It is an open

question as to how this institutional complex is going to evolve. Since the Single European Act the European Community seems to have been moving in the direction of decentralised solutions. Even in the area of legislation the concept of common uniform rules is tending to give way to a concept of harmonisation and decentralisation, the objective being to remove the obstacles to free movement and thus create „a European area without borders” while building an environment that allows the activities of economic and social agents to develop favourably.

Alongside the principle of *double participation* by the Member States and by the people is the principle of *union in diversity*. Thus we read in the introduction to the *General Report* of the European Community for 1988 that „Interdependence between the European countries imposes its own logic of co-operation in the face of divergent interests; it leads to an acceptance of diversity while recognising differences and helps the twelve to live together”. Jacques Delors emphasised this same idea:

„There is no cause for any anxiety that national particularities might disappear any more than that specifically regional features might be eliminated. It is true that to give Europeans a feeling of belonging to a single body, governments have decided to establish a number of elements of a Europe of citizens: a European passport, student exchanges, sporting and cultural events ... But nothing in all that shows any sign of a desire for standardisation. After all, each country is free to cultivate the heritage of its own history, traditions, customs, and peculiarities. Our Europe will be united only in diversity”¹.

Two innovations set out in the Single European Act are a proof of this: the use of *directives* and the rule of *mutual recognition*. In fact the implementation of the internal market is based on a web of about 300 directives that are binding as to the objectives they define while leaving the actual means up to the Member States. In the same spirit, while making due allowance for real diversities and difficulties, the goal of harmonising national legislations and the practice of issuing uniform regulations is giving way in many places to the principle of mutual recognition. Thus a diploma or regulated product in one Member State will be recognised automatically in the other Member States. These different forms of Community instruments and actions move towards a generalised though sometimes imperfect application of a fundamental principle of federalism - the *principle of subsidiarity*. For example the European Council of June 1989 stated in its final resolution that the Delors Report was completely faithful to its mandate. It held that the building of an Economic and Monetary Union must take account of the parallelism between economic and monetary aspects, respect

^{1/} Jacques Delors: „Europe: Les embarras de la souveraineté” in *Politique internationale*, No. 41, Autumn 1988, p. 265.

the principle of subsidiarity and reflect the diversity of specific situations. In the same way the final stage provides for the full operation of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) on a *federal basis*, and with a European Central Bank, a wholly *autonomous* Community institution responsible for the formulation and implementation of the common monetary policy. Furthermore in this *federative* type of structure the national central banks will be responsible for carrying out operations in conformity with decisions taken by the ESCB Council. As for the Ecu, the report announces that it has the necessary potential to become a real common currency after a transition period during which it will act as a parallel currency. This is the final objective put forward by the Delors Report². This project clearly reproduces the structure of the American Federal Reserve (FED) and is inspired by the example of the Bundesbank. Such a step towards autonomous sub-systems and institutions is close to Denis de Rougemont’s idea of *European Agencies*. It was in this spirit, for example, that the Commission recommended the creation of an *Autonomous Environment Agency* within the Community system. There is also the *principle of differentiation*, in the form of the variety of Community sectoral and regional interests. Consultation between socio-economic groups organised at Community level is one of the main elements of this process, allowing the Commission to gather the opinions of Community groups and assess the level of their support. It is not, therefore, surprising that there are about six hundred Community organisations that form a dense web of communications and relations around the Commission. Likewise, as regards the *Regions*, regional policy supported by the work of the Regional Development Fund (ERDF) ensures that the *European regions* are not left out of the overall Community. The recent creation of a Consultative Committee for the Regions brings them into the decision-making process and strengthens regional structures while opening up new opportunities for the expression of regional and minority differences within the European Community.

