

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

Dusan Sidjanski *

INTRODUCTION

The Role of the Institutional Framework

Institutional and administrative support as well as managerial structure, which have been the neglected dimensions of development aid policies for a long time, have attracted the attention of responsible officials and researchers because of the disappointing results of the national and regional development efforts in the Third World. This deficiency has for a long time been concealed by the strategy of '*fuite en avant*' and by the false idea that the multiplication of new separate projects can guarantee economic and social development. The concrete results of this approach were deeply disappointing. Actually, the follow-up and implementation of the projects have rudely pushed forward again the question of the efficiency of the institutions in charge and their administrative and managerial capabilities. Of course the institutional structures are there to mainly support and administer economic and technical activities, but they risk becoming rapidly inoperative if they cannot rely on efficient administration with adequate political support. In fact, the administrative and managerial structures can be either a brake or a driving force for development at the national and regional levels.

* Translation in part from French by Translation Service, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht (NL).

If looked at from this perspective it is not enough to simply increase the number of institutions in order to guarantee efficiency. In many cases the abundance of institutions is a response to the abovementioned strategy and to a belief in the omnipotence of the institutions, rather than to the need for a division of work and specialization of tasks. Obviously it is neither the creation of institutions of variable efficiency nor the institutional mirage which ensure that solutions will be found to development problems.

From the institutional standpoint, the fundamental question is the relationship between, on the one hand, the aims assigned to integration, its content and its problems and, on the other hand, the shape, capacity and efficiency of the institutions primarily responsible for operating the integration process. The problems arising from this relationship, while varying in form, are much the same: adaptation of the institutions to common tasks; political and administrative modernization; reconciliation of national and regional interests; autonomy for the common institutions in decision-making; and the balance of power and advantages within the grouping.

Of course, it is not always politically possible to devise the most suitable institutional instruments. The importance of the institutional machinery has sometimes been played down in an effort to arrive at acceptable solutions. However, the experience of the Central American Common Market (CACM) in particular has shown that although in the expansion phase of integration these deficiencies may be offset or masked by shared enthusiasm and the convergence of wills, they inevitably appear with the first difficulties to arise. Institutional defects may in certain cases further paralyze an integration movement and undermine the strength of the regional organization. Nowadays, institution-building and management are among the priorities of the World Bank.

Currently, it is broadly recognized that the objective of common development implies more than a mere regulation of trade. It implies joint actions and policies, initiatives and promotion efforts, development strategy and development programming – in short, ampler or more active common tasks which in turn call for the effective organization of combined powers and means and for permanent and competent administrative tools.

While the EC has not served as a model of integration for developing countries, it has served as a point of reference, perhaps inspiration. If several industrial countries in Western Europe admit their need for large markets, for sharing their resources as well as their inability to carry out certain activities alone, this applies even more generally to developing countries which with few exceptions have more limited dimensions and resources. Hence the applicability of the subsidiarity principle according to which the tasks essential for

development but cannot be carried out by the countries alone, should be entrusted to the common organization. Hence the dynamic role devolving on the common institutions and in particular on a permanent secretariat or a collective body. The main aims are to increase development capacity by offering new opportunities to economic actors (common market) by coordinating the efforts of the member states and implementing common programmes mobilizing domestic and foreign resources (development banks); and also to strengthen the member countries' negotiation potential by coordinating their trade policies.

The effectiveness of common institutions depends on the economic and political situation and on the degree of homogeneity in domestic and foreign factors and their distribution in the region. It depends on the compatibility of political and economic systems among member states: democratic and/or authoritarian regimes; concentration or decentralization of powers; the role of the presidency; political factors (their importance appeared strikingly in the East African Community (EAC) crisis and the process which led to its final disintegration in 1978); market economy and/or planned economy; economic and monetary policies as well as the demographic and economic weight of the member states (gross national product per capita as rough indicator). Another indicator is the importance of intraregional trade compared to trade with third countries and more specifically with industrialized countries. In general, integration among developing countries is characterized by the low level of intraregional trade. Foreign investments, the role of the multinational corporations and the amount and distribution of foreign aid should be taken into account. The equilibrium and the combination of these multiple factors influence the states and the functioning of the common institutions trying to make them converge toward common development and interests.

