

# GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

VOLUME 11 NUMBER 3 SUMMER 1976

A JOURNAL OF  
COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Participations), public and private companies, and the three trade unions (ACLI played a very minor role throughout the period, being mainly, up to 1967, a reservoir of votes for the DC). Even the relationships of *clientela* which developed between the Ministry of Industry and Confindustria, and *parentela* between the Ministry of Labour and CISL, or the Ministry of State Participations and ENI, did not last for the entire period.<sup>33</sup> In addition, a very important variable was the lack of a coherent industrial and economic policy on the part of the dominant Christian Democracy. This meant that DC leaders pursued one ultimate goal: the unity of the multifaceted constellation of forces which are the bases of their electoral support, and identified as their main object the control and the expansion of the public sector as a source of party financing and as an outlet for disguised unemployment.<sup>34</sup>

A general preliminary evaluation of the process of interest articulation in the industrial sector cannot but lead to the conclusion that the process has been severely distorted by the attempt of entrenched groups to keep the *status quo* as long as possible. The inevitable consequence has been a vigorous revival of the labour movement and the overflowing of new and old, specific and general demands related to the conditions not just of the industrial working class but of all underprivileged and neglected strata, therefore spreading outwards into the field of interest aggregation, a function no longer adequately performed by the political parties.

<sup>33</sup> Joseph LaPalombara's already quoted book, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, was written when the situation was changing and new patterns were emerging.

<sup>34</sup> A brief appraisal of the economic stands of some important DC leaders (De Gasperi, Dossetti, Fanfani, Moro, Colombo) is offered by Fabrizio Cicchitto, 'La politica economica della DC', in *La DC dopo il primo ventennio*, cit., whose overall evaluation is very negative. The three main goals of DC economic policy are identified in 'the stability of the capitalist system, its development without endangering private initiative, the preservation of the traditional balance of power', p. 21. See also the accounts by one of the most influential economic advisers to DC leader Moro, Nino Andreatta, *Cronache di un'economia bloccata: 1969-1973*, Bologna, 1973 and his report to the DC Economic Conference of Perugia (December 1972), 'La politica congiunturale e le strutture monetarie e creditizie', *Il Mulino*, XXII, 1973, pp. 3-29. Needless to say, there is no reliable documentation of the positions held by Christian Democratic managers in the public sector but see *L'Espresso*, 2 May 1971.

## The Swiss and their politics

THE SWISS AND THEIR POLITICS: THIS TOPIC HAS ALREADY BEEN AND still is of concern to many citizens as well as to social scientists. Although it has been the subject of several studies, it has however never generated any empirical research using opinion polls. This has now been done. This study is part of a series based on the results of an opinion poll – the first in Switzerland – carried out in the spring of 1972.<sup>1</sup> The survey was designed to elicit the Swiss citizens' image of the country's democratic system as well as their attitudes toward important issues. It consisted of a questionnaire lasting about one hour and it was given to 1,917 male and female voters selected by scientific methods which guarantee their representativeness.<sup>2</sup>

Our intention in undertaking this survey was, among other things, to try to achieve a better comprehension of the Swiss political system and to clarify certain aspects of that system. The undertaking was all the more interesting in that we are dealing with a political system which has in a large degree succeeded in avoiding conflicts between religious or linguistic groups, between social classes and between Left and Right. These benefits of the Swiss system have been attributed to various factors: the existence of multiple decision-centres at different levels; the possibility of seeking solutions to problems at their own level and of avoiding uniform, majoritarian solutions imposed by one group on other groups; respect for minorities, tolerance, desire for compromise and cooperation as well as mutual trust; all of those factors making up a set of values, norms, and traditions

\* Extract from the forthcoming collective work by D. Sidjanski, C. Roig, H. Kerr, R. Ingelhart and J. Nicola, *Les Suisses et la politique*, Bern-Frankfurt/M, Peter Lang, 1975 (in English).

<sup>1</sup> This survey was carried out by the Political Science Department of the University of Geneva with the support of the Swiss Fund for Scientific Research in collaboration with the Psychological Institute of the University of Zurich. The field work was done by the Konso Institute of Basel.

<sup>2</sup> H. Kerr and G. Kalton, 'Meinungsforschung und Stichprobenverfahren in der Schweiz,' *Quartalshefte zur Markt- und Sozialanalyse*, March-April 1973.

which are customarily designated by the term political culture. This grouping, which is the warp and woof of political institutions, plays a rôle in their daily functioning. In an effort to isolate characteristic traits of the Swiss system, we made up a questionnaire consisting of more than one hundred questions about political parties and party preferences; the media and electoral campaigns; traditional cleavages (Left-Right, religion, language, class); how they perceived the government and political mechanisms; feelings of satisfaction and of confidence; personal variables such as sex, profession, education, even group-memberships.

The political environment in Switzerland and its principal characteristics have been the subject of numerous studies, such as *La Démocratie témoin* by André Siegfried and Denis de Rougemont's *Histoire d'un peuple heureux*, which have been an important source of guidance. These authors do, in fact, paint a particular picture of Switzerland and her people. We then asked ourselves if their idea of Switzerland corresponds to the one which emerged in our 1972 survey. Thus, Switzerland is depicted as a peaceful, federalist society whose members are happy and satisfied. What do the Swiss whom we questioned think of this?

### A NON-VIOLENT, REFORMIST, AND PEACEFUL SOCIETY

#### *Rejection of violence*

In answer to question 21: 'Choose the attitude which corresponds best to your personal ideas,' only 2% said they were for a radical change in our society through revolutionary action, against 59% who preferred a progressive amelioration of society through reform and 24% who were favourable to defending society against all subversive forces. Thus revolutionary action as well as other more or less violent means do not find broad approval; reformism, along with rejection of violence, is one of the traits of Swiss society. In order to test this general idea, we asked a series of questions such as Q. 23, 'In your opinion, could there arise in our country situations which would justify the use of violence against the government, or do you reject in principle any use of violence?'

Our first general finding is clear: a large majority (60%) reject all recourse to violence against 12% who would accept its use and 22% who are hesitant. Crossing these responses with other variables, we arrive at a more precise picture: thus, the German Swiss are readier to justify the use of violence (13%) than are the French Swiss (10%),

both staying at a very modest level; there is a more marked gap between those who reject the use of violence: 55% of the German Swiss against 73% of the French Swiss; likewise the proportion of those who hesitate is twice as high among the German-speaking Swiss. It can be seen from this rapid comparison that the French and Italian Swiss are more resolutely opposed to violence than the German Swiss.

