

18 Dusan Sidjanski

Pressure Groups and the European Economic Community

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Translated from French.

The development of the power of the European Economic Community has given rise to a reaction from those interests which are most directly affected. In order to make sure both that they are informed and that their interests are represented and defended, the various groups concerned have been led to create for themselves new structures at the level of EEC. A parallel relation has thus emerged between the official powers of EEC and the private powers affected by it. These groups, formed on the European level, naturally have neither the solidity nor the effectiveness of professional representation on the national level. Moreover, since such groups are themselves a part of the process of evolution of the political structure, they adapt themselves readily to new political circumstances. But if these European professional organs are not comparable to the national groupings, they cannot be seen as similar to the international associations. They are more numerous - 350 to 400 gravitate towards the European Community. Their action is both more intense and more concrete than that of the international associations, and corresponds to questions with which the Community is concerned.

On the whole, the birth of new groups, as well as the strengthening of the weak links which existed before, was, and is, caused by the emergence of a new centre of decision at the continental level. In turn, this centre of decision needs to win over and to consolidate support.

The four phases of formation

Roughly speaking, the emergence of the socio-economic groups within the regional European framework has passed through four phases:

1. The first wave appeared when the Marshall Plan and OEEC were launched. Ninety new organizations were set up to establish relations between the interests and OEEC (today OEDC); sixty

of them were formed between 1948 and 1957. But they were mostly groupings with a very loose structure, mirroring in this sense the loose powers with which OEEC and later OEDC were invested. The main purpose of these organs was to ensure that information was transmitted in two directions – from the organization to the members of the groups and from the groups to the organization. These can best be described as potential pressure groups.

2. The second wave appeared during the setting up of ECSC itself, from 1953 onwards. It was limited, but more intense, as was ECSC itself. About ten new organs, grouping together the main interests saw the light of day: in 1953 the federation of the iron and steel workers of the European Communities (FEDEREL), the liaison committee of the European metallurgical industries, the committee for study of the coal producers (CEPCEO), the club of the steel producers, as well as two European specialized offices of the confederation of free trade unions and of the confederation of Christian trade unions were set up. These groups were not content simply to inform and be informed, but tried to intervene in the decision-making process of ECCA.

3. The third wave arose with the entry into action of the European Economic Community in 1958. It was vaster and had more profound effects. From then on, the creation of multiple professional organizations began in earnest. Following the example of EEC itself, these organizations were concerned with the main sectors of economic and social activity. Some, such as the Union of the industries of EEC (UNICE), COPA (Committee of professional, agricultural organizations of EEC) and the trade unions' secretariat of the Six came into being the moment the institutions of EEC were formed; others, such as the committee of consumers and interprofessional or specialized organs (COMITEXTEL) were set up at the same time as and according as the regulatory powers of EEC began to take effect and to influence various interests. Sometimes the formation of these organs was spontaneous. Sometimes it was prompted by an invitation or even by some pressure from the Commission, as in the case of the consumers' organizations. Whatever their origin their action in the field of simultaneous information and consolidation between the members and exertion of influence corresponded to real needs. The form of these groups and the intensity of their action varies from case to case, the best structured organs often being those whose interests are most directly affected or threatened. In short,

whatever the original motivation of these professional groups, they all have, in various degrees, the object of bringing pressure to bear on the authorities of the European Community. For it is true to say that the European Community does not have all-embracing political powers, it can only use a still imperfect political procedure/taking decisions in the last resort. Moreover, ~~these procedures~~ contrary to what happens in national politics, apply only to certain specific economic and technical matters ~~(decisions)~~.

4. The fourth wave which again was a weaker one, coincided with the emergence of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of which fifteen professional organizations are members. However, the national groups have not felt any urgent need to be reconstituted in this intergovernmental organization because, as in OEDC, they can use the classic, intermediary channel of their own governments. This channel of influence suffices them because the decisions of the new centre of decision-making – the Council – are taken with the participation of national representatives.

