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85 Revue des livres
MODELS FOR ETHNIC PEACE.
SWITZERLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
TWO EXAMPLES OF INTEGRATION

Dušan Sidjanski*

1. Introduction

As I understood it, the main topic of this meeting is peace, so I will not try to be a judge of who is right and who is wrong in these conflicts, because I personally think it is very difficult to judge even from the inside, let alone from the outside. What I shall attempt to do is examine two cases of integration, namely Switzerland and the European Union, in the hope that these will help us to see what could be done in the future and not only what has been done and what is happening at present.

I do not believe that Switzerland can be taken as a model, nor do I believe that the European Union can either. Nevertheless, they are valuable experiences with many positive results and some problems, both of which we have to take into account.

There are, of course, similarities and differences in each of these two cases. First of all, both are multi-nationa, and here there is a similarity in some way with Yugoslavia. Secondly, of course, one is small and the other is big. The European Union is also the first case I know of in the history of a free association, a really free association, of nation states. Even Switzerland, a peaceful nation, was formed after a civil war, so its creation was not so peaceful. It was also a long process, whereas the European Union has seen relatively very rapid integration since its conception after the Second World War.

In the case of Switzerland, the civil war was between Catholics and Protestants, and I think it is interesting to note that after the Protestants won the war, they decided not to create a state based on majority rule, in which they could have imposed their rules on the Catholics. They decided instead that there were no real winners and no real losers, and so they respected the Catholics and gave them many privileges. This, I think, is a very important way of approaching this type of conflict, not only in Yugoslavia but in general. Majority rule is a possibility in Swi-
Let us take the example of Switzerland. On one hand there is great autonomy in the cantons, as in the German Länder, but perhaps even more so. On the other hand, there is intensive participation, so the cantons have a lot to say in the decision-making process.

Secondly, there is no homogeneous government. Instead, there is a complex government, with the participation of four national parties that hold about 70 per cent of the seats in parliament and which have been members of the federal government since the Second World War. It is a sort of coalition, but a permanent coalition, different from those found in a classical parliamentary system.

The third point, very important, is the consultative process. Before a bill is presented in parliament there is a long consultative process involving not only some political parties and the administration but also various interest groups - four big ones (trade unions, employers, farmers and small business, which are always present in this process) and other specialised or sectorial groups.

This is somewhat similar to what happens now in the European Union, in different committees - “government by committees” as some people have suggested we call it. Decision-making is thus carefully planned; it is not just a decision by a majority, but is based on some sort of consensus. Why? Because people have to be convinced. There are great differences between individual cantons, they have different interests, so this is a form of learning process and consultation before a decision is taken. And, as I said, the decision is generally adopted by consensus, if possible.

Direct democracy is another very important point. With such a stable government something is needed to counterbalance this stability, and this is provided by direct democracy. In direct democracy we can be against the government, and in some instances this has been the case. I must confess that direct democracy is not one hundred percent positive. Abstentions, for example, are very high, and so one might question whether it is democracy if only 30 or 35 per cent of the electorate vote.

But the importance of this experience, I think, is that in spite of all the cleavages we have in Switzerland - linguistic, between cantons, differences in economic levels, and so on - in spite of all this, the federal state functions rather well, and manages to avoid conflicts. We did have a conflict in Jura, but that was because of the creation of the new canton. We also had terrorist activity in Jura, fortunately not too much, as it could have been very dangerous, because in Switzerland, as you know, everybody has a gun at home. It might even have been like the Yugoslav situation in some ways.

Anyway, as I said, nobody thinks in Switzerland about a single, uniform state or a single government for everyone. There is always some type of compromise and negotiation in this pluralistic society. I also think it is very important to stress the point that in the nineteenth century, when the nation state was being built, Switzerland was completely marginal. The choice was completely different - it is a pluralistic state, not a nation state with one language, one religion and so on, quite the contrary. This, then, in my view, is one of the main characteristics of Switzerland.

But there is also something else that is very important, and that is the people’s political culture and political attitudes, which means no majority rule, checks and balances in society and the recognition not only of persons but also of groups - a very important factor. It is essentially Christianity that adopted this principle of recognition of the person as such. But we go beyond that by recognition of communities, of groups, and by applying the principle of tolerance. You have to tolerate others, and tolerance is sadly lacking in the conflict in Bosnia and the other parts of Yugoslavia, where everyone has their rights and can do whatever they feel entitled to do.

One of the consequences in a society organised like Switzerland is that there are no problems of minorities. Take the Romanian language, which is spoken by at most 50,000 people. We try to give support in order to keep this language alive. That is one example of differences which are very much appreciated.

The last point, which is also very important, is balanced economic development and solidarity. Some cantons, such as Zurich, Basle and Geneva, are more developed, but this is offset by a system of equalisation or compensation for the less developed ones - a kind of solidarity that also exists in some way in the European Union.

In short, in Switzerland, there is a method, a spirit, a special approach, and a special type of political behaviour based on tolerance and acceptance of others.