MAIN INSTITUTIONS

The structure of the institutions corresponds to the main functions of an organizational system while reflecting the context, distribution and structure of the national powers, the perception of the leaders and political will.

Intergovernmental Institutions

Both in Latin America and even more pronounced in Africa, power is expressed through and exercised by the president. The democratic or authoritarian presidential regimes are reflected at regional level in the highest institutions comprising the presidents – the real holders of

political power. By associating them directly in the integration process, the intention was to endow maximum authority on the regional institutions. This has however taken different shape depending on the regions involved.

In Latin America and in Southeast Asia, as in the EC, the ministers are seated mainly in executive councils. Gradually, however, the participation of the heads of state or government – the highest national political officials – has become a necessity, and this has led to the creation of the European Council and the periodic meetings of the presidents of the member countries of the Andean Group, of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and of the CACM. An exception is the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) with the Conference of Heads of Government as supreme institution, although its Common Market established under the Annex has a Council of Ministers as principal body.

The composition of the councils vary according to the integration schemes: ministers for foreign affairs (ALADI and Andean Group) who can be joined by other competent ministers (joint or separate meetings); or ministers for economic affairs in the CACM, plus the meetings of other ministers. Practice in the EC has led to a distinction being made between the general council and specialized councils (agriculture, finance, etc.). Although the forms and composition vary slightly, there is a certain amount of convergence which reflects the functional requirements of regional integrations.

In the African organizations, the councils of the heads of state are the supreme bodies conforming to the true situation regarding national power: nothing important can be decided without the approval of the presidents. Examples are the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), the West African Economic Community (CEAO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the former EAC. This generalized structure, while offering advantages (impetus, speed in decision-making, arbitration at the highest level), also creates rigidity, mandatory unanimity, and the risk of conflicting personalities as experienced within the authority of the defunct EAC. Under the supreme council is a ministerial council (management committee) composed of the ministers for economic affairs and planning or finance. In general, when the competences and field of action of the organization are extended there is a corresponding increase in the participation of the competent ministers.

Under the ministerial councils are often executive committees or commissions composed of representatives of the member countries. Thus, for example, the CACM has an executive council whose members are the deputy ministers for integration or senior officials heading the integrating commissions or offices established in the national

administrations. It is the same in the Andean Group where the Commission, for a long time the only intergovernmental organ, is formed of the heads or the directors of the institutes for integration or for foreign trade responsible for coordinating government activities in consultation with the private sector. In the UDEAC the commissions, composed of ambassadors or directors-general, prepare the decisions for the Management Committee and, by its intermediation, for the Council of the Heads of State.

While the unanimity rule is *de rigueur* in the presidential institutions and meetings, it can be relaxed in the other bodies. This is the case in the CACM which allows the Executive Council to take its decisions by a majority vote of all its members. Should agreement not be reached the matter is referred to the Central American Economic Council. Before reaching a decision, the Economic Council decides unanimously whether the matter will be settled by the concurring votes of all its members or by a majority vote (Article XXI of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration). In the Andean Group, as a general rule the Commission adopts decisions by the affirmative vote of the two tiers of member states (Article III). In certain cases the Treaty of Cartagena requires that there be no negative vote while allowing implicitly the possibility to abstain from voting. In the CARICOM the situation is somewhat more complex. According to the general rule:

'unless otherwise provided for, decisions of an Institution shall be made by an affirmative vote of all its members. For the purposes of this paragraph, abstentions shall not be construed as impairing the validity of decision of an Institution provided that not less than three-quarters of its members including at least two of the More Developed Countries vote in favour of such decisions.