Of course, the formation of the European Economic Community has created a new situation. The powers of the Community no longer belong exclusively to an intergovernmental institution. They are the result of an organic and often obligatory collaboration between the Council and the Commission. To the extent that the Commission fulfills an autonomous function, either by taking its own decisions or by working out proposals for the benefit of the Council, it becomes a centre of special interest for the groups. The tandem, Council-Commission, is the central mechanism of EEC and this centre of decision naturally attracts the groups. Certainly, the groups do not completely ignore other bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee. But in so far as it carries no effective weight in the decisions of the Council and of the Commission, the groups treat it rather as a future than as a present channel of intervention. Their relation with the European Parliament is even more ambiguous since, for the time being, it is only an indirect conveyor for resolutions which produce no results.

But some increased powers of the EP as well as European elections could well to make this institution one of the targets of the groups' action.

Figure 1 shows the way in which decisions are reached in EEC and illustrates the role of various institutions in the elaboration of community acts. It outlines the longest path for the production of the basic rules or directives. The line thus drawn can be re-

and were recently transformed into the European Trade Unions Confederation announcing the workers' unitary action at the European level.

duced, cut or altered. It is only a model for reference. For instance, if the basic regulations for agriculture have followed a longer route, the complementary rules for their implementation have been established by many short cuts. As these policies had already been decided upon, there was no need for the same long series of preliminary consultations.


But the figure must be altered in the opposite direction in cases in which the Council alone takes decisions. This does not often happen. But when it does, it is usually on important matters (the transition from the first to the second stage, the solution of the 1965 crisis). Then the whole Commission phase is practically suppressed.

The more the Council works alone, the more it tends to monopolize the attention of the groups. Their action is closely related to our figure, though not identical with that of the inter-governmental organizations. In fact, as the professional structures at the community level in EEC start to function, the national groups can bring pressure to bear either directly or through them on their governments by working on public opinion. It will be observed that the Court of Justice, an important institution in EEC, is missing from the figure. Yet its role in annulling or adjusting, or on the other hand in confirming the decisions of the Council and of the Commission is well known. But the Court remains, whatever its influence on Community decisions may be, the one institution of control which is the most impervious to pressure. This explains its absence from a figure which is designed to illustrate pressure groups and influences.

Birth of the professional structures

The acts of the institutions of EEC differ from their counterparts in the other organizations in that not only are they binding and compulsory but they also have direct results. That is to say, they bring pressure to bear directly on groups and individuals without passing through the apparatuses of the respective states. A direct relationship is thus established between the Community organs and groups or individuals. No wonder that in these circumstances the groups should have tried to set up a defensive mechanism against the power of EEC. Over and above the protection and the resources with which they are already supplied they strive to counterbalance this power by endowing themselves with permanent structures on the scale of EEC. Organized action of the groups is correlated to collective action by states and by the

first phase of the Commission



Sources: Treaty, basic statutes, proposals and initiatives of the Commission, initiatives of the Council, government or private organizations

Figure 3. European Economic Community: Diagram illustrating how basic decisions are made

In the Council

Commission, with the result that the current is no longer all one way, but flows from EEC towards the groups as well as the other way. The network has become much more complex than was foreseen by the Treaty of Rome; influences work in many directions between the principal elements – the institutions and the states – and various groups and many groupings have grown up alongside them.

The more important, immediate and autonomous the powers (as exercised by the autonomous institutions), the more probable it is that the groups will try to organize themselves at the level of these powers. There is a certain parallel to be drawn between the degree and the nature of these powers, on the one hand, and the structure and action of the groups on the other. Besides, the creation of these European groupings is a proof of the importance of these powers. The groups do not act gratuitously. When they establish a network of structures and of action, it is because they are trying to satisfy a real need. In order to be effective, their action is directed solely at the real power-centres. If the groups try to influence the Commission, it is a sign that the Commission fulfils an important function in the formation, execution and control of decisions. The action of the groups on the Commission is the tribute paid to its genuine importance.

However, it would not be correct to rely solely on this explanation. If the groups answer to a need – and their survival and development prove this – their creation or their reinforcement are often, at least in part, the work of the Commission. It is clear that the Commission has defined its policy, which consists in consulting preferably or exclusively the professional ^{groupings} ~~groups~~ which act at Community level. By refusing in principle to consult the national associations, the Commission has forced them to produce common organs. Two main criteria seem to guide the policy of the Commission: the representativeness and the autonomy of the ~~organs of the Six~~. Thus, a committee can form part of a larger association, grouping the Six and the Seven, but it must show a sufficient degree of independence. In addition to this indirect pressure, the Commission has been sometimes the driving force: the consumer's committee is the result of the initiative of M. Mansholt who also played a part in the establishment and strengthening of the structures which ^{assemble} ~~group~~ the activities connected with agriculture.