The *principle of the protection of minorities* is more specifically embodied in the overrepresentation of small and medium-sized states in Community institutions and processes. The small and medium-sized states each have one member in the Commission compared to two members for each of the five large nations. In the Council each Member State has one representative and the small and medium-sized states are highly privileged in the weighting of votes when a qualified majority of 54 votes out of 76 is required (Luxembourg = 2; Denmark and Ireland 2 times 3; Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Holland = 4 times 5; Spain, 1 times 8; France, Italy, Germany, UK = 4 times 10). This weighting prevents excessive dominance by the large nations, which cannot impose their will on the Community even by acting in concert. To obtain a qualified majority they need the support of several small and medi-

^{2/} Comité pour l’étude de l’Union économique et monétaire, *Rapport sur l’Union économique et monétaire dans la Communauté européenne*, June 1989.

um-sized members. The influence of the small and medium-sized states is strengthened when unanimity is required for certain fundamental decisions (for example, the Economic and Monetary Union, the harmonisation of tax systems). The European Parliament also includes a strong representation of small and medium-sized states in relation to their population in millions: Luxembourg (0,36) = 6; Ireland (3,5) = 15; Denmark (5) = 16; Greece, Portugal, Belgium (10) = three times 24; Holland (14.5) = 25; compared with: Spain (38,5) = 60 and France, Italy, Germany, UK (55 to 61 or 80) = four times 81 or a total of 518 Euro MPs³. Each Member State has a judge at the Court and both the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions contain strong representations of counsellors for the small and medium-sized states.

The Community system also involves a remarkable balance between the large Member States, none of which can permanently hold a dominant position, while their influence is counterbalanced by the small and medium-sized countries that create more or less stable sub-groupings like the three Benelux countries. This balance is strengthened all the more in that, despite the Community's dependence on the energetic leadership of France and Germany and on the action of the Commission - of which the small and medium-sized states are the most loyal defenders -, there are no permanent coalitions. The Commission preserves a general equilibrium by seeking to identify the Community interest, and all the more so in that its proposals cannot be amended other than by a unanimous vote of Council members. Thus, paradoxically, unanimity protects and reinforces its proposals and its negotiating strength.

This handful of federative features in the European Community are reflected by the growth - still insufficient but real nonetheless - of a democratic basis. The European Parliament is increasingly involved for several reasons - its direct election, its increasing grip on the Community budget, its cooperation in the legislative process in the framework of the Single European Act, and its power of codecision as laid down by the Maastricht Treaty. As its role grows the political parties are tending to take a more active part in the union process.

Initially limited to the activity of their parliamentary groups in the European Parliament, the parties belonging to the three large European political families (Socialist, Christian-Democrat, Liberal) have formed federations. Although still only embryonic these federations have several characteristics in common with the Swiss parties, which are established around their members in the cantons where their main activities are held. For all the Community or federal labels, what is expressed within unions of parties is actually national or cantonal diversity.

^{3/} Since the accession of three new members, the European Parliament has 626 Euro MPs: 16 for Finland, 21 for Austria and 22 for Sweden.

FEDERALIST OR REGIONALIST EVOLUTION IN MEMBER STATES

The countries of the European Community are in a general manner evolving forms of organisation that are at least more regional or decentralised if not actually or potentially federative. The general trend is no longer towards a strengthening of national central authority but towards the development of the potential of the regions.

By its power, its structure and its federalist experience, Germany has a central place in the evolution of the European Community. It exerts its influence towards federalism, reinforcing the tendencies outlined above. It provides the proof (if any were needed) of the effectiveness of the federalist approach and organisation, but it also gives its backing to the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. It also sets an example of the principle's application: on the occasion of the ratification of the Single European Act the Lander codified their participation in the Community process under the form of an agreement with the federal government. While asserting their powers at national level they have established representations at the European Community in Brussels in order to have a direct voice at Community level. Moreover regionalisation and federation are gradually advancing within Community Member States. In fact a second Member State is moving in its own inimitable manner towards a federal structure, for Belgium - having avoided breaking apart - has given its support to the 'federal party' within the European Community.