'Recommendations shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of all its members including at least two of the More Developed Countries and shall have no binding force. Where a member state fails to observe a recommendation of an Institution in whole or in part, it shall submit a report to the Institution making the recommendation as early as practicable and in any event not later than six months after receiving notice of such recommendation giving reasons for its non-compliance' (Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3).

The exception is provided for the voting procedure of the Caribbean Common Market Council: generally, 'decisions and recommendations of the Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of all its representatives'. Serious matters seem to require a unanimous vote.

Community Institutions

Executive Organs

In all schemes (CACM, CARICOM, UDEAC, CEAO, ECOWAS, ALADI), with the exception of the Andean Group, there is a clearly identifiable single executive head, called in each case, the Secretary-General. All six secretaries-general are appointed for fixed but renewable terms of three to five years duration. The formal authority of each of the six is defined in conventional terms: to serve the intergovernmental organs; to perform tasks delegated to them by the intergovernmental organs; and to be responsible for the administration of the international secretariat. However, an interesting difference in the cases of CARICOM, UDEAC and CEAO is that these responsibilities extend to several fields in addition to the creation and maintenance of the customs union. In CACM, the Secretary-General and the Permanent Secretariat (SIECA) are responsible in matters associated with the customs union and with industrial and agricultural development, but cooperative activity in several other fields is the responsibility of autonomous bodies.

The Andean Group is the only organization to have a collective executive head. The Junta, or Board of the Andean Group is patterned after the Commission of the European Communities, although in some ways it is more supranational than the European Commission. The Andean Board consists of three individuals appointed for three-year renewable terms. Fixing the membership of the Board at three, so that there were fewer Board members than member states, was a conscious effort to minimize the opportunity for Board members to reflect national viewpoints. Actually, the members of the Board do not even need to be citizens of the member states, although they must be citizens of a Latin American state. By contrast the members of the Commission of the EC always include two citizens from each of the larger member states and one citizen from each of the smaller member states.

The Andean Board's formal authority parallels that of the European Commission in several respects. Andean Group decisions are generally taken on the basis of a proposal by the Board and the proposals can only be modified by the intergovernmental commission by unanimous vote. In this case, as in the European Community, unanimity protects the proposals of the Group's Board and reinforces its position with respect to the intergovernmental body. This rule loses its significance when the procedure stipulated for the adoption of some final decisions is a unanimous vote. In certain situations, the Board can take decisions which have binding effect, specifically in the fields of supervision, execution and management competences. For some important decisions the Board must act unanimously.

Parliamentary Assemblies

The creation of a regional parliament brings to the fore the problem of the existence of elected parliaments and regular elections in the member states. Hence, in most cases, integration schemes between developing countries are marked by the variety of national political systems, contrary to the EC which makes respect for democratic principles a precondition for entry to the European Community. Variety in political systems leads to an approach stressing technical aspects and minimizing the political dimension of integration. Thus the absence of parliamentary institutions, except in the Andean Group.

Although at the start there was a certain degree of disparity in political systems, the countries of the Andean Group today form a community of democratic countries. In fact, Peru has returned to being a democratic system while Ecuador and Bolivia are following the same route under the influence of two democracies, Colombia and Venezuela. Furthermore they have forced Chile to leave the Andean Group after the military coup in 1973. Consequently it has been possible to establish the Andean Parliament, composed of representatives who are elected for a period of two years and may be re-elected. The functions of the Andean Parliament are to evaluate the progress of the subregional integration process and propose measures to establish closer relations among the legislative bodies of the member states.