The motives behind this active policy of the Commission are many, of which the most important are:

1. The Commission prefers to avoid intervention in the interests of professional bodies; problems should be discussed by the groups themselves within their common organs, which should then present the institutions of EEC with agreed positions or take note of disagreement among their members.
2. The Commission also needs these organs not only to obtain technical information, but in order to use them as a network of information on the problems of the Community.
3. In this way a sphere of support for its activity is formed around the Commission. During the recent crisis in the Economic Community, most of the groups adopted positions favourable to the Commission and rose in defence of the Community when it was seriously threatened.
4. Lastly, and by way of exception, the Commission can sometimes try to influence governments by using the national groups which are members of the European organs.

Up to a point, the preparation by the Commission and the adoption by the Council of the list of exceptions for the 'Kennedy round' provide a notable example of this procedure.

When speaking of the activity of the pressure groups, one thinks not only of a unilateral pressure, but also of the influence which institutions exert on the groups, or through them, on the national centres of power. It would be difficult, however, to say which of these two counter-influences is stronger. The action of the groups is conditioned by circumstances, by the relative importance of the respective group and by its position with regard to other groups.

Structure of the groups

According to various estimates, there are ^{about 400} ~~350~~ groupings at the Community level, of which two thirds possess statutes and formal organs. As on the national level, the groups correspond to three great categories: employers, agriculture and labour. The employers, for example, have a central organ for industry (UNICE), one for trade (COCCEE), one for banking (BFEEC); about one hundred ^{organisations} ~~groups~~ in branches, sections or subsections in industry and ^{mainly} ~~about sixty~~ commercial organs (agricultural activities). If, for instance, one were to look in greater detail at the organization of the industrial groups one would find three main structures: the central organizations (UNICE), the intermediary or inter-professional organs (COMITEXIL for textiles or ~~ISCI~~ ^{ISCIT} for the chemical industries) and the specialized organs (plastics,

Typology of groups

groupings constituted at the Community level

and by issues, groupings

Federation

to realise the aggregation of special interests and to act as their porte-parole.

But at the same time, the Commission has presented itself of maintaining a regular contact with national, regional or local groupings. 1)

part - parole for

detergents, pharmaceuticals or wool and cotton, etc). The two latter types of organs do not take part directly in UNICE, with which they keep in touch. At the level of economic policy, of planning and general problems (for example, anti-trust legislation) UNICE is ~~responsible to~~ the whole industry. This distinction on the structural and functional plane determines to some extent the action of the groups. The division of work is established, in particular along the dividing line between general, intermediary and specialized functions. In exercising these functions, UNICE is called on to try to coordinate the positions and the claims of other ~~organs~~. This is an arduous task in an environment in which the responsibilities and the links are still ill-defined. In practice, the various organs maintain contacts, collaborate and give each other mutual support, in spite of the lack of organic links.

subgroups

Other factors also influence the behaviour and activity of the groups. The predominance of vertical interests over horizontal (as for instance the Permanent Conference of the Chambers of Commerce of EEC countries) is one. Another is the multiplicity of specialized organs in the representation of a particular sector of economic activity. In this case, while the former take a stand on general questions, the latter restrict themselves to defending their particular interests. But the limitations on the range of their activity do not reduce its amount. Indeed, these organs tend to express their opinion on general questions quite as much as on matters which directly concern them. But one may well consider if the action of these specialized groups does not gain in effectiveness when it is confined to their area of interest.