Along the line of *profession*, two groups appear: one made up of civil servants, those in the liberal professions, and business executives and non-workers who are a large majority (70%) opposed to violence as a means; and the second group of workers (54%) and peasants (49%) who reject violence less categorically and who justify it more frequently (15% and 14%). From the standpoint of *education*, although we might expect a less clear rejection among those who have only an elementary education and more outright refusal from persons with a secondary education, one fact is worthy of attention: people with university training register the highest proportion of justification with 22%, but at the same time this group shows a high level of rejection with 64%, 15% are hesitant, but not a single university graduate is without any opinion.

These findings can be verified by examining the responses according to *political tendencies*: in effect, those who favour political parties with a predominantly worker or peasant membership most frequently declare themselves ready to justify the use of violence: 19% of the sympathizers of the Democratic Centre Union (formerly the PAB), 15% of those in the Labour and Socialist Parties, as well as 13% from the Republican Movement and National Action; to this group can be added those Swiss voters without any political tendency with 12%. In a parallel manner, the lowest percentage of rejection is registered among sympathizers of the Democratic Centre (51%), closely followed by those of the RM and the NA (52%) and those with no political preference (54%). On the other hand, partisans of the Left are more clearly opposed to the use of violence with a proportion of 61%. Symmetrically, those who sympathize with the Evangelical Parties (8% and 69%), Radical and Liberal Parties (10% and 67%) as well as the Christian Democratic Party (11% and 63%) show themselves most opposed to the use of violence and least ready to justify it.

The variable of *religion* does not give rise to any significant spreads between Catholics and Protestants: the latter show a few percentage points higher (11 to 15%) than the Catholics (10 to 11%) for justifi-

TABLE I  
*Attitudes towards violence*

		Sometimes justifiable 12%	Total rejection 60%	It depends 22%	Don't knows 6%
<i>Languages:</i>					
German	Nos (1417)	13%	55%	25%	6%
French	(387)	10%	73%	12%	5%
Italian	(89)	7%	62%	21%	10%
Others	(17)	0%	82%	12%	6%
<i>Professions:</i>					
Workers	(373)	15%	54%	22%	6%
Civil servants	(360)	13%	70%	14%	3%
Peasants	(138)	14%	49%	21%	15%
Liberal Professions, higher grades. Owners of large enterprises	(220)	9%	70%	20%	1%
Without prof. Others	(102)	12%	73%	10%	6%
<i>Education:</i>					
Primary	(899)	13%	58%	21%	9%
Secondary with or without matriculation	(276)	10%	70%	18%	2%
University	(88)	22%	64%	15%	0%
<i>Political sympathies:</i>					
Democratic Centre Union	(325)	15%	61%	19%	5%
All	(99)	10%	61%	26%	3%
Rep. & Nat. Action	(56)	13%	52%	30%	5%
Evangelicals & others	(39)	8%	69%	23%	0%
None	(588)	12%	54%	24%	11%
Rad. & Lib	(258)	10%	67%	20%	3%
Dem. Centre	(155)	19%	51%	23%	8%
Christian Democrats & PICS	(328)	11%	63%	25%	2%

cation, but comparable levels for the rejection of violence. Although there is no discernible difference between Catholics and Protestants, there is a significant spread between believers and atheists: 20% of the latter, who are only 2.6% (N = 49) of our sample, allow a possible justification of violence. Also, infrequent churchgoers show higher proportions than regular churchgoers. As for *age*, two aspects deserve to be emphasized: the age group from 20 to 29 tends to

accept, to a relatively high degree (17%) recourse to violence in certain circumstances and to reject it to a relatively limited degree (52%). The other age groups situate themselves between 10 and 12% or between 57 and 64% respectively, the maximum of those refusing corresponding to the category of the oldest persons (see Table 1).

*Attitudes towards demonstrations, strikes, and acts of disobedience*

In spite of these cleavages, the Swiss remain largely opposed to any use of violence. This pacific, non-violent attitude is confirmed, if it needed confirmation, by the repugnance shown by large segments of our sample for recourse to acts of disobedience (sit-ins, and refusing to pay taxes, for example), or indeed, even for strikes or demonstrations, the use of which is considered normal in neighbouring countries.

Use of these means does not seem justified in the eyes of Swiss citizens. The percentage of those who reject these three actions is situated between 36% and 57% from the top to the bottom of a scale going from 1 to 8. Inversely, by adding up the positive response for the three actions (a+b+c), justification for their use oscillates between 33% and 13%. There is also of course the category of those who hesitated, the 15 to 25% who replied 'it depends'. By estimating hypothetically that half of the undecided might choose one of the three actions and the other half none of them, we see that refusal to have recourse to one of these actions prevails. Furthermore, we observe that the highest percentage is given to the most anodyne action: demonstrations (10 to 28%). Against that, even the use of strikes, a legal means in democracies, is justified only by a very limited percentage: 1 to 13%. As for acts of disobedience, they receive general disapproval, being accepted only by 1 to 4% (see Table 2).

Three of the eight questions made direct reference to union affairs: lay-offs, wage increases, and worker participation. It is certainly because of these questions that approval of strikes is the highest even though it is still low: 13%, 11%, and 7%. Strikes do not enjoy the approval of Swiss voters. The years of social peace seem to have had some influence on the ideas of the Swiss about strikes.

Thus, these two rapid analyses converge on a single conclusion: the Switzerland of 1972 remains a largely pacific society rejecting violence and even certain current means of exercising pressure such as strikes. However, experience with similar analyses carried out particularly in the United States, warns us against a hasty conclusion

TABLE 2  
*Attitudes towards demonstrations, strikes and acts of civil disobedience*

Q. 25 'In each of the following situations, will you indicate according to this analysis whether or not one of these three actions is justified? (Several answers possible)	Total a + b + c					Total
	a Demonstration	b Strike	c Disobedience	It depends	None	
1) Range according to total a + b + c						
1) In order to prevent an undesirable construction (atomic centre, motorway, etc.)	28%	2%	3%	20%	36%	100%
2) To prevent sackings	18%	11%	2%	22%	37%	100%
3) To put a stop to unfair treatment of political, religious, or other minorities	25%	2%	4%	18%	38%	100%
4) Is one of these three actions justified to obtain increased salaries?	12%	13%	1%	25%	42%	100%
5) To achieve participation in an enterprise?	11%	7%	3%	22%	44%	100%
6) To put pressure on authorities or on the Federal Assembly?	18%	2%	3%	15%	48%	100%
7) To advance towards a new, more humane society?	13%	1%	2%	17%	48%	100%
8) To limit the number of foreign workers?	10%	1%	2%	19%	57%	100%

which would tend to minimize the role of minorities. Furthermore, the contribution of Charles Roig shows us that deeper analysis permits a better elucidation of the significance of the results of our survey.