3. The European Union

What about the European Union? Why is it so important to us? First of all it is very important because Frenc
ber the Ventotene Manifesto during the Second World
War, in which Rossi and Spinelli wrote the first Federalist
European Manifesto. It was very impressive to see that in
1941 they were thinking of the future.
What I suggest is this: that we should now think about the
future of these peoples and not just be obsessed by the pre-
sent. Human beings are changing. Evolution is at work,
and there is also a generation change - Karadzic and others
like him will not always be there.
The second point, an absolutely astonishing one, is
that a mere five years after the war, such a terrible war,
came Schuman's proposal. You can imagine what we who
lived through this period felt - we saw the change, the
incredible change, of the French people, the French
government, proposing that they and the Germans be-
come allies and constitute the core area of European integra-
tion. This was an extraordinary change, an utterly new
experience.
The third point is that the same conditions as those in
Switzerland can be seen in the European Union. Conditions
sine qua non, like democracy - remember the case of
Spain, which applied for membership of the EEC in the
sixties? It was refused, but after the change-over to demo-
cracy it was accepted. So this is one of the most important
conditions. Another is free and voluntary association. The
big difference compared to Switzerland is that there are at
least three levels in the European Union. There are, of
course, the national and community levels, but there is
also the regional level. The regions are emerging, and this
is a very new process - even in France, a centralised coun-
try, even in England, so centralised, the regions are emer-
ging. They have more and more contacts, not only centra-
ly with Brussels, but also horizontally with other regions.
These quiet changes, which are not under the spotlight,
are very important for the future. New links are being
created - not only those we see, governmental links and so
on, but more profound ones. To this we have to add the
formation of interest groups, which are not only signifi-
cant as interest groups but also as a set of linkages, social
linkages, between different types of leaders of organisa-
tions. There are about five or six hundred of these already,
with about 20,000 people in Brussels - experts, lobbyists
and so on. This is something new, a new network for the
society of the future, and this is very important. It is
something we should try to create for the future, not only
in ex-Yugoslavia but in the Balkan region in general -
recreate those networks which previously existed but
which are now probably interrupted. What this means, in
short, is that the European Union is evolving towards
decentralised systems, some new type of federal union - a
topic obviously too complex to be analysed here today.
Finally another very important point: economic and
monetary union, a move - an economic but still highly
political decision - to create the monetary union and a sin-
gle currency for the future. Of course, we know that there
are still many problems. Nevertheless, what we see in this
crime situation, much more complex than in a small
country like Switzerland of course, is complex decision-
making, which implies different actors and different
levels.
Despite these positive steps, however, there is no clear
political framework, no common foreign and security
policy. Of course, these are mentioned in the Treaty on
European Union, I know, but they are not effective, and I
think Yugoslavia has been and still is a test for the Euro-
pean Union.

4. The crisis in ex-Yugoslavia

As far as the Yugoslav crisis is concerned, I shall just
have to skim the surface, but I shall try to say what in my
view is fundamental.
First of all, cultural and linguistic conflict. Unfortuna-
tely we and our leaders do not have time to read all that
much, but if we had read and analysed papers written by
Izetbegovic in the seventies, the report by the Serbian Aca-
demy and Tudjman's history of Croatia, we could have
predicted conflict. And this is what I invite you to see: the
importance of words - not like Shakespeare's "words, 
words, words", but the astonishing importance of all the
words which are invading us today. Avalanches of words
are imposed through the media and supported by TV ima-
ges, which are the most effective and popular means of
communication. An analysis of these writings could help
us to predict what the concept of the nation will be and
how discrimination and the exclusion of others are the
consequences of their thinking.
We tend to talk about Western culture and Eastern cul-
ture, but we heard yesterday, we know that Byzantine cul-
ture is very important for Europe, and Greek culture was
fundamental, so why do we now suddenly want to sepa-
rate them and explain that there is a contrast, a conflict,
between Western and Eastern cultures in Yugoslavia?
There are differences and tensions, but this is not the only
explanation or justification for the war! Unfortunately these arguments are manipulated and many of us, scientists and scholars, adopt them and repeat them without any serious analysis or reflection.

My view is that European culture is a complex whole, a common cultural background with rich differences. Russians, Ukrainians, Slavs from Serbia and Croatia contributed to this culture, all of them. The Churches also. There are different trends and tensions, but it is not possible to conclude that there are essential oppositions and natures of cultures. If one thinks in this way, how could it be possible to create the European Union? I think of Denis de Rougemont and Jean Monnet who insisted on a personalist approach, the importance of the person. As de Rougemont often said, our common European culture, with all its wealth of diversity, is the foundation of European federalism - which implies acceptance of the differences - as well as the common basis of our culture.

Finally, the party officials, the intellectuals and the media have all been important in fuelling the Yugoslav crisis. One thing that tends to be overlooked is that at the beginning of the crisis we were interpreting it as if it were in Switzerland or in Western Europe - somewhere in France or elsewhere - but in any case in a democratic setting. We forgot that the political culture in this country - ex-Yugoslavia - was completely different.