From the point of view of this article, it is not irrelevant to ask whether the organs which undertake an action belong in their own right to the Six, or if they are only a subgroup, for action at ECC, of a wider association. For, even if the subgroup has sufficient functional or organic autonomy, it will probably have a tendency to consider the interests of the whole association, while at the same time stressing those of the Six. How far such a group can reconcile these two objectives depends very much on the structure and the links between the subgroups as well as on conditions in the relevant branch of the industry. To take an example, there is the case of ORGALIME (the organization of liaison of the European metal industry) and of the European confederation of the timber industry. At first glance, these two associations seem to have characteristics of a large structure with two subgroups, one at EEC and the other at EFTA. In reality,

they differ considerably. The timber confederation has two commissions, one for the Six and one for the Seven. But, in fact, the commission for EFTA is inactive, whereas the executive commission for the Common Market fulfils many functions and its structure develops in response to the growing demands (constitution of subcommissions). Thus a discrepancy arises between the two commissions, which is not without effect upon their activities. On the other hand, ORGALIME, and its two EEC and EFTA committees carry on their activities in a way which is at the same time more continuous, more balanced and better oriented towards the objectives common to the thirteen countries concerned and their twenty-seven associate members. What probably happens is that each committee takes more account of the interests of the other, even when it is acting primarily in its own interests.

Typology of channels and of influence

If one admits the close relation between the groups and the centres of decision, one is justified in distinguishing between the main and the secondary channels in the Community. The first are found at the level of the Commission, of the Council and of the governments; the second at the level of the Economic and Social Committee and of the European Parliament. One can also divide methods of action into informal and official – the latter taking on forms which are more or less institutionalized.

Confederation

not used but in some exceptional cases.

group

assembly

meeting

trade union

meeting

for example

and publish

declarations.

Direct and indirect action. At the European level more than at the national, the central organizations, unions or associations resort to general action and often try to intervene through declarations. On the national plane, organizations representing interest groups often take effective and decisive action. Thus, when the trade unions of the workers or of the farmers want to influence public opinion, they use a wide range of methods, from warnings to mass meetings, even strikes. But on the European plane, these methods are unknown. UNICE, COPA and the unions organize congresses, meetings (the assembly of COPA at Strasbourg and the trade union meeting in Dortmund, for example) and publish declarations.

Indirect influence is often intended to support the direct pressures which are brought to bear on the institutions of EEC. UNICE, COPA and the trade unions took a stand – as did many other organs – during the most recent EEC crisis. They

tried to bring their weight to bear directly on the governments, since the Commission was not involved. In these conditions, direct pressure could only be exercised on the governments on a national scale. As the French government was the cause of the crisis, most of these interventions were addressed to it. For the same reason the French groupings were called upon to play a more active role. Thus, the French farmers acted on two levels: as the driving-force within COPA, which only endorsed the text which they had composed - a supporting action which was intended to mobilize European public opinion. On the other hand, on the internal level, the French farmers acted as a pressure group by using direct channels, making representations to the governments, or taking part in the presidential campaign. Because of the particular form the crisis took (opposition of one government to the Commission and to the other governments) we can observe the difference between direct and indirect action on the two levels, national and European.

In other occasions COPA and its members organize public demonstrations during the agricultural year.
Channels at the level of the Commission. In principle, the Commission has not adopted the procedures of the UN or of the Council of Europe whereby consultative status is granted to international or European associations. But the Commission does accept some of the groups as spokesmen and acknowledges them as correspondents. The Commission is guided in this pragmatic choice by the criterion of representativeness and autonomy of the respective professional groups. Yet there are many cases in which it maintains only informal contacts with organs which seem to fulfil both conditions.

Informal channels

197- and introduced
We have drawn a distinction between informal and official channels. The first include every kind of contact which the professional groups establish and maintain with the Commission: meetings, private discussions, etc. However discreet and difficult to follow they may be, they are none the less effective. Besides, the content as well as the range of these relations depend on the ultimate influence of the groups. The content of the relations varies from simple exchanges of news, data and technical information to the tendering of advice and guidance. Although these contacts are private, they can take the form of genuine consultations. Their nature is not fundamentally different from those which develop at the national level.

structure observed in the EC, all important groups
European groupings maintain almost daily contacts with the Commission services
Informal relations can be established between the different types of groups (groups of national interests, business groups, groups of European interests) and the branches of the Commission. Nevertheless, one fundamental difference persists, according to the groups concerned: for the professional European groupings, and in particular for those which are regarded as the spokesmen for their sector, this is an additional channel which supplements the official one.