#### *Revolution, reform, or reaction*

In order to reveal fundamental attitudes about society, we asked our respondents to choose from three suggested attitudes the one which best suited their personal ideas.

TABLE 3  
*Fundamental attitudes*

Types of voters	%	Nos
(1) Our society must be changed radically by revolutionary action (Revolutionaries)	2	(38)
(2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms (Reformers)	59	(1127)
(3) Our society must be defended against all the subversive forces (Reactionaries)	24	(459)
(4) No opinion	15	(287)
Total	100%	(1911)

Crossed with the eight classic variables the spread of the replies permits some observations to be made: the difference between *men* and *women* is imperceptible, if one takes into consideration the fact that women more often state that they are without opinion.

*Linguistic groups* demonstrate more differences: if we exclude those persons whose mother tongue is not one of the three principal ones because of their very small number ( $N = 17$ ), the French Swiss have the highest proportion and the German Swiss the lowest proportion of revolutionaries, respectively 3% (11) and 1% (14); the proportion of reformists (60%) and of reactionaries (24%) is the same for the two linguistic groups.

Looking at *religious practices*, several traits stand out: although small ( $N = 81$ ), the group 'other religions and atheist' appears at one and

the same time to be the most revolutionary with 5%, the most reformist with 66%, and the least reactionary with 16%. On the other hand, it is the two largest groups, the most practising Catholics ( $N = 460$ ) and less practising Protestants ( $N = 516$ ) who show most revolutionaries among those belonging to the two religions: 2% of the revolutionaries or about twenty; on the contrary, among the most practising Protestants and in the same group of Catholics we find the highest percentage of reactionaries or 27%. Finally, the reformists occupy a privileged position with more than half of all the respondents: occasionally practising Protestants and Catholics are both over 60%.

As for *profession*, it appears that bureaucrats are the most revolutionary with 4%, followed by white-collar workers and artisans, while farmers contain none and workers only 2%. These last two groups are also the least reformist with 41% and 46%, unlike higher-level white collar workers and professionals with around 74%. Finally the largest percentage of reactionaries is found among farmers and artisans (33%) and the smallest among middle and upper-level white collar workers, and civil servants. Although skilled workers and foremen register 28%, they are closely followed by low-level white-collar workers and unskilled labour with 25%. Thus the latter appear to be less inclined to revolutionary action and relatively little reformist and slightly more reactionary than the average voter.

*Level of education* brings to the foreground some cleavages: not very noticeable in the 'revolutionary' category where university graduates hold the lead with 3%, but much more so among the reformists where the group 'secondary and university education' is far ahead with a proportion of 3/4 and that of elementary education all the way at the end with 48%, a percentage very close to that of unskilled workers. Reactionaries are recruited most often (30%) among those voters who have only an elementary education and who make up the most numerically important group with 900 voters.

*Age* reveals very few differences all in all: with 3%, the youngest group, from 20 to 29, has only one per cent more revolutionaries than the other age groups; the heaviest proportion of reformists is concentrated in the three groups from 20 to 49 years of age, the least reformist (43%) and the most reactionary (31%) being persons over 70.

The *reformists* are German or French Swiss in the proportion of almost 2/3 and in the same ratio are Protestants and Catholics who are occasional churchgoers; they are to a great extent (3/4) middle

and upper level white-collar employees, in the liberal professions, and company executives and naturally have a secondary and university education (+3/4); they belong principally to the 29 to 49 year-old age group (about 2/3) and to the group of people who are rather or very interested in politics (almost 3/4); as for their political tendencies, they belong in a proportion of 2/3 to the Republican Movement and to the National Action, to the Radical and Liberal Parties as well as to the Labour and Socialist Parties, Christian Democracy and the Alliance of Independents.

The *reactionaries* are also German and French Swiss (1/4) but an even higher proportion (1/3) is found in the group of farmers, artisans and small business men as well as among those having only an elementary education (30%), of advanced age (31% over seventy) and having no interest in politics; their strongest concentration is seen among the sympathizers of the Evangelical and other parties and of the UCD (formerly PAB).

Although the *revolutionaries* constitute a rather limited group, they are more often French Swiss (3%), atheists or of other religions as well as very practising Catholics; they are found in higher proportion among bureaucrats (4%), but also among the lower white-collar groups and among artisans and small business men (3%); they are most often university graduates, young, from 20 to 29, and are very interested in politics (3%); their highest percentage of 5% is found among the sympathizers of the Labour and Socialist Parties as well as the RM and the NA.

These three types then are seen to be largely dominated by the reformist bloc.

#### A FEDERALIST SOCIETY

##### *Pluralism: cleavages, voter interest and participation*

One of the most widespread ideas about Switzerland concerns its pluralism, its diversity in union. Certainly pluralism with its linguistic, religious, and partisan cleavages is well known and constitutes a fundamental factor of Swiss federalism. There is no need to dwell on this aspect which is revealed by simply consulting the data in the Swiss Statistical Annual. One noticeable trait which characterises this diversity has been pointed out by Lijphardt and by Kerr.<sup>3</sup> The first of

<sup>3</sup> A. Lijphardt, 'Linguistic Fragmentation and Other Dimensions of Cleavage', *AISP*, Montreal, August 1973; H. Kerr, *Switzerland: Social Cleavages and Partisan Conflict*, London and Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1974.

these authors stressed the fact that these cleavages are not superimposed but that they intersect: in fact, the religious cleavage does not coincide with the linguistic frontiers nor with the divisions of political parties. In this way, instead of producing a clearcut division, these intermingled cleavages can be an element of complementarity, even of solidarity, especially if inserted, as in Switzerland, in a federalist structure which respects this pluralism. The reality of a Switzerland built on several levels is reflected in the importance of