Court of Justice

The Treaties establishing the regional communities provide in general that in case of conflicts these will be put before the supreme institution or before an ad hoc arbitration body such as those originally of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) and the Andean Group. However, with the development of common markets and regional authorities conflicts tend to multiply so the need for a jurisdictional body arises. Thus, in 1979, the member states of the Andean Group decided to establish a court of justice as a result of numerous problems of interpretation or violation of the rules of the Treaty and joint decisions. The five judges are selected by unanimous vote for a term of six years. The jurisdiction of the court covers actions of nullification, non-compliance and interpretation through advisory opinions. In addition, the Annex to the Treaty of the Caribbean Community establishing the Caribbean Common Market provides that the Council will refer the dispute at the request of any member state to the ad hoc tribunal. Each party to the dispute is entitled to appoint an arbitrator from a list of qualified legal experts.

In Africa, ECOWAS and CEAO in their constitutional treaties provide for the creation of a tribunal and court of arbitration. On the other hand, during the revision of the Treaty of UDEAC, the governments of the member countries were opposed to the creation of a

jurisdictional institution since they were of the opinion that every conflict or recourse should be submitted to the Council of the Heads of State. The increase in trade and activities in the region could bring the member states to establish a jurisdictional body relieving the Council of Heads of State of non-political conflicts.

ADVISORY BODIES AND SPECIALIZED ORGANS

General Presentation

The common institutions have created around themselves vast networks of committees, advisory bodies and specialized regional institutions. They provide the major institutions with assistance in preparing common decisions and because of their composition they reflect the opinions and positions of the circles of political actors and economic agents. Furthermore, the participation of professional groups, interest groups and independent experts ensures that they have quite ample and diversified specialized information.

However, the creation of common markets and the liberalization of trade underline at times the lack of economic equilibrium between the countries and their regions making it necessary to set up compensatory instruments. Consequently, the Andean Group for example, has made special safeguard provisions in favour of Bolivia and Ecuador – countries to which the Andean Development Corporation grants preferential aid. Similarly, the Common Solidarity Fund has been established in UDEAC for less developed member countries, such as the Central African Republic and Chad.

As support for the common development programmes, the regional groupings have created institutions such as the development banks: the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the Caribbean Development Bank, Common Development Fund (CEAO), the Development Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC).

In most of the regional groupings there are instruments for monetary cooperation: the Central American Clearing House, the Andean Reserve Fund; the member countries of UDEAC form a monetary union in which the Bank of Central African States acts as bank of issue and as a link between their monetary zone and the franc zone.

In addition to these associate institutions, there are several specialized autonomous agencies, for example the Central American Institute for Industrial Research and Technology (ICAITI), the Central American Institute for Public Administration, the Central American Air Services Corporation (COCESNA).

Advisory Bodies

All the groupings have a system of advisory bodies composed of government experts designed to associate authorities of the national administrations in the study and drafting of joint instruments: the councils and committees of planning directors in the integration groupings and the seven councils set up by the Andean Group Commission. In short, a fairly dense network of commissions and committees surrounds the main institutions. Although these bodies of official representatives are numerous and differ little from one grouping to the other, the bodies bringing private interests together are few. The Andean Group has convened an Economic and Social Committee, comprising both management and labour. The purpose of the Committee is to analyze the Board's proposals before they are sent to the Commission, to make its views known through recommendations addressed on its own initiative to the main institutions and to assist them whenever they request advice.

After a period of paralysis in the Economic and Social Committee, the Andean Group has established two separate councils, one for management and the other for labour. In contrast to these consultative forms, UDEAC and CEAO do not in principle associate people other than official experts in their work. These two groupings have no bodies with members from the economic and social sectors. In the case of CACM, the private sector is closely associated in the activities of its institutions through various working parties.

This association of independent and private experts and of representatives of professional organizations or the private sector charged with the preparation and implementation of decisions, through advisory bodies or ad hoc groups, is to be found with some variations in all the Latin American groupings. Other groupings very rarely resort to this form of consultation, but the practice of consulting public administrations and government experts is well developed in all of them.

The existence of regional professional structures is one indicator of the degree of integration attained. In principle, as regional activities, community powers and their effects increase, it may be assumed that national professional associations will decide to form regional organizations (1). However, this assumption is not altogether valid in the groups that have been studied. There are virtually no regional professional organizations in UDEAC except the meetings of chambers of commerce and industry.