In accordance with the general
This supplementary quality does not diminish its importance which, as national experience has shown, is far from negligible. On the contrary, when a European group is not consulted officially by the Commission, the informal channel remains the only avenue available. This lends prominence to the channel which becomes privileged, as in the case of business concerns. Informal channels can also be particularly important for those groups which do not dispose of a complete set of channels at official level. Thus, for example, the Permanent Conference of the Chambers of Commerce has no official channels: the Commission does not consult it and it has no representative in the Economic and Social Committee, in which it has the status of observer; its general-secretary no longer takes part in the press conferences called by EEC. In these conditions, informal channels become a precious instrument. The secretary-general of the Permanent Conference, with offices in Brussels, undertakes personal contact with the officials of the Commission. Fairly intensive technical activity is also undertaken.

For where its demands are not taken into consideration, a direct
A similar kind of monopoly is found at the level of the national organizations and the business groups, but with the difference that they can both use official channels as well, by means of the European professional groups of which they are members. The employers or the French farmers can try to influence the attitude of UNICE or of COPA and thus ensure that their wishes are taken account of by the Commission. The Commission in principle does not maintain official contacts with the national groups. But some of them take part in the work of the Economic and Social Committee and of the various consultative agricultural committees.

Italian
Official contacts for the *groups* of business interests are more often undertaken by intermediaries. Indeed, they must pass both through the national professional organs and through a European one to reach the Commission. Here the distance becomes greater, but sometimes it is made up for by the weight of influence of these

Especially in the case of medium and small firms.
Dusan Sidjanski 411

gigantic concerns. It is clear, for instance, that this distance is reduced to a minimum for the European organization of the motor-car industry. In addition, the sheer weight of these concerns allows them to develop effectively all available informal channels.

Although the European organs often act through official channels, they do not neglect the informal ones. Regular contacts are established at every level. Thus the presidents of the central federations represented in UNICE hold regular meetings with the Commissioners. On the permanent staff level, relations are closer and almost daily; the secretary-general of UNICE and the permanent delegates are in constant touch with the high officials of the Commission; the same holds good for contacts at the level of experts and cadres. Contacts are often easier between compatriots. They are also smoothed by professional or personal affinities, and the fact of belonging to the same social circle or political party can be a positive factor.

Official channels

These may take institutionalized or non-institutionalized forms. Among the non-institutionalized channels one can count various types of 'hearings' and information meetings. During the Kennedy negotiations, genuine hearings took place, organized by the Commission. During the drawing up of the list of exceptions, the interested groups were consulted and they collaborated in apportioning the exceptions. These information sessions have dealt with the problems of EEC, its commercial policy, the associate status of Greece, etc.

The most interesting aspect of this non-institutionalized collaboration is the contribution of the groupings to the drawing up of proposals or other acts by the Commission. They intervene on several planes: in the phase of study, the Commission allows them to contribute by asking them for technical information; in turn the Commission supplies the groups with its documentation and keeps them informed of its various plans. At this stage, the action of the groups is neutral or objective; experience has shown that this is by no means the most negligible method of influence used by professional groups. At the more advanced stage, the Commission goes on to hold consultations with the European organs and the national experts, in a personal capacity. Without dismissing the effective role of the groups, it is generally admitted that the national experts carry most weight during the process of elaboration - a point which it is necessary to remember, in order

not to overestimate the influence of the groups. This influence which is difficult to assess exactly, is exercised by their participation in various working-parties called by the Commission, by their individual attitudes, by their advice and studies as well as through direct and informal contacts. These interventions occur at the level of professional experts in the working-parties as well as at the highest levels, as for instance when the president of UNICE addresses the president of the Commission directly.

These various activities mostly arise over projects of the Commission itself. The intervention usually follows on the activities of the Commission, but sometimes it precedes them. Group initiatives have lately become more frequent. To take only one example, the federation of bankers of EEC has formulated several proposals: the elimination of discrimination arising out of legislation or regulations, the suppression of all taxes on cheques and commercial drafts with EEC. COMITEXTIL and many other groups continuously put forward their own proposals and suggestions to the Commission. In this way, they take an active part in the development of the Community, by urging and helping the Commission to undertake and to fulfil a multitude of tasks.