TABLE 4  
*Political interest according to fields*

	In which political field are you <i>most</i> interested? (One reply only)		In which of these fields are you generally interested? (Several replies possible)	
	Range		Range	
International affairs	1	29%	3	48%
Federal affairs	3	21%	1	52%
Cantonal affairs	4	7%	4	43%
Communal affairs				
} local		} 29%		
Not interested in anything particularly		16%		22%
Don't know		5%		5%
		100%		multiple choices

different levels of political activity (going from the communal level to the federal), as well as in membership in multiple communities. Denis de Rougemont has already described this pluralism in Swiss society.<sup>4</sup>

Certain data of our survey illuminate this characteristic. Thus, for example, the interest shown by voters in different political fields (Table 4). It is clear that their interest is distributed evenly among

<sup>4</sup> *La Suisse*, pp. 22, 109, 110 csp.

three levels: when the voter must make a choice between different fields and give only a single reply, international affairs come first and cantonal affairs last; on the other hand, when he may give several answers, his interest is divided between all levels with a slight decrease for cantonal affairs. It is not without reason that many writers, led by Denis de Rougemont, affirm that the commune is the basic cell of Swiss federalism. '... The desire to safeguard local independence explains', according to Denis de Rougemont, 'the birth of this community and its profound continuity up to the present. We must go back to these primary facts if we are to explain our civism, our

TABLE 5  
*Importance of elections and of voter participation*

	The most important, which must not be missed		Those which take second place	
	Rank		Rank	
1. Communal elections	1	29%	5	11%
2. Elections to the cantonal Great Council	4	4%	3	14%
3. Elections to the cantonal State Council	5	3%	6	8%
4. Federal Elections	3	17%	2	14%
5. Participation in federal voting	2	25%	1	15%
6. Participation in cantonal voting	6	3%	4	14%
Don't know		19%		24%
Total		100%		100%

more and more conscious adherence to federalist procedures. . .<sup>5</sup> In fact, it appears that interest in communal affairs occupies second place with 22% after international affairs in answers to the first question; when several answers were possible, communal affairs (51%) came immediately after federal affairs (52%). On the other hand, the intermediate or cantonal level seems to be of less interest to the Swiss voters who put it in last place in both cases. Nevertheless, the levels are differentiated and well-marked.

It is also possible to approach the problem from the perspective of elections and referenda as well as by voter participation (Table 5).

<sup>5</sup> *La Suisse*, p. 22.

Communal elections occupy first place ahead of federal referenda and elections. This order is unchanged even when we consider the responses to both questions. Communal elections are followed closely by federal referenda and elections, with cantonal elections and referenda coming behind them with a wider gap.<sup>6</sup>

Tables 5 and 6 tell us about the importance and interest that the Swiss voters accord to public affairs, elections and referenda at the different communal cantonal, and federal levels. Does voter participation confirm this order of preference or importance? Examination of the responses to Question 58 can help us to clarify this point. In fact, voter participation is on the whole higher at the local level than at the federal level. Furthermore, these responses can be compared to the real figures for participation in federal elections, which are 65.7% and 56.9% for 1967 and 1971 respectively. Participation in the

TABLE 6  
*Participation in elections*

Have voted in . . .	Participants			Total	Abstainers
	All	Most	Some	Participants	None
1. Communal elections	30%	22%	17%	69%	18%
2. Cantonal elections					
3. Federal elections	33%	16%	11%	60%	20%

latest elections in 1971 in general corresponds to the responses we obtained, that is 60%, of whom one-sixth claim to have participated in only a few elections. As for the referenda, we can take as an example the last thirty, from 1965 to 1973: the mean participation is 42.2% with the maximum at 74.7% of the eligible voters on the initiative against foreign businesses (7 June 1970) and a minimum of 26.7% on the issue of stabilizing the construction industry and regulating the currency (4 June 1972).

#### *Multiple group memberships or loyalties*

André Siegfried, one of the best observers of Swiss institutions, has

<sup>6</sup> Furthermore the Swiss voter gives more importance to elections at the local level and the two forms taken together – election and referendum – gain in importance at the federal level.



already emphasized the individual's multiple membership in several groups: religious community, 'bourgeois' community, interest groups. According to Denis de Rougemont, this remark 'allows a glimpse of the condition of civic liberties in a federalist regime, and that is simultaneous membership in several groups or communities whose borders are not the same.'<sup>4</sup> Certainly multiple membership exists at the level of activities and interests in all countries that are acquainted with pluralism or polyarchy,<sup>7</sup> that is, about twenty democracies. But it takes a more marked form in Switzerland, as we have just seen, according to the federal, cantonal, or communal level. Furthermore, the importance of professional organizations and other kinds of associations, patriotic, student, sporting – is well recognized. One characteristic trait was suggested by Denis de Rougemont's reflections on the idea of 'the nation' in Switzerland: that author reminds us that the idea of a fatherland is less precise than for their

TABLE 7

Canton of origin	} Canton + region	29%	} 45%
French, German or Italian Swiss		16%	
Swiss		45%	
Others		7%	
Don't know		3%	

neighbours for whom the fatherland is France or Italy. For the Swiss, the world 'fatherland' frequently evokes a more reduced dimension linked to the place where one was born or where one grew up and lived for a long time. This more local 'fatherland' however does not exclude adherence to other, broader communities such as Switzerland.

In question 43, we asked how an individual best defined himself: 'Do you feel yourself to be more a Genevois or Valaisan (etc.), or more like a French Swiss or just Swiss?' (Table 7).

The respondents identified themselves equally with a local region or with Switzerland. It is nevertheless more significant to look at the results obtained by crossing these responses with the mother tongue.