For years and years there was collectivity, collective concepts that predominated over individual values, and persons were not regarded as important in the process. There was authoritarian government for years and years. Of course we know that the process was much more complex, but nevertheless this was the spirit. And suddenly, they had elections, referenda. But they were not like referenda or elections in Switzerland or in democratic European countries. The situation was quite different, but we thought it was the same, and only now can we see that the transition in all those countries is much more difficult than we predicted or hoped it would be after 1989.

The really important point is the concept of the nation state and its sovereignty. The idea there is that if you have a majority - as, for example, in Serbia, where Serbs make up approximately 65 per cent of the population - then you can apply your rules, majority rule is the rule for all. You can forget about Kosovo, forget about other minorities, Vojvodin and so on, by applying majority rule. The basic concept is that a sovereign state can do whatever it wants inside its own territory. The logical result of this type of reas-

ning is the need to create homogeneous states, with all the consequences this entails. The Western governments - I am not saying whether they were right or wrong - recognized these new states without any conditions, without any guarantees for human rights, for minorities, for religious rights. What happened and is still happening now is mainly the consequence of this recognition of sovereign states and the way they interpreted sovereignty and the nation state.

The absence of co-ordination between the so-called big powers of Europe and the United States made the situation even worse. There is no real common policy, the supposed result of the contact group - on the contrary, each government has been pursuing its own policy. What is even worse, these policies respond to their own internal constraints, not to the needs of ex-Yugoslavia. Needs, as General Murillo pointed out, that have been largely influenced by the media.

This is what has happened regularly in the United States, in Germany, in France, in Switzerland.

5. Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn? The first point is that it is not the European Union that should be accused (although it has been accused so many times for its actions) but individual governments of member countries, because of all the differences and tensions they have displayed during this crisis. It must be admitted, though, that the crisis did break out before the existence of the common foreign and security policy, which was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty.

Nor should we forget the ambiguous interventions of the two super-powers: the US, which had promised military intervention - often announced by Clinton but never actually arriving - and Russia. Both these powers have been prompted mainly by their own internal problems and needs and have never acted with a view to finding a global solution to the Yugoslav conflict.

What can be done? I think for the future it is essential to encourage pluralism in all those countries - Serbia, Croatia and the others. We must support the opposition. We forget that there are people who oppose Milošević, that in Croatia there are many people who are opposed to Tudjman and his government. We have to promote pluralism, free and pluralistic media, in all of those countries. That is one point.
CONCLUSIONS

Arij A. Roest Crollius, s.j.

1. La paix est une valeur, surtout dans une période de changement

Nous vivons une période de grands changements, non seulement en Yougoslavie, mais dans toute l’Europe et dans le reste du monde. La Yougoslavie constitue seulement le cas le plus éclatant parmi les dimensions dramatiques prises par ces changements.

Le changement comporte une transition, laquelle se traduit inévitablement en une confusion; quand la confusion atteint un niveau de violence déterminé, c’est la guerre. Hélas, nous vivons une période de déstabilisation.

Durant ces journées, nous nous sommes rencontrés pour parler de “paix ethnique” car nous considérons que la paix est une valeur. La culture a besoin de valeurs et une culture de la paix doit cultiver la valeur de la paix, dans le secret d’un laboratoire mais comme pour l’ex-Yougoslavie - dans le cadre de la réalité humaine chaotique et conflictuelle.

2. La paix n’est pas une valeur absolue

La paix n’est pas innée en l’homme et n’existe pas dans la nature, elle n’est pas une chose prétendue, mais un objectif à atteindre. La paix, en outre, ne peut être considérée comme une simple marchandise, elle est subordonnée à des valeurs plus élevées comme la justice, la vérité, le respect des droits de l’homme.

Si ces valeurs venaient à faire défaut, seules seraient possibles une “paix injuste”, une “paix fausse” ou une “paix oppressive”. La paix ne peut pas être bâtie en dehors de cet ensemble de valeurs humaines qui se sont historiquement et concrètement réalisées.

En tant que valeur devant être cultivée dans la réalité de l’existence humaine, la paix peut être définie selon l’expression de Maritain un “idéal historique concret”. Notre discussion sur la paix n’a pas été de nature abstraite, mais a tenu compte de la pluralité ethnique et culturelle de la Yougoslavie, une région caractérisée par la complexité de sa situation politique, économique et religieuse.

Un appel historique concret à une culture de la paix exige surtout que soit accordé au facteur religieux, dans les conflits en cours, toute l’attention qu’il mérite. Mais si la religion est, dans de nombreuses sociétés, l’enseignante et l’éducatrice principale du peuple, dans la mesure où elle transmet les valeurs, propose les idéaux, protège les institutions et conserve les éléments les plus précieux de l’identité d’un peuple, cette même religion peut, dans le cadre d’un pluralisme religieux, aggraver les tensions culturelles, ethniques et sociales. Dans de telles situations, un conflit politique signifie presque toujours que ceux qui doivent transmettre les valeurs religieuses ont négligé l’existence des “autres”.

En d’autres termes, l’actualité invite chacun à accomplir des efforts authentiques et sincères pour l’exercice d’une compréhension mutuelle d’un point de vue religieux.
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