About 20 associations exist in ALADI – either general, such as the Association of Latin American Industrialists, or sectoral, such as the Latin American Association of Plastics Industry or the Canned Foods Industry. In Central America, the professional federations, such as FECAICA (Federation of Industrial Chambers of Commerce), together

with 10 sectoral associations are actively participating in the integration process.

In the Andean Group professional organizations are taking shape, and as the different sectors are affected by joint decisions and programmes, they tend to establish organizations at the Andean Group level, particularly as the Board's policy is apparently to give priority to the proposals and views of subregional groupings. Sectoral programming is likely to hasten this process which can already be observed in the textile sector, the pulp and paper industries, the glass industry, the metallurgical industry and the road transport sector. Lastly, the establishment of such groups may also stem from an attempt to reorganize production or distribution at the regional level, or more simply from the need for information, for a minimum of coordination or for the joint defence of their interests.

DECISION-MAKING AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COORDINATION

Decision-Making and Distribution of Powers

With the exception of the Andean Group, on first examination these groupings reveal quite a concentration of powers in their supreme intergovernmental institutions: the distribution is relatively simple in UDEAC and CACM. In UDEAC, although the essential powers are vested in the Council, the Management Committee is empowered to deal with questions referred to it by the Council. Under the Treaty establishing UDEAC, the Management Committee has delegated powers, particularly in matters connected with the customs union. In addition, it prepares draft decisions for consideration by the Council. The Secretary-General has considerable powers of initiative, implementation and coordination and is responsible for promoting policies in the industrialization and transport fields.

The distribution in CACM is similar: the Economic Council – supreme power – directs and determines integration policy, coordinates it, takes basic decisions and arbitrates disputes. As in the case of UDEAC, the Executive Council plays a central role, but in CACM it has a number of powers of its own to which may be added tasks entrusted to it by the Economic Council. Apart from its right of initiative and its role as a filter, the Executive Council takes measures to ensure that the Treaty and the joint decisions are implemented and that the integration process proceeds smoothly. It cooperates with SIECA whose powers are less clearly defined. In practice, SIECA supervises the implementation of common rules and decisions, organizes meetings at

various levels, prepares projects, drafts reports and carries out various tasks and duties entrusted to it by the two Councils.

The Andean Group differs from the other groupings in that there is a clear and balanced division of powers between the Commission and the Board. The Board is responsible for research, making proposals, preparatory work, execution and management. In the case of decisions of importance or general scope, the Commission has to act on a proposal submitted by the Board. The Andean Group machinery is thus endowed with more autonomy and with greater powers and functions than the secretariats of the other groupings, and can therefore play a major dynamic role. This is because the Cartagena Agreement establishes a satisfactory balance between the community machinery and the intergovernmental organs – the two basic institutions. Their functional cooperation is the keystone of the Andean system.

Coordination at the National Level

Coordination in the UDEAC countries is pragmatic and chiefly ensured by the presidential secretariats and by interministerial commissions and groups. The similarity of the positions taken by the national delegations of one country, which can be observed even among the experts, gives some idea of the coordination achieved by the UDEAC countries. In addition, the representatives of the presidents exercise control in political matters.

In the Latin American countries coordination is more institutional. The members of ALADI and the Andean Group have special bodies, national commissions and departments or institutes for integration or foreign trade. They are responsible for coordination at the level of ALADI and the Andean Group.

Columbia has a foreign trade institute (INCOMEX), like the one Venezuela attached to its Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Ecuador has established an institute for external trade and integration; Chile and Bolivia have secretariats, respectively the Executive Secretariat of ALADI and the Technical Secretariat for Integration; in Peru, there is a National Integration Office attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Board of the Andean Group maintains close contacts with governments through these national institutes or offices. In the Central American countries there are departments and deputy ministers responsible for integration questions.