The German Swiss tend to identify most frequently with Switzerland: more than half of our respondents did so. Otherwise they

<sup>7</sup> The term is that of Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971, esp. p. 84.

choose the canton of birth in the same proportion as do the French Swiss. On the other hand, only one-sixth of the respondents consider themselves mostly German Swiss. As they are an overwhelming majority, representing 4/5 of the total population, the Germanic Swiss tend not to consider themselves as a separate entity but to identify themselves with Switzerland. This is not the case for the other Swiss who make up the minorities and who seek to preserve their own identity. In fact the Italian Swiss as much as the French Swiss – the latter to a higher degree – identify with a canton or a region. Although the Italian Swiss have the highest percentage (38%) of those who chose their canton of birth, the French Swiss also declare themselves *Suisse romands* to a considerable degree (29%). In addition, for 60% of the French Swiss the feelings of belonging are

TABLE 8

Canton of origin	French, German or Italian Swiss		Identification	Swiss	Total
			Canton + region		
German	31% (392)	16% (196)	47% (588)	53% (659)	100% (1245)
French	31% (97)	29% (93)	60% (190)	40% (125)	100% (315)
Italian	38% (30)	14% (11)	52% (41)	48% (37)	100% (78)

localized at the cantonal or regional level, only 40% of them thinking of themselves as mostly Swiss in contrast to 53% of the German Swiss and even 48% of the Italian Swiss. Identification is a differentiated idea or sentiment, manifesting ties at different levels which are not exclusive. A Genevois or Valaisan, while giving preference to his local region, is not less attached to French Switzerland or the Swiss nation. It follows then that these differentiated and non-exclusive ties foster, along with other multiple memberships, the federalist form of organization, that is, several levels of autonomy (Table 8).

Ethnic pluralism poses the problem of cohesion for Switzerland. Indeed, the three principal ethnic groups, German, French, and Italian, which make up Switzerland belong at the same time to three linguistic groups which encircle the country. Of course some people maintain, not without reason, that Switzerland is part of the Euro-

pean cultural complex, but it is still true that the elements of that complex are marked noticeably by their linguistic affinities. From this standpoint, we are right to wonder if the distance between the German Swiss and their Latin compatriots (French and Italian) is not more evident than that which separates each of these linguistic groups from their neighbours with the same language. The question of affinity or proximity may be examined with the help of the following table:

TABLE 9  
*Sympathy of the three linguistic groups towards different ethnic groups*

<i>Respondent</i>		<i>Respondent</i>		<i>Respondent</i>	
German Swiss (N = 1417)	%	French Swiss (N = 387)	%	Italian Swiss (N = 89)	%
German Swiss	37%	French Swiss	50%	Italian Swiss	73%
Protestants	35%	Protestants	38%	Catholics	48%
Catholics	29%	Catholics	35%	Protestants	40%
French Swiss	27%	Italian Swiss	33%	French Swiss	39%
Italian Swiss	26%	French	31%	German Swiss	35%
French	15%	German Swiss	24%	French	25%
Italians	10%	Germans	18%	Italians	24%
Germans	9%	Italians	16%	Germans	17%
Spaniards	8%	Spaniards	14%	Spaniards	12%

Although all groups give preference to their own linguistic group, it is significant to observe that Catholics and Protestants are high on the scale with scores between 29 and 40%. These results also confirm the high level of tolerance which characterizes Swiss society. Behind them come the French Swiss and the Italians and then the German-speaking Swiss. Nevertheless, it should be noted that compared with their French-speaking compatriots, the German-speaking Swiss with their score of 24%, are behind the French who scored 31%. With the one exception, sympathy for compatriots belonging to other linguistic groups is higher on the scale than that shown to other ethnic groups in spite of the attraction exercised by the larger neighbours. Thus Switzerland exhibits a certain affective cohesion reinforced by long years of common habits, traditions, and cohabitation. Furthermore, these various factors fit into a normative, institutional framework as well as of an atmosphere of general satisfaction.

### A HAPPY, SATISFIED PEOPLE

#### *Satisfaction: general and socio-political scale*

The happiness<sup>8</sup> and satisfaction of the Swiss have been the subject of many works among which are those of Denis de Rougemont and Luc Boltanski.<sup>9</sup> And so it is natural that we should ask questions designed to help us appreciate the degree of satisfaction felt by Swiss voters. Thus, for example, Questions 4 and 5 measure the satisfaction about income and work:

TABLE 10  
*Economic satisfaction*

Degree of satisfaction		Housing	Income	Work
Satisfied	very satisfied	32%	14%	27%
	quite satisfied	41%	46%	41%
	satisfied	17%	25%	14%
		90%	85%	82%
Dissatisfied	Not very satisfied	6%	10%	4%
	Not at all satisfied	3%	3%	1%
		9%	13%	5%
Don't know		1%	2%	13%*

\* 11% of which do not work

It appears from Table 10 that the proportion of satisfied people is high in all three areas and that it varies from 90 to 82%. Certainly the proportion of those satisfied with their work is lower, but it is this same area which shows the fewest discontented and which also includes 11% of those who do not work.

While a great majority are contented, the persons surveyed did not therefore consider that the distribution of income or opportunity was equitable in Switzerland. As for the distribution of wealth (Q. 34), opinion was divided between yes and no, while it was negative on the question of opportunities afforded by the government (Table 11).

Besides these questions pertaining to socio-economic satisfaction,

<sup>8</sup> See my *Présentation des premiers résultats de l'enquête suisse*, 1974.

<sup>9</sup> Luc Boltanski, *Le Bonheur suisse*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1966.

TABLE II  
Distribution of income and of opportunity<sup>1</sup>

Distribution of income		Opportunities	
Fair	40.5%	Fair	31%
Unfair	40.3%	Unfair	56.2%
Don't know	19.2%	Don't know	12.8%

<sup>1</sup> The questions are formulated as follows: Q. 34: if you compare what you earn with what is earned by people in other social degrees in our country, do you think that income distribution is fair or unfair in Switzerland? Q. 84: Do you think that the people who govern us give an equal opportunity to everyone, or do you think that they pay more attention to important people?

TABLE 12  
Criteria of appreciation and perception of government

Categories of replies	Appreciation of the political system Q. 87	Satisfied with the government Q. 14	Confidence in the government Q. 84	The federal authorities take care of your problems Q. 15
Positive replies	Very good 11% Quite good 54.5%	Very satisfied 12.3% Fairly satisfied 56.2%	Always 10.5% Most of the time 54.2%	A lot 5.3% Enough 41.5%
	65.5%	68.5%	64.7%	46.8%
More or less negative replies	Tolerable 25% Not very good 3% 28%	Not very satisfied 20.9%	With reservations 24.9%	Little 30.3%
Negative replies	Bad 1%	Not at all satisfied 2.6%	Never 1.1%	Not at all 6.9%
No answer	Don't know 5%	Don't know 8%	Don't know 9.3%	Don't know 16%

we wanted to know what the attitude of the voters was with regard to the political system and to the Swiss government (Table 12).