COMITEXTIL and EUROFER became very active and aggressive in defending their sectors against Institutionalized channels can be classified under two headings: those channels giving access to participation in the preparation of general policy decisions; and those giving access to participation in administrative functions. In the first case, the Economic and Social Committee provides a channel, if only on a consultative basis, for the various categories of interests which are represented on it. Whereas the mechanism of informal consultation is reserved essentially for the European organization, it is the national groups who sit in the Economic and Social Committee, although this is not tantamount to formal representation. The European organizations are brought into the Committee as coordinating bodies. UNICE, for instance, coordinates the representation of the employers, or COPA that of the farmers; the secretariats of the European trade unions fulfil the same function with regard to the trade unionists who are members of the Committee. Thus, the central organs which, as previously mentioned, participate in the preparation of the Commission's proposals, are also present at a later stage of the process, namely at the moment when the complex negotiations between the Commissions and the members of the Council are embarked on. As for participation in

management of different community affairs
the administration, the Consultative Committee for Social Welfare and the consultative committees of various agricultural sectors provide the best examples. Their practices do not differ much from those of similar committees in the administrations of various governments. Here again, whereas national groups are called to sit in the European organizations, groups such as COPA assume the function of coordination according to categories of members. In this way, the groups intervene both at the level of execution and of administration.

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By and large, these are the main channels at the level of the Commission. Their effectiveness certainly varies, but none of them appears to be neglected by the European groups, which tend to penetrate all the mechanisms at all levels. One of the rapporteurs of the union of craftsmen of EEC (UAEEC) recommended in 1963 that each national federation of craftsmen should try to obtain a seat in the consultative committees. This will to be present does not necessarily reflect the actual effectiveness of the *groups* in question. But the existence of such a desire indicates that the strategy of the groups is aimed at placing their spokesmen in all the channels which bring them or could one day bring them nearer to the power-centres of the Communities.

and public demonstrations organized by European farmers
Other channels. It is generally admitted that it is very difficult for the European groups to influence the Council as such. The groups often submit their studies and documents to the Council but find it somewhat inaccessible. Direct intervention is an exception, as for instance the dispatch of telegrams by COPA during the agricultural 'marathon' (a term which describes a specific procedure during discussion of some general issues, on which a decision must be taken in order to avoid complete deadlock in the machine; hence day and night meetings are held over long periods). Indirect access can be obtained by using the institutionalized channel of the Economic and Social Committee which is consulted by the Council. As a rule, however, the national groups press in the classic manner through their own governments: direct contacts with the Council and with the permanent representatives take place very rarely. One may assume that some national groups try occasionally by private contacts to influence the position, if it is not too rigid, of their permanent representative in Brussels.¹ Sometimes the European

1. It seems that the German and Dutch representatives are more open to this dialogue with some groups than are the other representatives.

groupings
organs, when there is complete agreement between their members (which seldom happens), can attempt to influence the Council through these members and their national governments.

Among the *secondary channels*, we have already noted the role of the Social and Economic Committee. The role of the European Parliament is scarcely more important. Having no real grip on the power of the Community, the European Parliament is rarely lobbied by the groups. At most its documentation on the Communities can interest them. In addition, since it has only a consultative function and its powers of political control remain on paper, it offers, in contrast to the Economic and Social Committee, merely an indirect channel. *This situation could be change with increased powers of the EP and the activity of the groups the direct elections.*

Figure 2 shows the activity of the groups at the national and community level. It certainly does not cover all the possible situations. In the case of *ISCI* (the international secretariat of the chemical industry of EEC) and of UNICE, the diagram can be said to be accurate. But if one replaces the *ISCI*, for instance, by COMITEXIL the situation is changed because COMITEXIL is a group which does not willingly act through UNICE and prefers to approach the Commission directly. In spite, however, of such discrepancies and inadequacies, the figure can be of help in summarizing the complex character of the activity of the groups and the combination of typical pressure group action on the one hand, and action on the European scale, on the other.

group
Taking as a point of departure the particular interest of a national federation, one can think of several possibilities. Thus, at the community level, this interest may coincide with the interests of the other federations which are members of the European organ: in the present example this would be *ISCI*. In such a case, action will take place on the plane of EEC, and of the Commission in particular, with *ISCI* acting as spokesman through the available channels. If the action concerns a purely professional question, three possibilities are theoretically open: the action of *ISCI* might suit the policy of UNICE, in which case UNICE would support it; or it might be a matter of indifference to UNICE, which would then remain neutral; but *ISCI* could also be opposed to the policy of UNICE, thus giving rise to a conflict between two European organizations. Finally, if the action of *ISCI* were to involve more general interests, the same patterns would be reproduced, but with the