These national offices also maintain contacts with the private sector through consultations, groups and committees, so that they can prepare proposals with a view to adopting a national position. The system adopted in most member countries is continuous contacts and consultations with the private sector, but decisions and action proper at

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the level of the responsible government officials. There is one exception, that of Ecuador, whose delegation include representatives of the private sector, which thus participates directly at the negotiating table. In the CACM, in its earlier period, representatives of the private sector were associated in the deliberations of the Executive Council. This practice was abandoned before the revolution in Nicaragua.

External Relations

ASEAN has the most advanced coordination instruments. The enlargement of the EEC has caused the members of ASEAN to undertake joint representation, to define common policy and to establish a permanent liaison body with the EEC. The degree of coordination of external relations is one of the main indicators of the level of integration. Paradoxically, external coordination is looser in other regional groupings which are however much more integrated than ASEAN.

In UDEAC, the main institution conducts tariff negotiations, as a logical result of establishing a customs union. The grouping is represented at international conferences by the President of the Council of Heads of State, the Chairman of the Management Committee or, customarily, by the Secretary-General. Should there be requests for technical assistance, the Secretary-General must obtain the Council's authority in each case. Article 20 of the revised Treaty of 1974 authorized the Secretary-General to acquire direct assistance and support from international, regional or national organizations. But this was withdrawn by a decision of the UDEAC Council of the Heads of State taken in December 1977.

Pending the development of a common trade policy, cooperation in CACM between the governments and SIECA is continuing despite the crisis. SIECA is particularly important as a preparatory, coordinating and informing body. In international conferences and organizations, a single spokesman presents the position of the member countries. Lastly, trade agreements concluded by the member states contain a community clause. These factors will help in establishing a common trade policy, one of the main tasks in reviving CACM.

The Andean Group is gradually setting up various mechanisms: a joint commission with the EEC and relations with other organizations. Decision 24 establishing a common regime for foreign capital gives the Andean Group a common image abroad. In this matter, the decision-making process follows the general pattern. With the increase in the activities of the Andean Group, the institutions have strengthened the mechanisms for external relations.

CONCLUSION

Trade liberalization, one of the objectives of integration or cooperation among developing countries, is of limited importance because their intraregional trade is marginal in most cases compared to intra-EEC trade which exceeds 50 per cent of its global trade (see Table 1).

Even if the percentage were more significant, as in the case of ASEAN and CACM, it is important to take into account those parts of this intraregional commerce represented by each member state. For example, in ASEAN, Singapore, with 5.8 billion dollars of exports and 1.25 billion dollars of imports, and Malaysia, with 3.35 and 3.6 billion respectively represent together 76.6 per cent and 67.5 per cent respectively of the total intraregional trade. The main regional economic power, Indonesia, has a modest part of 9.5 per cent and 3.3 per cent respectively. This structural disequilibrium has presumably an impact on trade liberalization in the area.

In general, the regional integration strategy for developing countries should not concentrate primarily on free trade areas, although this objective could be important in future.

In my opinion, free trade should be complemented, if possible, by common policies, programmes and projects, even if global planning for regional development seems too ambitious at this stage. Originally, the UDEAC Treaty of 1964 provided a transport and industrialization regional plan but this was never worked out and implemented. The revised 1974 Treaty proposed a new, more comprehensive and flexible approach; new sectors were introduced as areas of integration: agriculture, telecommunications, statistics, research and technology, regional tourism. Existing domains were strengthened, for example transport and sectoral industrial programming and common projects. Some additional means were also provided, such as a framework for UDEAC companies and the establishment of the UDEAC Development Bank. But even this new institutional structure has not guaranteed the efficient use of the instruments. In fact, the recent African states are too involved in nation-building and too jealous of their fragile emerging powers, the most important being – with the exception of military and police functions – the authoritative spread of social and economic values in a society run on economic planning and policy. The UDEAC member states are therefore so reluctant to submit to common planning since this would mean the joint exercise of one of their most substantial powers.