As a general rule, we observe (see Table 13) that the structure of the replies is quite similar. In fact if we consider that 'tolerable' may be classed in a more or less negative category, the replies may be ranked in three groups: positive group with 2/3 of the responses; an intermediary group comprised of the sceptical or slightly negative opinions which oscillates between 1/4 and 1/5; and finally the negative group which represents a minority with 1 to 7%.

This table shows us furthermore that the Swiss appear to be satisfied with their political system: only 1% consider it bad; 3% not very good and 25% tolerable. On the whole, the opinion they express on the way in which their government governs the country is

TABLE 13  
General scale of satisfaction

Categories	Those who work		Those who do not work	
I. Satisfied	47.7 + + + +		32.6 + + +	
	86.4%		67.4%	
II. Neutrals	38.7 - + + +		34.8 - + +	
	10.8% - - + +			
III. Dissatisfied	2.8% - - - +		32.6% 27.4 - - +	
	- - - -		5.2 - - - -	
Total	100% N = 1320*		100% N = 135	

also largely positive: in fact more than two-thirds declare themselves very or rather satisfied, 1/5 barely satisfied while only 2.6% consider themselves not at all satisfied. As for the question relating to the confidence felt in the government, it also obtained a majority of positive responses: 1/4 of those interviewed accord the government only a conditional confidence, while only 1% have no confidence at all.

Utilizing these responses, two scales were constructed: one of general satisfaction and the other of satisfaction or of socio-political

support. For the first we used the responses to four questions dealing with income, work, distribution of income and the Swiss political system (Table 13).

In Group I of the category of persons who work, those who declared themselves very or rather satisfied on all four questions or on three of the four are included. In the group of neutrals are those who divided two and two, while in Group III, dissatisfaction was expressed on three or four questions. For those who do not work, the scale has only three variables excluding the question relative to work. Group I is composed of those people satisfied on three or at least two of the variables and Group III of those dissatisfied on at least two variables (27.4%) or on all three (5.2%).

The table needs no commentary; it confirms the high general level of satisfaction which exists in Switzerland.

TABLE 14  
Scale of socio-political satisfaction

I. Satisfied	60.8%	14.4% + + + + +	
		24.1% - + + + +	
		22.3% - - + + +	
II. Neutral	18%	- - - + +	
III. Dissatisfied	21.2%	11.6% - - - - +	
		7.2% - - - - -	
		2.4% - - - - -	
Total	100%	N = 1000*	

\* Number of people working and who have replied to all six questions.

The second, socio-political scale (Table 14) was constructed from six questions: in addition to the two questions already used, there are also four variables touching on the satisfaction with regard to the government (Q. 14 = V. 20), interest shown by the federal authorities in the problem of the citizens (Q. 15 = V. 21), the equality of opportunities granted by them (Q. 84 = V. 226) and the confidence shown them by the voters (Q. 85 = V. 227).

By comparison with the preceding scale, a marked difference appears as to the percentage of satisfied people. In reality, the questions relative to income, housing, and work which give a high degree

of satisfaction do not figure in the socio-political scale. Of the two questions included here, the one relative to the political system results in a high degree of satisfaction due principally to the fact that the responses which considered the political system as tolerable were classed in the 'more or less positive' category. This positive contribution (90.5%) compensates at least in part for the division registered on the question of distribution of income. Moreover, of the four

TABLE 15  
Political system according to incomes

Evaluation of the political system							
Income	v. good	Quite good	Tolerable	not v. good	Bad	Don't know	Total
Very satisfied	57 21%	147 54%	44 16%	4 2%	2 1%	14 5%	268 100%
Quite satisfied	98 11%	514 58%	211 24%	26 3%	2 0%	30 3%	881 100%
Satisfied	39 8%	239 50%	156 33%	15 3%	3 1%	26 5%	478 100%
Not very satisfied	8 4%	109 57%	46 24%	13 7%	8 4%	8 4%	192 100%
Not at all satisfied	4 8%	22 43%	13 25%	5 10%	0 0	7 14%	51 100%
Don't know	4 13%	10 33%	7 23%	0 0	3 10%	5 17%	29 100%
Total	211	1046	479	63	19	90	1908

supplementary questions, three of them show a level of satisfaction of 2/3 while the fourth pertaining to the opportunities afforded by the government to citizens obtains a negative result (56.2%). It is not astonishing that, in view of these responses, the level of persons responding positively to most of the six questions is lower and is situated at about 60%. The neutrals and dissatisfied are divided almost equally in the remaining 40%.

*Satisfaction and the political system*

We now turn to the examination of the relationship between income, political system and fundamental attitudes (Tables 15 and 16).

Those who are satisfied with their income are also those who for the most part consider the political system to be very good or good enough. It is surprising to see that the favourable majority opinion is held also by those who are not altogether satisfied (61%), even

TABLE 16  
*Fundamental attitudes in relation to income*

Income	Revolutionaries	Reformists	Reactionary conservatives	No opinion	Total
Very satisfied	1%	177 65%	74 22%	19 7%	272 100%
Quite satisfied	11 1%	567 64%	189 21%	155 13%	882 100%
Satisfied	11 2%	245 51%	133 28%	91 19%	480 100%
Not very satisfied	7 4%	104 54%	53 28%	28 15%	192 100%
Very dissatisfied	3 6%	24 48%	9 18%	14 28%	60 100%
Don't know	3 10%	15 50%	3 10%	9 30%	30 100%
Total	37	1132	461	276	1906

those who are not at all satisfied (51%). Nevertheless, it is in these two categories that the proportion of those who consider it not very good is the largest; on the other hand, the greatest proportion of those who think that it is bad is to be found among the respondents who do not know whether they are satisfied with their income or who are not altogether satisfied. Thus, we conclude that if a relation does indeed exist between income and political system, it is far from being perfect, since the majority of the dissatisfied consider the political system to be good.