The regional policy of the European Community has been supported and supplemented by the regionalisation undertaken by several Member States. Thus over the years Italy has seen its Provinces grow more independent, to the point of becoming real political and economic powers. More recently the Regions in Spain have begun to develop rapidly and are now political powers and centres of economic and cultural development. Other Member States have also set out on the road towards regionalisation: even France - the very example of a centralised state - has given in to this trend and is evolving towards a regionalisation that is ceasing to be purely economic and becoming more and more political. Here, therefore, are so many signs of a slow march towards federalism, a federalism henceforth built on Member States and Regions. Thus within the European Community we see Denis de Rougemont's *Europe of the Regions* emerging including simultaneous parallel movements, the one aiming to create a *European Federation* and the other to develop the *potential of the regions* and the wealth of local resources within the European Community and its Member States. In this manner the principle of subsidiarity is embodied at different levels in the European Union.

The future is an open door

The application of federalist principles makes it possible to avoid numerous *conflicts* by softening the impact of clashes and preventing antagonisms from concentrating in the centre. In centralised political communities conflicts, disputes, and revolts - even those with local or regional sources - automatically come back to the central power, the only one with decision-making capacity. On the other hand in a federative system a multiplicity of tensions and troubles may find local or regional solutions to the extent that the different levels themselves have powers to arbitrate conflicts or respond to new demands. Thus while in France the events of May 1968 were centred on Paris with the main interlocutor of the protesters being the French government, violent protest movements in Zurich were handled by the Cantonal authorities and therefore affected only marginally the Confederation as a whole.

The variety of situations and needs arising with federalist practices encourages people to search for *consensus*, to compromise or to harmonise positions, and also to prefer the policies best adapted to particular conditions instead of hankering after uniform rigid measures. From this point of view and thanks to its flexibility, federalism is better equipped to manage the technological revolution. The current attitude of the European Community is also going in this direction. The rules of differentiation and mutual recognition - just as the use of directives and the principle of subsidiarity - all confirm this. A growth in tolerance and mutual understanding, a particular concern for small and medium-sized Member States, and the involvement of Regions and a large number of groups are all helping to strengthen the same general trends. Especially so in that as federalism is being built at the highest level of the European edifice, it is also penetrating the structures of those Member States which are either federal or quasi-federal (Germany, Belgium or Spain) or regionalised (Italy) or on the way to regionalisation (France). The federalist approach and principles are spreading through most of the Member States, penetrating their economies and their businesses and gradually transforming even their societies. Moreover federalism as an approach, a method, and mode of organisation is supported and encouraged by the spread of microcomputers and communications networks. In fact its flexibility and adaptability make federalism a highly effective response to post-industrial society's multiple requirements and to the needs of modern man and the post-national era.

Federalism does not attempt to impose one single fixed model but suggests an ensemble of principles and experience articulated within „a union in diversity”¹. The Federal Union brings together collectivities and forces while encouraging local, regional and national potential to develop, which it then directs towards common objectives. It thus allows autonomous and diversified groups to develop while en-

sureing that they participate in achieving shared ambitions and goals within dynamic ensembles. This method, generating a variety of synergies with common aims, is also becoming prevalent in business and human resource management. We are witnessing the creation and multiplication of numerous horizontal communication and participation networks that counterbalance the vertical relationships represented by the centralised state. This state - a stage only in a chain of communities and associations of people - is striving now to rediscover its true role, an important one, of course, which is somewhere between the regions and a community of states like the European Community. The idea of a supreme state, totally sovereign and independent, is losing its way in front of reality and the experience of shared powers exercised in common in a Community marked by solidarity, interdependence and federalism. Groups of states now tend to assume joint responsibility for their security and to coordinate their foreign policy and their economic, social and democratic development. In this configuration the state avoids being overloaded by exercising certain functions in partnership within the European Community, and by handing over other tasks to the Regions. And yet at the same time its role as policeman, interventionist or provider is evolving and broadening as it also provides drive, stimulus, support and coordination. Lacking public power, the European Community has developed and highlighted more than the traditional state has, this function as a *motor and innovator* in response to the double need for union and innovation. This new function is embodied in exemplary fashion in the scientific and technological research programmes where the Community takes on an enabling, supporting and coordinating role among the various participants; states, public collectivities, universities and research institutes, public and private sector businesses. The Comett, Esprit and numerous other programmes illustrate this point, creating a new triangular synergy between public and private sectors and universities. This same *principle of mutual support* is (at a different level) behind the science and technology parks. Thus the federalist approach, combining flexibility, autonomy and participation in the pursuit of common objectives is finding an increasingly rich and extensive application at many different levels.