This observation is also valid for other regional experiences, for example, the Andean Group. It is well known that the few sectoral programmes (metallurgic, petrochemical, automobile) have encountered many obstacles and resistance. In parallel, the regime of foreign capital (Decision 24) faced certain difficulties in its implementation due to the

limited administrative capability of some member states and to the general tendency towards a more liberal policy. In fact, the change which occurred in the approach to multinational and foreign investment problems – the will to attract them replacing defiance and search for more control – led to the adoption of more flexible rules for the region.

In the regional integration process, the main problem is not only how to contribute to equilibrated and accelerated development but also how to procure additional benefit for the member states through common action. In this respect, the community institutions, and especially permanent secretariats or boards assisted by bodies, like regional development banks, play a crucial role. The way in which they actually accomplish this fundamental task of development and modernization, depends on many factors but more specifically on institutional capability, level of technical competence and managerial skill enabling the permanent organ to influence the decision-making process and to control the implementation factor. The actual structure and power of the common administration depends strongly on the amount of trust and support received from member states. In the case of UDEAC, the predominant weight of Cameroon creates a complex situation: the Secretary-General is always from Cameroon, a country which, in addition to its economic power, has the best qualified civil servants for technical jobs. He is assisted and surrounded by high-ranking civil servants from other countries who altogether form the permanent regional staff. We presume that it was to limit this predominance that the secretariat's headquarters was established in Bangui, Central African Republic.

The experiences of regional integration among developing countries and in the EC has highlighted the crucial importance of political factors. The most integrated community in East Africa was disintegrated in 1978 as a result of considerable political tensions culminating in the war between Tanzania and Uganda. Political will is indispensable for establishing institutional capacity and the performance of regional schemes. If the best institutional design resists negative political influence with difficulty, low institutional capability can contribute to preventing positive political will from getting the best results. As stated at the beginning, the institutions are in charge of supporting and managing economic and technical activities and resources. Their efficiency and performance depend on their capabilities, but also rely on multiple factors, among which adequate political support is vital. Nevertheless, this support and will have to be built up in operative institutions guaranteeing the continuance and progress of regional development. It is not pure chance that the World Bank has recently attached prime importance to institution-building and management of development programmes.

Table 1: Intraregional Trade in Percentage of the Total Trade (1980)

	Exports	Imports
ECOWAS	2	3
UDEAC	2.5	
ANDEAN GROUP	5	4.5
CEAO	6.95	4.2
CARICOM (1979)	9.5	7.5
ALADI (1979)	14	13
ASEAN	17.8	11.1
CACM	24	23

Source: UNCTAD, Economic Cooperation and Integration among Developing Countries, 1983.

NOTE

(1) There are more than 500 socio-economic groupings in the European Communities. See J. Meynaud and D. Sidjanski, Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne, Institute for European Studies, Free University of Brussels, 1971.

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EXPERIENCES IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

Edited by
Rita Beuter and Panos Tsakaloyannis

CIP-GEGEVENS KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG

Beuter, Rita

Experiences in regional cooperation : prepared in the
framework of EC/ASEAN cooperation / Rita Beuter, Panos
Tsakaloyannis. – Maastricht : European Institute of
Public Administration
ISBN 90-6779-030-3
SISO 354.6 UDC 339.92(4) NUGI 693
Trefw.: Europese integratie.

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permission of the publisher, European Institute of Public
Administration, O.L. Vrouweplein 22, 6211 HE Maastricht, The
Netherlands.

Typeset by the Publications Dept, EIPA, The Netherlands.
Printed by Leiter-Nypels, Maastricht, The Netherlands.

EXPERIENCES IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

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EC-ASEAN Cooperation

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Rita Beuter and Panos Tsakaloyannis

1987, European Institute of Public Administration /
Institut Européen d'Administration Publique
Maastricht, The Netherlands / Pays-Bas.

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