The revolutionaries or the 'antis' (see Table 17) are recruited in slightly greater proportion from among the dissatisfied as well as from among those who gave no opinion. On the other hand, it is those who are most satisfied or quite satisfied who are most often in favour of progressive reforms. The idea of reform gathers a proportion of more than 50% from among the most satisfied and not very satisfied. It is these same people who provide proportionally the

TABLE 17  
*Fundamental attitudes towards the political system*

Evaluation of the political system	Revolutionaries	Reformists	Reactionary conservatives	No opinion	Total
Very good	1 0%	107 51%	77 36%	26 12%	211 100%
Quite good	9 1%	668 64%	255 24%	114 11%	1046 100%
Passable	16 3%	288 60%	95 20%	78 16%	477 100%
Not very good	7 11%	36 57%	14 22%	6 16%	63 100%
Bad	4 21%	11 58%	2 11%	2 11%	19 100%
Don't know	-	22 24%	21 23%	47 52%	90 100%
Total	37	1132	464	273	1908

greatest number of defenders of our society against all the subversive forces; they are closely followed by those who are very satisfied with their incomes. The degree of satisfaction with income is associated, although not always very clearly, with the fundamental attitudes.

It is evident that the voters who consider the political system as very good are also those most inclined (36%) to defend our society; half of this group are for reforms and only one person in 211 is in favour of revolutionary action. Those who consider it rather good or

tolerable have a majority of two-thirds for reform and between 24% and 20% respectively for the defence of society. Although the number of revolutionaries is highest among those who consider the system tolerable their proportion is highest in the category 'bad' followed by the 'not very good'. Examination of this table allows us to confirm what was foreseen intuitively: the better one judges the political system to be, the more one seeks to defend it and the less one is disposed to change it radically; conversely, the worse one considers it, the more one has a tendency to advocate radical change through revolutionary acts. This relationship exists but the fact remains that Swiss society is only rarely considered bad and that it contains a very small number of revolutionaries. The great majority declare themselves in favour of progressive amelioration by means of reform.

*Comparison with countries of the European Community and with the United States*

It is very interesting to compare these results with those of other Western countries. Unfortunately we do not have at our disposal identical questions: in the countries of the European Community and in the United States the comparable question is concerned with the functioning of democracy.

In order not to give Switzerland an advantage, we decided to rank the replies of 'tolerable' in the negative category and to align them with the 'rather dissatisfied'. In spite of the reduction in the degree of support, the comparative Table 18 unequivocally displays the high level of satisfaction and support which is characteristic of Switzerland. In fact, in the classification of countries according to the degree of political satisfaction, Switzerland is in first place with 66% and 68%. It also registers the lowest percentage of dissatisfaction, that is 29% and 24%. In comparison, two countries, the United States (before Watergate) and Belgium, obtain scores of 65% and 62%; three countries, Ireland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands are situated between 55% and 52%; after that come four countries in decreasing order: Denmark 45%, Western Germany 44%, Great Britain 44% and France 41%. Finally, at the end of the line comes Italy where only 27% of the people declare themselves very or rather satisfied with the way in which the democracy of their country functions.

Inversely, dissatisfaction increases from the Swiss mean of 26% and reaches the impressive figure of 72% in Italy. Between these two extremes are inserted, on the one hand, the six countries in which

the degree of dissatisfaction is lower than 50%, going from 32% for Belgium to 46% for France; and on the other hand, three other countries (Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain), where the percentage oscillates between 53 and 55%. The situation is slightly different if we consider only the category of those who are not at all satisfied. Between the same extremes – 3% or 4% for Switzerland and 30% for Italy – the three Benelux countries (9–10%) and Germany (11%) come first; then France and Ireland with 16%, the United States and Denmark with 18% and Great Britain with 20%.

It would be of interest to examine the relationship between the high or low level of satisfaction or of dissatisfaction and the actual functioning of the democratic systems. We will limit ourselves however to a simple statement: at first sight, a high degree of dissatisfaction goes with crises and political difficulties; this seems to be the case in Italy, in Great Britain and in Denmark with Germany the exception. Conversely, in the Benelux countries the proportion of those who think that their democracy is functioning well is high, both in the Netherlands and in Belgium, in spite of a certain periodicity in governmental crises. Without trying to go more deeply into this observation, we shall be content with remarking that the variation among the nine countries of the European Community is rather accentuated and that, furthermore, in that scale Switzerland generally is in the lead.

The peoples most satisfied with the way their political system is functioning are not necessarily the ones that are most satisfied with their incomes. The Danes, for example, rank only fifth in political satisfaction, but they are the second most satisfied with their incomes. The Swiss, however, rank first in both respects. Interestingly enough, public opinion in the four relatively large nations ranks lower than that of the smaller nations in *both* types of satisfaction.

*Conclusions*

The first results of our survey confirm the image of Switzerland as a peaceful society which rejects the use of violence. This rejection is particularly apparent among the French Swiss (73%) and among civil servants, executives, members of the liberal professions and managerial classes (70%); it is least high among the farmers (49%). On the other hand, the use of violence is most often justified by those who have a university education and who constitute only a narrow segment of our sample (5%) and who at the same time register a high degree of rejection (64%); they are followed by the followers of the

TABLE 18  
Comparison between political and economic satisfaction

Satisfaction	Countries									
	Switzerland	Belgium	Ireland	Holland	Denmark	Germany	G.B.	France	Italy	
Political satisfaction (PS)	67% (1)	62% (2)	55% (3)	52% (4)	45% (5)	44% (6)	44% (7)	41% (8)	27% (9)	
Economic satisfaction according to income (ES)	85% (1)	75% (4)	61% (5)	79% (3)	80% (2)	58% (6)	57% (7)	52% (8)	45% (9)	
ES - PS =	18%	13%	6%	27%	35%	14%	13%	11%	16%	

Source: *Enquête Suisse, 1972*, Department of Political Science, University of Geneva.  
*Enquête de 1973*, Commission of the European Community, Brussels.

UCD (19%), by young voters (17%), the Labour Party and the Socialist Party (15%) as well as by unskilled workers (15%) and by farmers (14%) who make up the greater part of the membership of those parties.

The Swiss are also little inclined to resort to demonstrations, strikes and acts of disobedience (13 to 33%). Even strikes have a very low figure of approval (7 to 13%) which may be explained by the social peace which has reigned for almost half a century.