A common aim adapted to shared medium- or long- term objectives inspires this process, a process which guarantees the free collaboration of men and communities. This is the strength of the *European Project* and its components as compared to what Richard Darmon calls 'cultural now-nowism' or obsession with the present and the conditions of the moment which is currently overwhelming American values. This abuse of the present at the expense of the future and this lack of longer term vision contain the seeds of decline. Darmon's recommendations are similar to Community programmes and the 1993 objectives. The 1993 deadline was Jacques Delors' „Columbus's egg". After a prolonged period of stagnation, this „ardent ob-

ligation" emerging from the consensus of Member States and embodied in the Single European Act gave a new impulse to the union process, crowned by the European Union created by the Maastricht Treaty.

The pace of the union process speeded up as the 1993 deadline approached and under the pressure of external and internal factors. Preparations, restructuring and regrouping are in full flood both in the European Community countries and neighbouring states and among its economic partners. Eurobarometers are there to show the extent of the 1993 effect and its echo in public opinion. External pressures are reinforcing this movement by acting as powerful stimulants: in addition to the threat of American competition and even more of the Japanese, there is a significant transformation in Eastern Europe. Two readings of the phenomenon have been given - one by President Mitterrand and one by Mrs Thatcher - the former is to be preferred. In President Mitterrand's view, there is only one possible response to the mad dash for reform and democratisation in the Socialist countries and to the destabilisation of Communist systems in Europe: to speed up the union process and coordinate common action in favour of Socialist countries in the process of democratisation. Furthermore German reunification and more recently the Gulf crisis have also demonstrated the urgent necessity for the European Community to acquire adequate powers in the area of foreign relations and security. A dynamic and united Community will be required to form the core of a larger multi-faceted Europe under the banner of democracy and federalism.

Nation-State or an Ethnic-State facing the European Union?

As long as the world was settled in the comfort of the tense East-West balance, the European Union continued to progress under the pressure of the universal search for well-being. Today the Community is a large economic power facing the challenge of a destabilised world and coping with the shock of a new revolution in Eastern Europe. A growing radicalisation of nationalist and ethnic-religious movements is visible on every side, taking on epidemic proportions: linguistic and cultural claims are being transformed into demands for autonomy and independence, or indeed into a desire to create a national „living-space" or homogeneous nation-state, whose inevitable consequences will always be war and ethnic cleansing. Ex-Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Central Asia have been swept by this fever which now threatens to spread to other countries. Worrying signs are appearing in Hungary and Slovakia while ethnic discrimination is affecting the Baltic states too. Talk of a greater Hungary, calls for cultural space, the spectre of „living space" and appeals for a gathering of all Hungarians into a nation-state echo claims

and conflicts in neighbouring countries. The Right-wing of the Democratic Forum goes even further with its claim to be the „sole representative of the historic Hungarian identity" and through the mouthpiece of its leader it is calling for the creation of a „Magyar lebensraum". On the other hand the new Slovakian constitution ignores demands for cultural autonomy from the Hungarian minority and defines Slovakian as the „national language" instead of the „official language" and begins with the words „We, the Slovakian People" instead of „We, citizens of the Slovakian Republic". For all the claims to a European and Democratic nature, the constitutions of more than one Republic of ex-Yugoslavia contain similar references and spirit.