Figure 2 Diagram of action (Groups of socio-economic interests in the EEC)

difference, this time, that the agreement or the conflict would be upon matters which are within the jurisdiction of UNICE. The coincidence of the particular interest and of the wider point of view of UNICE leads, as happened in the struggle against anti-trust legislation, to common action. What about the other central organs? On the whole, at the national level, a central federation or central organization can face three situations. In the first, the interests of a national group coincide with the interests of other federations which are members of the European grouping. In this case, the action of a national group, through the channel of its own government, goes in the same direction as that of the European group and provides it with additional support. For example, in the case of the most recent crisis in EEC, the pressure of the French farmers on their government was extended to the community level through COPA, which acted as intermediary. The second situation arises when the interests of the national group run contrary to those of the European group. In such a case the national group may make common action impossible and bring pressure to bear on its own government. This occurred with the German farmers' opposition to a uniform

price. Alternatively, the national group may align itself with others on a general question, but oppose through its own government the application of a particular measure. This occurred, for instance, when the French National Council of Employers, although supporting EEC, later opposed the expected application of the customs union. A third situation occurs when the interests of the national organ do not conflict with the European interests. In these circumstances, the national groups are free to act through the traditional channels. The above are only a few examples of possible contingencies. In reality, the main variations, the complex network of organs (central, intermediary, specialized, both European and national, plus business groups) provide an infinite variety of combinations.

One last remark about this figure, in connection with its one-way appearance. In fact, the influences are not all one-way, running from a group towards the Commission. The Commission frequently tries to influence the groups and to win their support. For its technical and specialized work, it often requires the recommendations of professional organs (the work of COMITEXTH, of specialized groups); their advice and suggestions. This need explains the process of consultation. In cases of difficulty or of crisis, the supporting action of the groups is of considerable value, as their reaction to the 1965 crisis showed. On other occasions, the Commission can rouse or stimulate the action of the groups. Indeed it may well be that during the 'marathons', the Commission asked the groups for their help in furthering its proposals or achieving successful compromises. The drawing up of the list of exceptions for the 'Kennedy round' is one example which is often quoted: during its hearings and negotiations with the groups, the Commission succeeded in drafting a list of exceptions, and the groups undertook to bring the necessary pressure to bear on their own governments. Thus a precarious compromise was in the end confirmed by the Council. In these cases, the groups did not bring pressure to bear on the Commission, but acted in favour of it. Thus, they have not always been the originators, but sometimes the objects of influence.

Conclusion

In principle, for a group to be able to act, it must have a clear view of the desired goal and it must be able to count on the support of its members. This double will is expressed in many

organizations by the requirement of unanimous agreement of their members, an agreement which reflects the configuration of forces enabling the member groupings to act. Indeed, the European organization generally takes a confederal form, which provides the best guarantee for the protection of the particular interests of its members. And yet this confederal form acts as a brake on the efficient functioning of a European group: COPA, for instance, was paralysed during the discussions of the question of the uniform price for lack of unanimity. This is why the groups have adopted in practice and often in their statutes, the rule allowing the expression of minority opinion, together with that of the majority. Thus the functioning of the group is assured, without a brutal suppression of differences of opinion. More and more frequently the groups present an agreed opinion. In exceptional cases, this unity of action can be assured by reference to the qualified minority. The statute of COCCEE, for instance, incorporates this principle for its own organ of decision, basing itself upon article 148 of the Treaty of Rome.

The central groupings concentrate more often on action of a general character, and leave more specialized activity to sectional or subsectional groupings. UNICE acts as the authorized spokesman for the industries of the Six on all problems of general interest, or on those problems which touch upon questions relating to the common policy of the central organizations which are members of it. In so doing, UNICE does not try to cover all industrial activities, but retains for itself questions of common policy or of general interest. The specialized federations are all free to organize themselves and to act in their own field.