A large majority, or 2/3 of those surveyed, say they are in favour of reform, 1/4 are for the defence of the present society, revolutionaries forming a mini-group of only 2%. The reformists are as likely to be German Swiss as French Swiss (2/3). They come from the high and middle income levels, from the liberal professions (3/4) and have received both secondary and university education (+3/4). They are to be found in different political sympathies with the exception of the Evangelical Parties and the UCD where they number only one-half. Reactionaries and conservatives are most concentrated in the groups of farmers, artisans and the small business men (1/3), those with little education and the elderly (31%). Finally, the revolutionaries, although they form a marginal group, are found in highest proportions among the civil servants (4%) as well as among the French Swiss (3%) and among the very devout Catholics; they are most often college graduates, young, and very interested in politics (3%); they are most often enlisted in the Labour Party, the Socialist Party, as well as in the RM and the NA. The followers of the latter form a cluster of 'regressive revolutionaries'.

Swiss federalism has two sides: the marked pluralism makes for linguistic and regional cleavages as well as for multiple group memberships. To take one example, interest in politics is distributed evenly among international, federal, and local (cantonal or communal) affairs. This distribution is confirmed by the importance of elections and referenda, as well as by voter participation at the local and federal levels. The Swiss identify themselves equally either with a local region (French Switzerland), or a canton, or with Switzerland. It is the German Swiss who most frequently feel themselves to be Swiss (53%). Conversely, the majority of the French Swiss declare that they belong to a certain region or to a canton. But these differentiated ties are not mutually exclusive.

On the idea of general cohesion, we have shown that although everyone manifests a preference for his own linguistic group, the German and Italian Swiss also give preference to their compatriots

of other languages over their neighbouring countries speaking the same language. The one exception is the French-speaking Swiss who show more sympathy for their French neighbours (31%) than for their German-Swiss compatriots (24%).

The very high economic satisfaction (82 to 90%) is not matched by the ideas held by the Swiss about income distribution: in fact, it seems to them equitable and inequitable in the same proportions; this tendency is noticeable in the majority of negative responses concerning the opportunities afforded by the government which are judged unequal by 56% of the respondents. As for their attitudes towards the system and towards the government, a majority is positive. These conclusions are confirmed by the scales of general satisfaction (86%) and of socio-political satisfaction (61%).

The relationships which can be shown between income, system, and fundamental attitudes are not always clear. Thus it is noteworthy that even those discontented with their income consider the system good by a majority (51%). Moreover, those who consider it bad are not to be found in greatest numbers among the discontented but among those who have no opinion or who are rather dissatisfied. Revolutionaries are found in slightly greater numbers among the discontented than among those who have no opinion. Finally, people who judge the system to be very good are also the most disposed to defend it.

On the whole, the Swiss generally have confidence in those who govern them. Very devout Protestants register a very high level with 81%, as well as the artisans (74%) and people over 70 (72%), civil servants (71%) and university graduates (70%). From the viewpoint of political leanings, the bourgeois parties are at the head with the Radical and Liberal Parties, the parties of the Left with the RM and NA coming last. Quite naturally those people who think the system is good also most often show trust in those who govern; and vice versa, those who consider it not very good or bad accord them very little confidence.

Comparison with other Western democracies demonstrates that Switzerland registers both the highest level of political satisfaction and the highest degree of economic satisfaction.

These principal characteristics of Swiss society which were empirically confirmed by the 1972 survey constitute the foundations of Helvetic democracy. A society at once peaceful, reformist, pluralist,

and federalist, which manifests a high degree of satisfaction, Switzerland has provided itself with political institutions which correspond generally to these traits and reinforce them. Governmental cooperation, compromise and amicable understanding which are its reflection form the traditional pillars on which the Swiss political system rests. Except for certain nuances, most writers are agreed on these fundamental aspects of Switzerland. Similarly, but with some variation, the attitudes of the voters' reproduce, as a general rule, the image that we hold of Swiss democracy. The system rests to a large extent on confidence, consensus, and the seeking of compromise.

Thus the image of the Swiss system which corresponds to many accepted ideas appears to have been internalized by the majority of the Swiss themselves. Their happiness, the high level of auto-satisfaction, and the support given to the system are reflected there. However, these basic elements are not unshakeable principles. Certainly they seem to be the fruit of a long tradition and of habits of co-existence but they are nonetheless exposed to change and subject to diverse influences. The present general contentment could well be weakened by a tenacious inflation, despite the margin of security afforded to the Swiss largely because of their foreign workers. The latter, furthermore, have been the impetus for two referenda (1970 and 1974) which, while they affirmed the positive opinion of the majority of voters, did manage to disturb Swiss tranquility. It is probable that this conflict over foreign workers can be absorbed as so many other conflicts have been, but it is possible that it may be a sign of growing distrust and discontent. The fact remains that in order to interpret the results of our survey, we must not be content with a single view and this research must be pursued over a long period of time. Nor must we too hastily minimize the role of marginal groups who tend to get lost among the greater numbers. Thus the ideal picture of Switzerland which we see must be shaded by constant retouching and continued research.



*John C. Campbell*

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## **European Security after Helsinki: Some American views**

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING AND THE EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its product, the Final Act signed at Helsinki in August 1975, are of sufficient variety to suit anybody's taste. Governments on both sides have hailed the Final Act as a great landmark, the opening of a new era of international relations in Europe based on high principle. Some of the same governments and their spokesmen, mainly on the Eastern side, have also called it the ineluctable result of the changed balance of forces in Europe; and among observers in the West who have agreed with that proposition some have argued that the Soviet Union has by Helsinki prepared the way for the domination or 'Finlandization' of the nations of Western Europe, and that the latter are too stupid or too complaisant or too scared to do anything about it. Then there are those in the West who feel neither satisfaction nor alarm but see the whole negotiation as much ado about nothing, changing neither the existing balance nor the outstanding differences.

The American position has been full of ambiguities. President Ford joined the party at Helsinki, apparently for no stronger reason than that Mr Brezhnev wanted a summit conference and it was hard to say no, but his own speech and the explanations that followed all stressed the point that the United States was not being taken in and would press for compliance with the provisions on humanitarian rights and the free flow of persons and of information. American opinion, which had virtually ignored the CSCE negotiations during their marathon course at Geneva, seemed suddenly to erupt in strong statements pro and con, mostly con. The Ford-Kissinger Administration, already on the defensive because other aspects of detente had turned sour and given ammunition to their critics, appeared to be nettled by the need to defend at some pains a step which they were celebrating as one of detente's great successes.

It may be useful for the benefit of European readers, both in the