The truth is that simply adopting democratic institutions and holding elections does not establish democracy. The weight of the old political and administrative structures, and the accompanying mentalities, is blocking the way to democracy. What is needed for this form of society are values, virtues and behaviour that are in harmony with the requirements of democracy, along with a political culture that is the opposite of what these peoples have been forced to practise for the last 50 or so years. In fact life in a democracy requires a set of instruments and behaviours supported by a pluralist society and articulated by political parties under the eyes of an independent media.

In a society bankrupt by its totalitarian past and which lacks a sense of responsibility, the apprenticeship of democracy is a long one. Leaders who pander to peoples' explosive nationalist feelings are using authoritarian methods in the name of the defence of the Nation. Violent or latent conflicts, pressures, or external support are threatening to pressure these new states into becoming authoritarian nationalist regimes. This process of transition from communism to nationalism and from a totalitarian system to an authoritarian national system is exposed with all its nefarious consequences by the conflicts and civil wars in ex-Yugoslavia; it also threatens, though currently under a more benign appearance, most of the erstwhile popular republics of Eastern Europe.

What can be done to put the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe on the real path to democracy and peaceful cohabitation? Only a common commitment, an unrelenting dedication, can guarantee that human rights and the rights of peoples are really respected. In situ observation agencies, the supervision of democratic procedures during elections (technical assistance, aid to parties, neutral observers, etc.), massive training programmes for political, economic and social leaders and their immersion in democratic societies, exchanges of leaders, students and professionals, training journalists and the maintenance of pluralist media, the revision of history books and civic education (values, institutions and how they really operate), apprenticeships in negotiation and community experience. Moreover, the condi-

ons for acceptance into the Council of Europe or closer association with the European Community will have to be strictly observed and proofs required. The initially lax approach inspired by enthusiasm at the liberation of the Communist bloc exposed the Council of Europe and the European Community alike to the loss of democratic credibility.

Help in democratisation clearly also involves a parallel policy of support in the area of economic development: rebuilding cross-border economic areas and regions, reviving networks of exchanges of persons and goods, giving preference to joint or regional projects and multinational collaboration, training staff at regional level and gradually transferring Community experience and management methods. This kind of support programme towards a market economy presupposes a general framework, a kind of Marshal Plan with a series of measures to unite the Eastern European states instead of dividing them. The strategy employed in regard to the EFTA countries at the time of the EEA negotiations can be adapted to Eastern Europe - to initiate the rapprochement of Eastern European countries with the European Community by encouraging them to reconstitute their collaborative links and to form areas of cooperation and regional common markets. The Monnet method began by creating natural economic areas like the Ruhr, before going on to create a larger internal market, and this kind of approach can be used to guide the process of renovation in Eastern Europe. It is all the more necessary in that in recovering their freedom, the countries of that region have regained their desire for identity and sovereignty. Yesterday they were oppressed, today they are calling for absolute independence, and in doing so they are laying bare the contradiction between sovereign identity and vital interdependence, a contradiction that will only be resolved within federative structures.

This is the perspective opened by the movement toward a United Europe since the end of the Second World War. Today the European Union is looking for a new breadth by strengthening solidarities, as well as going ahead with the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. This political community is the basis of a new European federalist Union.

By bringing together Swiss and Czech political scientists, this book debates the *making* of democracy, both at its beginning stages through the process of institution-building, as well as in its actual *making* through daily political life and practice. Scholars from an old democracy and a polity experiencing a successful process of democratization illuminate different perspectives on this subject.

Among the questions debated are the relationships between democracy, efficiency, communication, and ethics, the democratization in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspectives of the European Union and regionalization programmes, and the analysis of the Czech case, including the 1996 elections.

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