Specialized action is within the competence of technical organizations. In COMITEXIL the general activities of the textile industry coexist with the particular interests of the sectors. Cotton, for instance, does not necessarily take up the same position as wool. Each of these sectors can make its own approach to the Brussels authorities. At the level of common textile interests, the organization of the entire branch intervenes. It is clear that in reality, both at the level of the central organization and of the intermediary or specialized ones, many combinations and much friction and opposition can arise. Without venturing on generalizations, one may say that the predominance of specialized organizations bears witness to the effectiveness of limited technical action. General action is difficult to define, and general agreement is often the result of compromise. To the ex-

tent that action directed to general questions is vague and fluid, it has less chance of exerting real influence. A proposal to regulate beer or jam suggested by European organizations has a better chance of being adopted by the authorities of EEC than a general trade or anti-trust policy proposed by a central organization. In the actual state of European integration, influence is exerted more effectively in the domain of technical matters than on general questions.

Finally one may raise the question of the relationship between the groups and the political parties, and their respective activity. The political parties have established only weak and ineffectual links, except for the socialist parties of the Six. This prolonged absence of the parties from the European political stage may lead to a lack of balance favouring the interest groups, with serious consequences for the future of European democracy. This situation is easily explained in the light of the parallel between the powers of the Community and the groupings at the same level: to the extent that the European Parliament lacks real power, the parties do not feel the need of widescale common action at the Community level and are content with a token presence in the Community. Indeed, their action is geared mainly to their national policies.

At the same time, some professional groupings, organized at the European level, occasionally give the impression, in their general declarations, of wishing to promote a political idea. This is why the European trade unions, as well as other groupings, periodically demand that the power of the European Parliament should be enlarged. But the situation is still far from clear. Both functions and powers are more intertwined and more fluid than on the national plane, where the action of pressure groups and of political parties occurs within a framework both global and better defined.

Within the Community, the structures of powers and of groups are in process of transformation. Moreover, the position is even more complex because a new scale is superimposed upon the national and local levels. But this new scale has not yet acquired the powers and the articulation of a national community. Indeed, in spite of a certain shift the principal and original power remains in the national units and groups. And the European groups attempt to maintain a minimum of coordination and common action between them. It appears that both in matters of policy reserved to the states, and in economic and social matters, the

division of functions and activities in the European Community is still fluid and obscure.

Tendencies such as have been described here can develop in a variety of ways. However, to the extent to which developments continue in practice in the direction outlined here and to the extent to which the powers of the Community are enlarged, especially through the strengthening of the European Parliament ~~or through the creation of an effective Senate~~, the division of functions between the future political formations and the pressure groups will tend to become more precise. For the moment, the groups, but above all the parties, tend to play only a marginal role in supporting integration. Active power is concentrated in the member states and in the central Council-Commission tandem of the European Communities, and more recently,

in the European Council. But, although the member states, institutions and pressure groups constitute a new power structure in the European Community.

19 Werner Feld

Political Aspects of Transnational Business Collaboration in the Common Market

W. Feld, 'Political aspects of transnational business collaboration in the Common Market', *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 2, 1970, pp. 209-38.

Transnational business collaboration is a phenomenon that can be observed in many parts of the world. It may assume special significance when it is carried out on an extensive scale within an international region where an economic integration scheme is being implemented, as is the case in the European Economic Community (EEC). And indeed, a rising trend of transnational business collaboration within the EEC has become manifest during the last decade. Focusing on certain political aspects of this collaboration, this article will

1. Examine the principal objectives pursued by collaborating enterprises that require for their attainment action by the national authorities of the EEC member countries or by the community institutions.
2. Make a preliminary assessment of the effect that transnational business collaboration within the Common Market might have on political integration.

The empirical data presented in this study stems from fifty in-depth, open-ended interviews and conversations with executives of firms engaged in transnational ventures and with officials of interest groups, political parties, national administrations and the EEC. Data is also drawn from secondary sources and a variety of statistical compilations.

The nature and pattern of transnational collaboration in the Common Market

As understood in this study, transnational business collaboration refers to long-term collaborative endeavors across national borders by two or more economic entities located in different countries of the EEC. It goes beyond a mere export and import trade relationship under which orders are placed with different suppliers according to the most favorable terms available. Rather,

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